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THE CULT OF THE CRETAN CAVES*

By Spyridon N. Marinatos
Professor of Prehistory, Athens University

The oldest civilizations in the world were born in the lands which surround the eastern Mediterranean. In the center of this sea lies the island of Crete, which was the cradle of Minoan culture. This was one of the most splendid of prehistoric civilizations, and the first upon the soil of Europe. The Minoan civilization begins in the early years of the third millennium and ends at about B.C. 1200. The huge palaces, the marvellous wall-paintings and ceramic products, the great fleets (Minos, we are told by ancient writers, was the first ruler of the Mediterranean), and the development of an elaborate system of writing—all these give us a glimpse of a powerful monarchy and of a refined life which existed in the days of the rulers of Knossos.

The religion of this great civilization seems to have been a kind of monotheism in which an omnipotent female goddess was the supreme religious conception. There existed, of course, minor gods and perhaps goddesses, too. It is clear, also, that the Great Goddess appeared in several aspects and functions, for instance as goddess of the sky, of the earth or sea, as house or domestic goddess, etc. A striking feature in Crete, showing a marked contrast to other great civilizations, and especially to that of the later Greek culture, is the absence of temples. In Egypt we have giant granite temples; in Mesopotamia, similarly, we see the construction of huge brick temples and towers, the Ziggurats. In the Hittite Empire we see, too, the ruins of their extensive temples with enclosures, but in Crete existed a cult of miniature art forms. We find only tiny palace chapels and shrines, whose total extent may be no more than fifteen square feet. The Minoans possessed no feeling for the monumental. We have as evidence for this the fact that no large plastic figures have been found in Minoan Crete. The most famous piece of Cretan plastic art, the well-known ivory and gold statuette of the Snake Goddess, in the Boston Museum, is less than seven inches high.

* A lecture delivered at Columbia University, November 10th, 1939, published here without documentation. For a detailed description and bibliography of the Cretan caves known up to 1927, the reader is referred to Martin P. Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion* (Lund, 1927).

Among the cult places of Cretan religion we may mention the tops of mountains and the sacred groves. But the chief characteristic of this religion is the cult of the numerous caves. Crete may be called the classic land of the cave cult. We shall not insist on an explanation of this phenomenon. It may be a reminiscence of the old use of caves as the earliest habitations of semi-barbarous man. It may be that the caves were the common cult-places instead of the missing temples. Or it may be that the Minoans found in deep and dark caves the most suitable places of worship for their great chthonic Goddess, who dwelt in the innermost parts of the earth, whence she could send fertility and prosperity, as well as sterility and terrible earthquakes.

We may assume, that the cult of the Minoan divinities in caves was the chief characteristic of the popular religion. The great Minoan priest-kings and the nobility had their own chapels and house-shrines. It is extremely probable that the curious subterranaean constructions in Cretan palaces, of which the so-called north lustral basin and the basin of the Room of the Throne at Knossos are the best examples, were simply elaborate imitations of the caves. The steps lead down to Mother Earth, where prayers could be better addressed to the great chthonic Goddess.

Centuries and millennia passed by. The great Minoan civilization disappeared. A new era arrived, and a new people, the Dorians, invaded the island. But the cult in the caves persisted. It was so deeply rooted in the country that the Dorians took it over and made it their own religious practice. The ancient Greek writers give more detailed accounts of the cave-cult in Crete than any other achievement of Minoan civilization. Already in the Odyssey, the poet speaks of the famous cave of the goddess Eileithyia, a cave which I myself had the good fortune to explore at Amnisos.

Greek literary tradition is familiar with the Dictaean cave, and also the Idaen cave. Both are connected with the worship of the Κοῦρος Ζεύς (the child Zeus), with his birth and growth, that is, with conceptions which differ completely from the religious conceptions of the Indo-Germanic Zeus, the great god of Heaven, "father of gods and men." Though Greek tradition speaks only of these caves, archeological research has proved that numerous other caves in Crete show traces of the old cult. I, myself, have found and partially investigated no less than a dozen of such caves, some of which lie in the still un-

explored region of western Crete. Thus we can say that almost every considerable cave on the island served as a place of worship, and that in most of these caves the cult continued down to the Greek period.

The cave of Ida, one of the most famous in Crete, is merely a hollow space leading into the rock. The excavation was done by Italians and Greeks, in the very early years of Cretan archeological investigation. The objects found are Greek only, among them being the famous bronze shields, dated from the eighth and ninth centuries B.C. However, a Minoan gem in the museum at Heracleion is reported to have been found in this cave. In the Greek period, the Idean cave was far-famed as the birthplace of Zeus. The cave of Kamares is situated on the opposite side of Mount Ida, on its southern slope, facing the plain of Messara and the palace of Phaestos. Its excavation was very difficult, because, for the greater part of the year, its mouth is blocked by snow. Taramelli examined this cave very superficially in 1894. The British School at Athens undertook a systematic investigation in 1913. The interior of this cave is very imposing. It is divided into a broad upper cave and a lower section, accessible only over a steep sloping rock through a very narrow passage. Offerings were deposited in the little cavities between the great boulders which cover most of the floor. They consisted only of vases. These vessels, which contained milk, honey, perhaps wine, and similar liquids, belong to the best period of Middle Minoan times (about B.C. 1900-1700), and were the first examples of this splendid polychrome style which bears the name "Kamares style." At about the same time such vases were found in Egypt, at Kahun and Harageh, near the pyramid of Senusert II, and in an undisturbed tomb at Abydos. They belonged to the XII dynasty, and so it has been possible to date the Cretan material.

One of the most famous caves in Crete was that of Psychro, excavated by the British School at Athens, and since generally identified with the Dictaean cave, where the oldest Hesiodian tradition localized the birth of Zeus. Like the cave of Kamares, it consists of an upper and a lower grotto. In the upper part stood an altar, near which there were found many Minoan objects, among them the famous inscribed table of offerings, one part of which is now in Oxford and one other in Paris. East of the altar lies a temenos, which contained only Late Minoan and geometric pottery. On the floor of the upper grotto were found, under a thin layer of earth, fragments of pottery, bronze and

iron objects, and ashes. A very steep slope leads to the lower part of the cave, which contains magnificent stalactites. In a thin layer of earth here too, lay numerous objects: a dozen gems, bronze idols, needles, fibulae, double axes, rings, etc. Clay lamps, terra cotta animals and bronze objects such as daggers, little swords, razors, spearheads, and a tiny chariot, were found in different parts of this cave.

During the excavation, which took place, of course, under artificial light, a workman suddenly observed a small offering in the little hollow between two stalactites. Systematic research soon showed that the Minoans deposited their bronze offerings between the stalactites. As stalactites increase in volume from year to year, in many cases the hollows had become too small to permit the removal of the offerings; sometimes the holes were completely closed. The excavators, therefore, broke off the stalactites, and discovered many offerings.

I shall not discuss in detail the question as to whether the cave of Psychro was or was not the legendary birthplace of Zeus. That it was an important cult cave is proved by the fact that the cult persisted here down to the Greek period. Geometric and proto-Corinthian pottery was picked up there, which means that the cave was visited by worshippers till the seventh or sixth century B.C.

Many scholars have examined the question of the Dictaean cave and have proved that only the most eastern part of the mountain-chain of Lassithi was called Dicte. The true Dictaean cave must, therefore, lie more to the east in Crete and has not yet been discovered.

Another question is whether the cave of Psychro can be identified with the cave of Hesiodic tradition. Hesiod speaks of "the cave in the Goat Mountain," (ὄρει ἐν Αἰγαίῳ), near Lyktos, where Zeus was hidden after his birth, by his mother Rhea. The distance between Lyktos and Psychro is about four hours along a steep path, and the scholars say that there can be little doubt that the cave of Psychro is identical with that mentioned by Hesiod. Meanwhile, the problem is complicated by a recent discovery in which I had the opportunity to investigate the richest cave hitherto found in Crete.

At a distance of only an hour's journey from Lyktos lies the cave of Arkalokhori. This was known to contain "old bronze," and there exists a report that many pounds of this metal had been extracted by the peasants and sold to the smiths of the town of Heracleion. Hazzidakis, founder of the Archaeological Society of Heracleion, examined the

cave and found traces of pottery, and a small number of bronze daggers and double axes. Some years ago, peasants were reported to have found some objects of gold there. A new examination of the cave was the result, and I saw at once that the roof of the cave had collapsed in ancient times. What Hazzidakis thought was the whole cave was merely a small part of it. Systematic and dangerous work began, which disclosed that the collapse of the roof of the cave had saved for us the most interesting metal treasures yet found in Crete. Among these were several small votive double axes of gold and silver ornamented with elaborate bands of finely engraved lines, scroll patterns, and bands of drop pendants. On one of the bronze double axes there is an engraved inscription, the script being very similar to that of the famous Discus of Phaestos. On another, a silver double axe, there is a short inscription, this time in the ordinary linear script of class A. This magnificent hoard of offerings belongs as a whole to the transitional period of Middle Minoan III-Late Minoan I, that is, the objects cover the entire sixteenth century B.C.

And now, after these most interesting finds, the question arises: is it not probable that the cave of Zeus according to Hesiod is the cave of Arkalokhori? It is much nearer Lyktos than the cave of Psychro. The hill upon which it lies could easily be the "Goat Mountain" of Hesiod. The offerings show that it was a most venerated shrine. Even after the roof had collapsed, worshippers frequented it and deposited their pious offerings near the entrance. Our excavation showed that not alone there, but upon the whole hillside there are vestiges of pottery, and that there was a settlement here down to at least the sixth century B.C. It is, therefore, quite possible that, at the time of Hesiod, memories of the cave still survived at Lyktos.

Before describing the most interesting of all Cretan sacral caves, a few words are necessary to explain the aniconic cult of stalactites, as revealed to us in that cave, the cave of Eileithyia at Amnisos. We may be sure that the imposing interior of most of the Cretan sacral caves stimulated the religious imagination of the people. Most of the caves are filled with magnificent stalactites and stalagmites, which in the dimness of the caves take fantastic forms, as of human or superhuman creatures. Even today the Cretans believe that in this or that cave there lie petrified nereids or giants or heroes, and that every sort of animal exists there, turned to stone. So it is in Tsikalaria, a

cave in a village near Chanea, so in Acrotiri, near Chanea, also, where a stone concrete in the middle of a cave shows the outlines of a bear. Psychro, already described, has a magnificent series of stalactites. But the most instructive example of the cult of stalactites is that of the cave of Eileithyia at Amnisos. The inner part of this cave is full of stalactites and stalagmites. In the middle of the floor are two stalagmites which lie isolated. They were surrounded by a stone enclosure, testifying to the fact that here a cult existed beyond any reasonable doubt (*Frontispiece*).

Already in a previous paper, (published in *Ephemeris archaiologike*), treating of the excavation of a Middle Minoan house at Messara, I have suggested that in these house-shrines there existed stalactite fragments, taken surely from the sacral caves, exactly as we European Christians take a little earth from the Holy Place at Jerusalem. Indeed, a study carried out at my suggestion by my assistant, Dr. Platon, now director of the Cretan Museum, proves that in almost all the older excavations, such fragments of stalactites were found in houses and palaces, but have not attracted the attention of the excavators. Thus, we are now able to claim that the stalactites of the sacral caves contributed to the developement of the aniconic cult of the Great Goddess. In the darkness of the caves the stalactites took on the forms of supernatural creatures. The scientific explanation of their formation was, of course, unknown to the Minoans, who thought it the result of divine power. The religious imagination was at work then, as it is today. Thus, it was believed that there, in the innermost part of a dark cave, the sacred drama of the birth of a new god took place, that a goat suckled the divine infant, and that the giant Kouretes were its guardians. Considering what happens today in the religious imagination of the Greek people, one can be sure that the Minoans recognized in a stalactite the petrified image of the goat that suckled the boy-god, Zeus. During my excavation of the cave of Amnisos, every visitor saw fantastic pictures in the stalactites. The finds in the cave of Eileithyia were nothing but pottery, as was the case at Kamares. We may conclude, therefore, that the same goddess was worshipped in both places. She was a peaceful divinity, and the offerings were μειλίγματα, that is, mild liquids such as milk, honey, or even wine. We may conclude, too, that, in Psychro and in Arkalokhori, another, a warlike divinity, was adored, as the double-axes, swords, and daggers show.

The pottery of the Eileithyia cave covers a tremendous extent of time. From the earliest appearance of man upon the island down to the fifth or sixth century A.D., no period is missing from the layers in the cave. Neolithic pottery (fourth millennium B.C.) is very abundant, as well as pottery of all periods of the Minoan age. Then we have geometric, early Greek, classic, Roman, and early Christian pottery. No other cult-place in Greece shows a cult of such duration, covering, as it does, four to five millennia. With the cult there persisted, also, into the Greek civilization the strange name of the Minoan goddess. Her cult extended through the Cyclades and the Peloponnesus to the whole of Greece. That the name of the goddess was difficult to Greeks (it shows no less than twenty variations in orthography and pronunciation) is only a proof of its pre-hellenic origin. And when we hear that in Athens, north of the Areopagus, there existed a venerable sanctuary of Eileithyia in which the wooden statue of the goddess was Cretan, and in which was an ex-voto of Phaedra (the daughter of Minos), we recognize that all this is nothing but a reminiscence of that goddess's place of origin. We are told by ancient writers that, down to the Roman period, sailors who landed at Amnisos had to go to the cave dancing a curious special dance, which imitated the complex curves of a labyrinth.

The poet or poets of the Odyssey knew still perfectly well about the famous cave of Eileithyia at Amnisos, and in the Hymnus of Olên, cited by Pausanias, Eileithyia was praised as the oldest goddess of all, mother of Cronos, who is older than Eros. It was the early Christians who succeeded, after great effort, in destroying this persistent cult of Eileithyia in her cave. The breaking off of the two central stalactites in the adyton of the cave can, no doubt, be ascribed to them. But even today the Cretans call this cave the "Grotto of the Nereids," and attribute to it a series of popular beliefs.

We have given a glimpse into the history of Cretan caves, and now we can understand better the old Cretan traditions in the light of these archeological investigations. In a Cretan cave a new-born child first saw the light. Many other gods were later born in caves, such as Hermes, the Greek λόγος. Mithraism, one of the most widespread religions just before the rise of Christianity, taught that Mithras was born in a cave, and he was worshipped in caves. The mystic expression "Θεός ἐκ πέτρας" ("god born out of a stone") is characteristic of Cretan religion and reminds us of the cult of stalagmites.

Perhaps it may be stated here that only in such a way can the birth-mystery of our own religion be understood. In the older gospels, Jesus Christ is not represented as having been born in a cave, but elsewhere. It is only in the last of the synoptic gospels, that of St. Luke, who was a learned man, that the story of the cave of Bethlehem appears for the first time. It contributed, surely, in attracting many people to Christianity, because of the similar Mithraic belief. So we discover in the Cretan cult the earliest prototype of our own Bethlehem. Here on this island, also, there was repeated every nine years an older Moses-story. King Minos went up into the mountain and disappeared for seven days in the dark interior of a sacral cave. He reported to Zeus, his father, the events of his reign. The people waited his return in prayer and fasting and excitement. If the god was satisfied with the king's report, he renewed his powers for another nine years, and gave to the king new legislation. So the laws of Minos were thought of as being of divine origin.

I personally believe that some sort of religious academies existed in the most famous of the Cretan caves, where theological doctrines were taught. Thus we can explain a statement of Philostratos that the famous philosopher, Apollonius of Tyana, visited the cave of Zeus in Crete and heard "*τὰ ἐκεῖ Θεολογούμενα*," the theological doctrines of that site. Pythagoras, according to Porphyrios, spent there a whole month ("three times nine days"). So, too, we may explain the legend of the famous Knossian or Phaestian theologian, Epimenides, who, in the early sixth century B.C., purified the Athenians from the Cylonian guilt. The legend says that Epimenides was a simple ignorant child, who one day visited a cave to sleep. When he awoke, sixty years or so had passed, and his parents were dead. But he was transformed into a wise man whose fame spread all over Greece. In other terms, this meant that Epimenides had spent his life getting a theological education from the priest of an ancient, venerated, Cretan cave.

We may then conclude by repeating what was said at the beginning, that Crete may be thought of as the classical land of the cult of caves; that this old Minoan religious fashion endured for centuries, in various civilizations and religions. The Cretan cave cult is to be recognized today, in the light of recent archeological research, as the origin of one of the most persistent motifs in religious history.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL AGE
A DEMOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION OF THE PERIOD 200-900 A.D.

By J. C. Russell
Associate Professor of History, University of North Carolina

Of all perids of history the age from about A.D. 200 to 900 has been among the least attractive to scholars, and to other readers as well. Its early and great historian, Gibbon, labeled it "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," and the characterization of the period as an age of decline, depression, and therefore of stagnation, has remained with us. Yet it was in precisely this period that the Christian Church became the dominant factor in western culture.[1] The possibility that the long continued depression and depopulation[2] of this period may have been a causative influence in the rise and triumph of Christianity may well be considered.[3]

It is difficult for us to appreciate such an age properly, because we, and nearly all historically minded peoples before us, have been conditioned to a quite different type of culture. We live amid increasing and usually rapidly increasing population, which has seen the rise of a vast material civilization interrupted only by relatively short and exceptional intervals of depression. We have thus learned to think optimistically and hopefully of the future, of "not selling America short," and of the "New Deal." We thus assume as normal conditions the growth of population, the increase of prosperity, and the expansion of opportunity. For us it is difficult to understand, much less to appreciate properly, a world of declining material interests and of lessening population and opportunity. It is even more difficult for us to realize that people in such a world might even regard such a trend as normal

1. In this article we use culture in the sense of "organized human behavior," the anthropological and sociological meaning.

2. For the population of the period see Beloch, "Die Bevölkerung in Altertum," *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, II (1899), pp. 505-14; "Die Bevölkerung Europas in Mittelalter," *ibid.*, III (1900), pp. 405-23; A. P. Usher, "The History of Population and Settlement in Eurasia," *Geographical Review*, XX (1930), pp. 110-32; and my "Medieval Population," *Social Forces*, XV (1937), pp. 503-11. Also see below, note 7.

3. In view of the lack of research upon population as a force in religious development, this study can be presented only as a tentative hypothesis, designed as the basis for further research and discussion.

and desirable, and develop institutions, ideals, and rationalizations suitable for their condition but very different from ours.

We do not realize that we maintain these assumptions in our historical perspective when we approach this age. Even the most ardent supporters of the study of this period are apt to defend it as an epoch which is not as bad as it is usually pictured. They name as its triumphs its pale imitations of the achievements of more prosperous eras such as the Carolingian Renaissance, a feeble revival of Roman intellectual interests. Or they seek there the primitive origins of modern institutions, such as our modern parliaments.[4] All of these are true to some extent, but the outstanding leaders of that era would have stressed the secular less than its ecclesiastical achievements.

This assumes that the period under consideration was predominantly an ecclesiastical age, an assumption which probably few would deny. An age which developed a Church as its greatest institution, the saints as its most revered men, and heresy as its greatest crime, could hardly be regarded as other than an ecclesiastical age. The deepest interests of any age must be sought in the ideals of the men whom it regards as beyond human criticism, in the beliefs so abhorrent to it that its holders are not protected by normal judicial processes, and in the pattern of life that its institutions are designed to preserve.

Basically, then, we have to understand why the European world turned so rapidly away from secular interests to religious interests. Was it that Christianity was so appealing or that changed conditions in the Roman world found in Christianity what it desired? In an excellent summary, Professor Angus has given his explanation of why Christianity won over the mystery and other religions:[5] intolerance, interest in humanity, Christian faith, the Greek Bible, consolation, and an historical leader. It seems clear that the superiority of Christianity would have ensured its future as a great and perhaps dominant religion. Yet we may still believe that demographic and economic factors may have been decisive to secure its quick (as religious changes go) and complete triumph.

4. For a good summary of this interesting historigraphical development see Carl Stephenson, "Taxation and Representation in the Middle Ages," *Haskins Anniversary Essays* (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), pp. 293-96.

5. S. Angus, *The Mystery Religions and Christianity* (New York, 1925), pp. 277-309. I should have stressed the Christian moral standards as one of the greater advantages of the sect.

In this study we shall try to show how the conditions of the Roman world in an age of depopulation and depression[6] produced a material and mental state which demanded a religion of a definite type. Christianity so nearly fitted the necessary pattern, with its ethics, charity, eschatology, and dogmatic certainty, that it was almost swept into a dominant position. However, even Christianity was forced to fit the pattern created by the cultural conditions of the time so that it emphasized ideas present but not prominent in apostolic Christianity—intolerance, celibacy, and monasticism. Resistance to the advance of Christianity varied somewhat in proportion to satisfaction with, or vested interests in, the existing order. We shall consider first, material interests, then mental problems, and institutional developments.

In the second century after Christ, the Roman Empire was enjoying probably the most remarkable peace which the world has yet had, and with it stability and prosperity. By the tenth century this same area exhibited an astonishing degree of economic chaos and depopulation. Between these periods the decline was almost constant except for ephemeral revivals, a decline unparalleled for length and degree. It offers us our best example of what such periods of material decline do to the human race. With the causes of the decline we are not concerned. They constitute the reasons for the "fall of Rome" and are the subject of ever continuing controversy. However, the course of the decline is fairly clear and well understood.[7]

The first signs of the decline were doubtless in the fortunes of those whose interests were at all speculative: builders, sellers of real estate

6. On the relationship of population to economic developments see, for instance, A. Hansen, "Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth," *American Economic Review*, XXIX (1939), pp. 1-15; A. Lösch, "Population Cycles as a Cause of Business Cycles," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LI (1937), pp. 649-62. For the general effect of population upon life and policy see, for instance, H. P. Fairchild, "When the Population Levels Off," *Harpers*, 1056 (1938), pp. 596-602; S. Chase, "Population Going Down," *Atlantic Monthly*, 163 (1939), pp. 183-92. The large literature upon population can be followed in the *Population Index*.

7. On depopulation as a factor in the decline of classical civilization see Otto Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* (Stuttgart, 1921), I, chap. v. Rostovtzeff does not believe that depopulation was a serious factor in the fall of Rome, but some of his references convey the opposite impression. *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 328-30; 478-87, but see pp. 308, 311, 314, 424, 425, 466, 606 and 620. He seems to base his theory upon the increasing population of some cities, notably Timgad (p. 330) which were on the periphery of the empire, in the area which continued increasing latest in population. Tenney Frank never seems to have considered the economic consequences of rising and falling population. *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* (Baltimore, 1940), V, pp. 296-304.

and the like. Cities would cease to grow as they had in the past, although the stagnation would not be so apparent as today, since so many city people lived in what we should consider apartment houses. There was no delicate and dangerous credit structure to start avalanches of economic trouble with each small panic. As commerce declined the merchants would find their markets contract and profits lessen. And with these conditions they would have less with which to patronize the professional men: doctors, lawyers, and teachers. With the civil wars of the third century the decline became more marked.

Later, the Germanic kingdoms substituted for the oppression of a burdensome economic system the rigors of constant local warfare and consequent insecurity of life. With greater decline the effects became more obvious to the eye. The roads deteriorated, the bridges were not replaced, and the aqueducts remained unrepaired. In the cities the area of habitation contracted, while the old houses were pillaged for lime or building material. Depopulation proceeded there more rapidly than in the countryside, where the primitive simplicity and toughness of the agricultural system resisted the decline better. Probably most significant of all was the failure of the people to recuperate as a culture, as has been done at other periods of equally bad conditions: beneath it all there seems to have been a serious demographic fault not as yet understood.

Material conditions seem to have declined first in Italy, in the West,[8] as population had reached its height first there. To some extent we might expect that the developments in Italy would be precursors of those which would appear in the other parts of the western portion of the Empire. Thus we can hardly be surprised to discover that Christianity developed strongly in Rome, at least, and that Rome attained a leadership in the West.

The class most quickly injured by the depopulation and depression would be the urban population, rather than the agricultural populace or the ruling group. Christianity spread rapidly in this urban group and became a city religion. This is peculiar, because Christianity commenced as the religion of the agricultural dwellers of Palestine and might seem quite unsuited for urban religious experience. Although Jewish in origin, it quickly spread among Greek and Roman groups, largely destroying its Jewish connections.

8. See particularly Tenney Frank, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-98; Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 308, 311, 314, 328, 424.

The depopulation and depression tended to increase poverty on a wide scale, making the life of such unfortunates as widows and orphans particularly precarious. A religion which emphasized charity as an essential belief thus would have an especial appeal at the time. Charity was one of the ideals of Christ which the early Church did follow seriously. It was often regarded, however, rather as an act of faith than as an act of social justice: it was better to give than to receive. Thus we find that Christianity was advancing most rapidly in those social areas where depopulation and depression were producing their greatest effect.

The decline of conditions was bound to have a depressing effect upon the spirit of humanity. There developed a certain feebleness which contemporaries diagnosed as indicating senility in the Empire.[9] The human mind had to be adjusted to the new conditions if it was to remain sane and satisfied. Thus we have to inquire what adjustments of mental outlook were necessary to produce peace of mind amid depopulation, depression, and delapidation, with little prospect of anything but increasingly worse economic conditions. That it was done is what we should expect. Sooner or later every group rationalizes its position and finds leaders who will comfort their people by proper explanations of the virtues of their environment. But since these conditions were so different from ours, their reactions could hardly be expected to seem normal to us.

A society which faced a constantly losing struggle against this world might be expected to lose faith in itself, and to seek compensation in the hope of a future life which would offer the delights refused by this life. This loss of confidence showed itself in a turning more and more to the supernatural for help. Prayers at the tombs of the saints were more highly regarded than visits to the doctors.[10] The writings of the saints acquired authority, even in the fields of science. The world became chaotic in the human mind. It then sought relief in the con-

9. Confessions of St. Augustine, V; Sidonius Apollonaris, VIII, letter 6 (ed. Dalton), p. 146. Claudian, War Against Gildo, I, 20 (Lock, ed. I, 100-3), see also *ibid.*, I, 15 (pp. 106-7). This has been commented upon by E. M. Sanford, "Contrasting Views of the Roman Empire," *American Journal of Philology,* LVIII (1937), pp. 454-56.

10. The best collection of information about Merovingian medicine appears in an unpublished thesis by Fay Dwelle, "Medicine in Merovingian and Carolingian Gaul" (University of North Carolina, 1934). Much of the material reappears in L. C. MacKinney, *Early Medieval Medicine* (Baltimore, 1937). Rapidly increasing population might be expected to have the opposite effect of inducing too great confidence in human ability. Perhaps this is the explanation of Christian Science, the product of a rapidly increasing population in nineteenth century United States.

templation of the orderliness of the future world, neatly arranged into heaven, purgatory, and hell and subdivided into smaller divisions.[11]

The shift in orientation appears in the qualities which seemed most desirable in the ideal man. The man embodying the most approved qualities in any age is treated as somewhat more than human, approaching, if not actually attaining, divinity.[12] His exploits are recounted and enlarged upon until they usually attain superhuman proportions in a conventional pattern of biography. Their errors and faults are forgotten or regarded with indulgent amusement.

The placing of the saint in a higher category of value than the higher authorities of state, and even of the Church, presumes a superiority of the next world over this one. He achieved his eminence by his conquest of the forces of this world, its pleasures, its temptations, and its sins. By his achievement he prepared himself for the endless and unlimited pleasures of ascetic satisfaction in heaven. Although often of humble birth and frequently of simple mentality, he attained, in Christian estimation, a place in the celestial hierarchy, worthy of veneration and capable of miracles of healing of mind and body. At the other end of the scale were the enemies of the faith. In Dante's *Inferno* Judas Iscariot shares the lowest depth with Brutus and Cassius.

Even while waiting for the next world, one must live in this one and adjust himself to this one. The human tendency is to accept environment and even to explain why seemingly evil conditions are right and proper after all, perhaps even peculiar to the genius of the people, witness the Slavophil defense of Old Russia, or the Old South's defense of slavery.[13] Thus we might expect that depression and depopulation would operate to produce a rationalization of themselves, until people regarded them as actually good. Clerical celibacy and monasticism may perhaps be regarded as the proper results of depopulation and poverty.

Even in the period of the Empire, feeling in favor of celibacy had become so strong that the Christian emperors had abolished the penal-

11. For a good description of the inverse perspective, see Ernest Brehaut, ed., *An Encyclopedist of the Dark Ages, Isidore of Seville* (New York, 1912), pp. 67-73.

12. The relationship of sanctity and politics has not been carefully studied. For one illustration, see my "Canonization of Opposition to the King in Angevin England," *Haskins Anniversary Essays*, pp. 279-90.

13. W. S. Jenkins, *Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South* (Chapel Hill, 1935).

ties against it in spite of the obvious need for larger families.[14] Then the laity of France and Spain[15] showed its preference for celibate leaders by electing monks rather than secular married clergy as bishops. From this it is clear that celibacy was highly regarded and was forced upon the clergy by popular action. The clergy knew that celibacy was disciplinary rather than moral.[16] To us the difficulty of explaining celibacy as the rationalization of depopulation is chiefly one of believing that any group would adopt the theory that such a decrease of population was good in itself.[17] It implies that no care need be expended to preserve life upon this earth. To us this seems impossible, because we feel that the world is good. If it seemed evil no valid reason would exist for viewing the disappearance of humanity as undesirable. Few persons seem to have gone to this logical extreme, but the Priscillianists moved in that direction.[18]

To chastity, monasticism added poverty as another element in its ideal. In poverty can be seen the effect of the depression of the western world. The emphasis on charity fitted into the same situation in a different way. The monks resigned their property when they entered religion, but little attention was paid to the recipient of the property. It might go to relatives, or possibly in some cases, to the monastery itself. In any case it was the surrender that was important to the monk; his poverty rather than his charity.

Looking at the world in decline we can see that the normal thing was done in creating a vision of a future world and rationalizing upon

14. A list of sumptuary laws prepared by Cicotti appears in *Metron*, IX (1932), pp. 150-51.

15. H. R. Bitterman, "The Beginning of the Struggle between the Regular and the Secular Clergy," *Medieval and Historiographical Essays in Honor of J. W. Thompson*, Ed. Cate and Anderson (Chicago, 1938), p. 25. The celibate communicated before the rest, in the East in the fourth century. L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship* (London, 1927), p. 63. I could find no statement as to the situation in the West.

16. If the passage by Duchesne is typical of second century liturgy in the West, it was not very ascetic. Duchesne, *Christian Worship*, pp. 50-52. Little apostolic authority for demanding a celibate clergy existed. H. C. Lea, *History of Sacerdotal Celibacy* (London, 1907), I, pp. 10-13.

17. If depopulation should increase interest in celibacy, rapid increase in population should have the opposite effect. Perhaps Mormonism's polygamy may have had its source in some such influence.

18. The Priscillianists were much like the Manicheans in their dislike for marriage. Some Christian elements approached the position of actual condemnation of marriage. Lea, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-7.

secular trends. Yet how far away we are from the thought of St. Augustine who wrote sorrowfully of his past life:[19]

> Only I was healthfully distracted and dying, to live; knowing what evil thing I was; and not knowing what good thing I was to be.

The "evil thing" was a life as a good son, a loving husband, a happy father, and a successful teacher. The "good thing" was a life as a monk.

Institutions exist in answer to essential needs of humanity, and in their changes are mirrored the alterations in the fundamental outlook of mankind. Thus, when there is a notable breakup of institutions we may feel that it reflects an underlying change of human interests. When, on the other hand, a great institution emerges and develops contemporaneously with altering material conditions, it seems logical to assume a direct connection between the two. The fall of the Roman Empire in the West and the rise of Christianity thus would show, at the least, evidence of a fundamental change in humanity's interests.

The "fall of Rome" was a spectacular event, so long had the empire dominated the life of the Mediterranean area. Of recent years historians have minimized the sharpness of the fall and have emphasized the elements of continuity.[20] The Roman Empire remained in the East in somewhat altered form, although even there the Arabs wrested vast territories away. In the West, the Latin language persisted as the language of literacy, of commerce, and of other phases of life as well. Roman Law became in part the customary law of western Europe. Even the social customs of the Empire tended to remain. Perhaps the reaction against the old idea has gone far enough. We all agree that society changes gradually, and that there are few catastrophic changes. Nevertheless, in the period under discussion the changes were many and serious.

We often forget that the successive kingdoms of Germanic tribes fell as well as the Empire. Those young and virile nations, springing from the northern forest uncorrupted and virtuous, did not have much more luck than their longer lived predecessor. The Ostrogoths and Vandals flourished less than a century. The Visigoths and Anglo-Saxons did somewhat better in less exposed positions. Even the mighty Franks

19. *Confessions* (Harvard Classics), p. 130.

20. A. Dopsch, *Wirtschaftliche und Soziale Grundlagen der europäischen Kulturentwicklung aus der Zeit von Cäser bis auf Karl der Grossen* (Wien, 1918, 1920).

dissolved into feudal chaos. In short, something more was wrong with the European world than corruption and loss of morale. It could not be restored merely by the substitution of the vigorous Germans for the decadent Romans (even assuming this very doubtful characterization to be true).

Along with these political institutions there disappeared certain phases of human development which were almost institutional: the Greek philosophies, the classical mythologies and ways of life, and even the mystery religions of the East. Much of these persisted as part of the Christian heritage and beliefs, but loyalty to them as separate and distinct entities went the way of loyalty to the Roman Emperor. Men thought that they were changing and were satisfied and even eager to have it so. There was a relatively clean sweep in vast areas of human thought.

If we turn our attention from the picture of the declining culture as seen in its decaying institutions, we find that during this period the Christian Church was becoming a very great institution. Practically supreme by the fifth century in the religious field, it was rooting out religious dissent except among the Jews. In other fields it was securing power, fields which other religions had hardly dared to invade. In the course of its progress it had absorbed much from Jews, mystery cults, Greeks and Romans, yet, when all acknowledgement of borrowing and unconscious imitation has been made, the result must still be viewed as something quite different from the preceding institutions.

The Church was not dependent upon the protection of earlier civilization and had, indeed, suffered from its persecution. At the very time when Roman civilization was on the defensive, Christian missionaries were penetrating beyond the boundaries of the empire into Ireland, Scotland, and distant German and Slavonic lands. Missionary activity of this kind is indicative of a tremendous driving force created by great enthusiasm.

In some ways more astonishing even than the missionary activity was the control over areas of human conduct both of the laity and clergy. The secular hierarchy, as we have seen, was forced largely against its will to become celibate. Great numbers of Christians entered monasteries, voluntarily giving up those family ties which the Romans held so dear. The membership as a whole adopted restrictions upon their diet on certain weekdays and during certain periods of the year.

The laity submitted to the moral guidance of the clergy through confession and penance, and followed a discipline which even the state had seldom ventured to prescribe. All of this restraint and discipline was accepted upon the theory that the Church had the keys to bliss in the future life.

In the course of the centuries the Church acquired a considerable number of duties which had previously been exercised by the state, and people saw little that was incongruous in the theocratic state. By the end of the period of decline of population, the Church had become a structure of tremendous extent and great powers. Yet this was accomplished when the central authority was often weak and sometimes corrupt: in many periods the Church as a whole seems to have set the standard of activity rather than its head.

In many ways the Roman Empire, in spite of its faults, was doing its work well after the end of the civil wars of the third century. Justice was obtainable, order maintained after a fashion, and the roads kept up. Yet population declined and material prosperity waned. Unconsciously perhaps, the people blamed the empire for the depression as rationally or irrationally as Americans blamed Hoover for ours. And with the blame went a loss of confidence and faith in secular institutions. Religion increased in power and influence with its adjustment to poverty and depopulation and its prospect of a happy future life.

Another way of looking at the question of the character of the age of depression and depopulation is to separate its contributions to our civilization and note their distinct qualities.

One contribution was the idea of the Church as a definite institution, separate from and almost equal to the state. Much of our modern freedom has resulted from the ideas of liberty sustained by various churches against the encroachment of the state. The idea of truth as distinct from propaganda for the state has been aided by educational institutions founded by and assisted by churches. Such ideas of the liberties of religious institutions must have sprung from an age in which the state was of less importance than the Church.

With the ideals of supernatural religion has come the belief that there are great spiritual values worth dying for. It has left us with a high estimate of the worth and dignity of the human soul. Clearly akin to this is the great store set upon the unworldly virtues of charity and chastity, together with the stress placed upon poverty, fasting, and in-

difference to worldly success. Countless numbers of people who have failed by material standards have found solace and comfort in the hope of a future world and even satisfaction in religious life here. Since so few can be successful in this world the importance of such ideas to human personality is obvious.

Intellectually, the long experience with depression and depopulation has thus given greater adaptability to the human mind in its adjustment to environment and greater breadth to human culture. Man had plumbed the depths of collective despair and had learned new concepts of human values. Our present culture is the product of two great eras of increasing population and secular civilization, the classical and the modern, and of one era of decreasing population, the medieval. The contributions of the eras stand out with some clearness. If our hypothesis of the unity and direction of the period, A.D. 200-900, as an age of depression and depopulation is accurate, then we ought to view it in a somewhat different perspective from that usually given it. The positive achievements which have so enriched human personality and the culture of our modern world should cause us to shift the focus of our attention from the decline of classical culture to the creation of an ecclesiastical culture.

ON THE FUNCTION OF RELIGION IN CULTURE

By Henry M. Rosenthal

We propose the hypothesis, *Religion is the central art in culture for the control of the emotional system.*

In the following pages we shall seek to explain this hypothesis. We shall do this first by defining its chief terms. In this process, the bearing of the hypothesis on some traditional and current problems of religion will appear incidentally. In a subsequent section we shall then seek to apply the hypothesis to the understanding of such problems more specifically.

PART I

DEFINITIONS

1. *The term, culture.*

We take this term in two fundamental senses, descriptive and positive.

In the descriptive sense, culture means the way people live. Here one adds, in a given society, or in a given area, or in certain other given continuities, as of time. The way people live in Middletown, Melanesia, Mt. Athos, Point Sur, or Ultima Thule, or the Kingdom of Heaven, or in the contemporary world; or the way they lived in Biblical or Periclean times, or in the thirteenth century, is their culture.

The continuities are inter-related, and one generally implies the others. This is obvious in ordinary usage, as when we say Biblical times and imply Palestine; but the matter is not always so obvious.

A culture is thus initially defined by local, temporal, and other continuities. But there are ways of living not necessarily contained within those bounds by which we are guided when we first set out to say what the ways of living are. Noting such ways, we may make an ideal synthesis of elements drawn from various cultures, and speak of it as a universal culture. There need be nothing artificial about such a synthesis, for we can observe actual universalities, especially of a formal or of a moral sort, in almost any culture. It is probable, indeed, that the idea of culture is to a certain extent universalistic in essence, for it is the product of comparative insight and observation.

The other side of the ideal synthesis, however, is that the universal culture will show itself only in concretely differentiated local forms.

Though complete or final description[1] of a culture is impossible, certain key features and stabilities, institutional, ethnic and otherwise, generally enable one to answer with a degree of relevance the question, whose[2] culture? or which culture? or what kind of culture?

Culture, in the positive sense, means the good life, or the way in which people ought to live—what people might do with themselves and their environment in order to live well. This is culture on its moral and ideal side.

That the two senses of the term are not radically separable is clear from the fact that the way in which people live will, under normal circumstances, embody, articulate and reveal, in greater or less degree, their sense of the way they ought to live, the values of their culture, or their conception of the good life.[3] This will not be true under abnormal conditions, as when people, individuals or groups, live under terror, political or otherwise.

Both anthropological and philosophic usages imply both senses of the term. Thus Malinowski, writing on "Culture" in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*,[4] states: "Culture consists of the body of commodities and instruments as well as of customs and bodily or mental habits which work directly or indirectly for the satisfaction of human needs." The emphasis here is descriptive, but the description implies noting the connection between the needs found to be prevailing, including mental, emotional and moral ones, and the modes of satis-

1. Description of a culture amounts to enumeration, classification and characterization of its contents. Complete description is practically impossible, because of the multiplicity and complexity of the contents; and final description is impossible because of the factor of change. Middletown, for instance, must soon enough be characterized as "in transition"; an anthropological field, Melanesia for instance, probably enters into the state of transition as soon as the white investigators arrive; and the countries of Europe as soon as the diplomatic mediators do.

2. This question is the inquiry into the validity and sufficiency of ethnic form as a determinant of sociological form in the broader sense. The ethnic inquiry sometimes narrows down to the "race" question, but it is in no sense identical with the latter. Upon analysis, ethnic form undoubtedly turns out to be a crystallization of other sociological forms—language, history, economy, organization, and biological factors. Whether it is, generally speaking, a primary crystallization may, meanwhile, well remain an open question.

3. When such a conception is applied by a critic standing outside, either actually or theoretically, the given culture, he generally seeks to show its discoverability in the way people live despite themselves.

4. Vol. IV, p. 625.

faction offered. The description would thus contain its own notation of the relation, good or bad, between the ends and means of the particular culture, even if it stopped short, as it would be hard to do, of any obiter dicta about the ends.[5]

Again, for instance, Santayana, writing in the *Life of Reason*[6] says: "... If we use the word life in a eulogistic sense to designate the happy maintenance against the world of some definite ideal interest, we may say with Aristotle that life is reason in operation. The *Life of Reason* will then be a name for that part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals—all conduct so controlled and all sense so interpreted as to perfect natural happiness."

The emphasis here is "eulogistic," that is, moral and ideal; but it is evident that this rational phase of life can only be discriminated out of a wider and more neutral context, which is that of organized human life as a whole. Implicit, therefore, in Santayana's concept of life as a career of reason is the sociological and relatively indifferent concept of culture.

Both sociological and philosophic usages thus converge on the idea of culture as a process of ends and means. But such a process may be fruitfully considered as an art process. This is Santayana's happy thought on the subject of the Life of Reason ("another name for what, in the widest sense of the word, might be called Art"[7]), and we adopt it in our hypothesis about the idea of culture.

Culture is taken as art.

To take culture as art does not prejudice the question in what degree unity and integration exist or should exist in a given culture. It is

5. In a society of head-hunters, for instance, one of the important prevailing needs is the acquisition of human heads. The mental habits which "work directly or indirectly" for the satisfaction of this particular human need are extremely complex, but self-evident in the need; and may be defined tautologically as the mental habits which make head-hunting needful and predispose one toward it. The bodily habits are the general skill in war, and particular skill in severing. Besides this, there are the techniques of drying and shrinking the heads, and the traditions of their proper display.

In a means-and-ends analysis of head-hunting culture, it would have to be considered, for instance, whether the methods of infant care, tribal ceremonies, etc., were really conducive to an efficient ferocity.

6. Vol. I (New York, 1911), p. 3. Cf. p. 4: "The Life of Reason is accordingly neither a mere means nor a mere incident in human progress; it is the total and embodied progress itself. . . ."

7. *The Life of Reason*, I, p. 6. Cf. Professor Irwin Edman's statement of this Aristotelian idea in his Introduction to the Section on "Art," in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, II, pp. 223 f.

clear that they must exist in some minimal degree for a culture to deserve the name; though the kind of unity and integration may change all the time. The quality of unity and integration and, beyond a certain point, the degree to which they should obtain—these are value questions, belonging to the moral and spiritual criticism of cultural ends.

The being an art is a formal requirement of the idea of culture in our hypothesis, but the force of the formality is that all analysis thereby leads to the analysis of values, and to their judgment.[8]

Culture is an art formally; in Santayana's phrase, it is "the sphere of all human art," for a man does not practice culture, but sport, politics, a profession or trade, and religion; and of these some are arts only in the formal sense that they are phases of cultural life and embody processes of ends and means, and others are arts more specifically.[9]

Religion is one of the latter.

2. *The term, art.*

Religion expresses itself through ritual, or cult, as sorrow expresses itself through the contraction—tears, or joy through the spasm—laughter. Ritual, cult, or worship is the physiology of religion, as essential to it, or from the "behaviorist" point of view, as identical with it, as the physiology of the human spiritual style, joy or sorrow, is with that style. As tears or laughter may be inordinate or restrained, natural or theatrical, come easily or hard, and as one may weep or rejoice in apparent silence or immobility, or, contrariwise, in the feverish chopping of wood, so ritual is of infinite structural and procedural variety. Since even tears and laughter may intermingle, and one may as soon double up with grief as with excessive amusement,

8. In the expression of Professor Tillich, and with something of the sociological, emotional and metaphysical implications of his use of the term, matters shift to the field of "decision." But analysis of values does not confine itself to the purely theoretical, or propositional, implications arising from social trends. Analysis of values is of means or instrumentalities too; i.e., of institutional arrangements and practices, and whether they justify the end.

9. Differences between the general, or formal, and the specific senses of the term art are brought out in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, I, pp. 69 ff., and in Professor Edman's article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, previously cited. A partial conspectus of historical variations in the use of the term is given in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (11th Edition), II, pp. 657 ff., especially p. 659. The term is metaphysically grounded in chapter IX of Professor Dewey's *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, 1925).

it is no surprise to find that "all religious rituals are a jumble, and the same act is performed for opposite reasons."[10]

Cult, like the church itself, is both cult visible and cult invisible, and we should not be surprised to find that the same quantitative relations prevail here as in other natural phenomena, for instance the iceberg, which shows only a relative splinter of itself above water.

If it is necessary to distinguish between the terms cult, ritual, and worship, we may say that cult is properly reserved as the term comprehensive, to include both the visible and invisible phases of the matter; ritual is the visible side of cult; and worship is the self-conscious, or the theological, phase of ritual.

Again as in the case of the iceberg, it is cult invisible which is far the more potent or dangerous, as many a moral crisis and shipwreck bears abundant witness. But this metaphor illuminates only one side of the matter, for cult invisible is also the root of the flower, or of the tree; and indeed it is indistinguishable, in the ultimate, from the soil itself, or from the realms of matter and spirit from which all blessings flow. But as soil is of a particular chemical composition and yields particular fruit, so even cult invisible is, in the first instance at least, of a particular invisibility, and adumbrated in a particular art.

The ritual side of religion is its true "mystery," as bread is the true mystery of appetite and hunger, and smiling is the true mystery of joy. This truth is conveyed by orthodox doctrine in its theory of sacraments,[11] as in the language used to describe them. A less lyric language than that of orthodoxy would say that bread and water are brute facts of organic life. Continuing the thought, we may say that religion is a brute *form* of cultural life, and that cult, or ritual, is the brute *form* of religion. We conclude, then, that religion is the true mystery of culture.

The question why, that is, why cultural life should have universally developed forms of ritual to express the non-ritual, such as God or freedom or immortality, or all three of these and many others, this question is a proper one, but metaphysical. It asks, in effect, why phenomena of style or of spirit or of meaning should be habitually or characteristically associated with the changes of time and space that

10. E. W. Hopkins, *Origin and Evolution of Religion* (New Haven, 1923), p. 97.

11. Cf., however, Maurice Zundel, *The Splendour of the Liturgy* (New York, 1939), p. 15, ". . . every object nevertheless is or may become sacramental. . . ."

in individuals we call soma, in history, law, in visible nature, things, and in culture, arts. The metaphysical answer to such a question consists in the further rendering of the relations between matter and style, fact and value, substance, impulse and pattern. It would be no surprise to discover, as has been done before, by Aristotle, for instance, that form is both more essential and more dynamic than is commonly supposed. If we should then be driven to conclude, as from a certain point of view we might, that God himself is, like ritual, a manner of form or pattern, we need not make the mistake of saying that ritual, or worship, is God; for this would be an old idolatry, to ignore the differences between, while recognizing the essentiality of, forms. Ritual, whatever higher or lower forms of divinity or diabolism it may serve, is the central pattern assumed by the emotional system in culture.

Ritual is a pattern, but a pattern of activity, intimately and vitally connected with and leading to other activities.[12] If we wish to characterize the quality and kind of this activity, we must say that ritual is disinterested activity.

We use disinterested to cover the meanings: non-technological,[13] indirect, symbolical, and enjoyable for its own sake. It also refers to the fact that the interests which operate in ritual activity—as in the slaughter of a bull in the temple, or in the Quaker period of silence,

12. Cf. W. T. Bush, "Concerning the Concept of Pattern," in the *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVII, no. 5, Feb. 29, 1940.

Cf., also, E. W. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 180. "Its [ritual's] great primitive importance is more than religious, for it established an intimate relation between religion and non-religious acts."

The literature abounds in expressions of emphasis on the action significance of ritual, as of religion in general. We cite, first, from Hopkins, p. 223. "Religion consists, says the worshipper of Rama, in worshipping Rama, not in defining him; in loving God, not in explaining his inexplicable nature. Let the scientist and philosopher discuss and explain; religion expresses itself in devout feeling and right living, not in mental exercises." Cf. H. Bergson, *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (New York, 1935), p. 190. "History is knowledge, religion is mainly action. . . ." Also, R. R. Marret, article on "Ritual," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (11th ed.), XXIII, p. 372, "There are signs that the religious consciousness has at length come to appreciate the fact that the function of routine in religion as elsewhere is to clear the way for action"; G. F. Moore's summary characterization of religion in *The Birth and Growth of Religion* (New York, 1924), p. 17; and the extreme statement of J. H. Leuba, "God is not known, He is not understood; He is used," quoted in E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (Boston, 1910), p. 314.

13. Cf. Ruth Benedict, article on "Ritual," in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XIII, p. 396. "Ritual . . . is prescribed formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine."

or in preaching—exhibit a striking fusion of orientation toward immediacy and orientation toward ultimacy.

Note that the term "disinterested" implies this fusion, or paradox, of itself, linguistically. In the attitude of disinterestedness there is, first of all, *interest*, and then there is a negation of it or a liberation and disengagement from it. In the performance of the sacrifice, or any other cultic gesture, such as the saying of "Amen," there is no doubt the proximate expectation of reward, even if the reward be no more than a result, like self-satisfaction. This is interest, or immediacy of expectation. (Let us ignore here any possible distinction between conscious and unconscious.) But there is also disengagement from expectation, because there is absorption, whether contemplative or active, in the performance. But since expectation, in a vital organism, cannot be denied but only displaced or postponed, and in its displacement or postponement tends, by a law of diffusion and recession to become involved with increasingly wider references, it ends by becoming quite ultimate.[14] But in the truly ritual attitude that is where it also begins.

This fusion of immediacy and ultimacy, like all psychological fusions, is necessarily unstable, and tends to break up. When it appears to be swamped by immediacy, one is generally impressed with the "magical" aspect of ritual; when it is dominated by ultimacy, one is impressed with the "sacramental" aspect of ritual, or its purely mystical significance (though sometimes we have merely a case of culturally anachronistic ritual, or one whose original semantic value has become historically remote, and has not been replaced or re-vitalized.)

We may make these further distinctions: the sacramental is truly and primarily immediate with respect to its effects on, or implications in, the emotional system; it is ultimate with respect to further consequences, if any. The magical, on the other hand, is immediate (in its intention, at least) with respect to the further consequences; it is "ultimate"[15] with respect to the emotional system, or, in other words, is only remotely and secondarily concerned with the latter, if at all.

14. As in apocalypse. But when stated prayer ends with the invocation of the absolute and the messianic, as in the Jewish liturgy, it is no doubt oriented toward such a conclusion from the beginning.

15. Or ulterior, which is one of the intermediate stages of ultimacy and helps to illuminate the meaning of the latter, though often contrasted with it. For instance, "one begins by doing a thing not for its own sake, and ends by doing it for its own sake."

But the magical and the sacramental, immediacy and ultimacy, are essential to all ritual as such, and represent the optional poles of its development or disintegration.

It thus follows that the magical and the sacramental are differences in disposition, attitude and meaning, not differences in technique or outer behavior. We may express this also and somewhat otherwise by saying that the difference between the magical and the sacramental is a *moral* one, and not primarily religious, except as religion and morality become one (which is further explicated in the Applications).

It is with art-activity, more than with any other, that ritual shares this quality of disinterestedness. Ritual, or cult, is historically a synthesis of art-techniques.

The emphasis here is on objects and practices which form part of a cult or devotional life, and not on the incidental décor of religion or a religious setting. Thus, the gargoyles of Notre Dame in Paris, or the floral arrangements of a New York pulpit, are arts, sculptural, horticultural and decorative, applied to religion; but they do not primarily illuminate the art-character of religion, except to suggest that religion tends to appropriate to itself an aesthetic environment, even if it be the negative aesthetic, or the aesthetic of the unadorned, as in certain types of temple and the Quaker meeting house.[16] The inversion of the aesthetic is also found in religion, as in some orgiastic rites, or the cultivation of the repulsive in some forms of extreme asceticism.

Public ritual consists (primitively and classically) of dance, pantomime, actual or quasi-dramatic performances, and (today among us[17]) of music, stylized or hieratic gesturing, processional, and the arts of voice and rhetoric.

The traditionally close association of religion with these and other arts has given rise to two kinds of question: (a) a theoretical one as

16. "The bareness of the Meeting House is in itself sacramental . . . ," Evelyn Underhill, *Worship* (New York, 1937), p. 313.

17. Distinctions between contemporary and historical forms of ritual are relative. Thus, the mass is characterizable as "a form of ritual dance by sacred persons" (C. Delisle Burns, article on "Ceremony," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, III, p. 315).

Cf. O. Rank, "But the prime drama of all European art was Christianity itself, at least in its significance as a new ideology of sacrifice, corresponding to the death and rebirth cycle of the ancient world," *Art and Artist* (New York, 1932), pp. 292-93.

In terms of our hypothesis, the "ideology of sacrifice" is itself not confined to religion as such, but is involved in the nature of art (as perhaps of other cultural processes); and the fuller investigation of such ideology would belong to the metaphysics of art, etc.

to origins; and (b) a practical one as to the future of religion, now that the arts have become autonomous activities, and competitively offer "another world, almost as vast and solid as the real one, in which the soul may develop."

We say nothing as to the first question; but as to the second, the envisaged danger seems to rest, in part, upon a misconception, namely, that the arts and ritual are alternative and equivalent activities. For several reasons this does not seem to be so. (a) Participants in ritual are neither creative and expressive artists on the one hand, nor merely auditors and spectators on the other, but something intermediate between the two, and sharing something of both, as the chorus in a Greek play was neither audience nor actor, but partly both. (b) Post-classical and non-primitive[18] ritual seems to evoke the mood and quality of art, but at the same time seems to set bounds to it; apparently invites the aesthetic experience, but at the same time prevents its entire intrusion, or the absorption of ritual into the purely aesthetic. This apparently has to do with, (c) the more highly charged[19] symbolism with which ritual works, and (d) the synthetic character of ritual, which means that its contents, considered as art, are fragmentary and even abortive, when compared with the development they would each have in a purely aesthetic medium. Ritual, in other words, does not take the full musical work, the realized dance form, etc., and lump these together, but rather takes fragments of musical effort, reduced bits of the theatrical mode, etc., and fuses these into a distinctive kind of procedure, which, it would appear, is functionally (as well as formally and technically) different from the procedures of the arts proper. Finally, there may be noted: (e) that ritual is certainly a more rigorous[20] kind of procedure than mere art-enjoyment, on the one

18. In some classical, as well as primitive, situations, art activity and religious activity seem, in some respects, to be identical; e.g., the performances of the Greek plays seem to have been religio-civic rituals. According to our hypothesis, such situations are optimal instances of religion's aesthetic centrality in culture.

19. On the purely structural side, this more highly-charged character of ritual symbolism is illustrated in the general psychoanalytic characterization of symbol, as given in a monograph on *The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences* by Otto Rank and Hans Sachs (New York, 1916). The discussion there contained (pp. 13 ff.), makes, in substance, the following three points about the nature of symbol: (a) that it has concealed meaning; (b) that it has multiple meaning; (c) that it arises by "compromise formation" out of conflicting tendencies.

From our point of view, the more highly charged character of ritual symbolism has to do with its leading-to-action (or involving action) character.

20. Rigorous may be taken to suggest the further meanings of compelling, consequential, momentous, and practical.

hand, and, on the other, is generally a less original and intense kind of experience than art-making, say acting, dancing, painting, or playing a difficult instrument.

The foregoing has dealt mainly with public religion. Its application to the question of personal and private religion is a complex and difficult matter, but only relatively more complex and difficult than the relation of any other phase of a man's public life to the corresponding phase of his private life, for instance, how far and in what ways is a political person's private life, or a musician's, governed by the psychological dynamics of his public operations?

The question is more complex and difficult in the case of religion for two reasons: (a) because religion is a more synthetic kind of practice, and (b) because the more sophisticated or developed religions, or those with pronounced ethical preoccupations, tend toward more deliberate impingement upon the whole range of a person's private life than do the other activities.

The distinct, but organically bound-together, categories of social and individual life have hardly been satisfactorily separated, let alone investigated, and cannot be investigated here. Two points, however, may be made. (a) If a person leads a private life of systematic religious devotions or other kinds of practices, its ritual character is obvious, being no more than a private reproduction or adaptation of public religion.[21] By the same token, its classification as an art permits us to mark its patterned character, and to raise at once the question: what

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At this point, certain of Freud's psychoanalytic conceptions, such as "compulsiveness," "repetition compulsion" (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, [London, 1922]; *Moses and Monotheism*, [New York, 1939]; etc.), and those ideas of "cultural symptom formation" on a macroscopic scale which appear to be the theme of *Civilization and Its Discontents* (New York, 1930), suggest themselves as related.

Psychoanalytic theory of religion has many special premises and a number of special, perhaps conflicting, conclusions. But a good deal of it seems renderable as a commentary, though a penetrating one, on the etymology of the word "religion"; for instance, "from *religere*, to execute painstakingly by means of repeated effort. . . ." (Article on "Religion," by A. Bertholet, in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XIII, p. 228).

If a summary characterization of the Freudian theory of religion is to be ventured, it may be suggested that that theory is an outstanding attempt to investigate the structure and dynamics of cult invisible, without, however, a true understanding of the latter's relation to visible cult, and to art and culture. The relation of religion to culture is, of course, more truly intimated in *Civilization and Its Discontents* than it is described in *The Future of an Illusion* (London, 1928).

21. Cf. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 185. "There is no genetic distinction between celebrations of public and private rites."

good is it? meaning thereby, what is its function, if any, and is the latter capable of realization by such means? (b) Religious ethics, when it is specifically religious in its inspiration and does not fuse into "plain reason and duty" or civic propriety, tends also to exhibit a patterned character which brings it closer to ritual than one would at first suppose. An example of this would be the Jewish system of ethical commandments, which are observed not for "plain reason and duty," but as religious rules of life.

This may be generalized by saying that cult thus includes morals, or, more concretely, that any ethical religion taken seriously tends to become a certain style of life, for instance, puritanism.

3. The term, emotional system.[22]

This term implies, in a certain contrast to Ortega y Gasset,[23] and in agreement with Aristotle, the medieval scholastics, and contemporary psychoanalysts, that man has not only a history but also a nature, which is a historical nature, no doubt; and that this nature, having a fundamental unity, perhaps not demonstrable but discoverable, is classifiable.

The kind of classification will depend, up to a certain point, on the point of view, as when, from the point of view of the gymnast, and assuming the feasibility of generalizing his outlook into a view of

22. A conspectus of the senses in which the term "emotion" is used in current psychology may be found in Warren's *Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 91, with which may be compared an interesting and suggestive exposition of what we take to be the category of emotionality in William H. Sheldon's *Psychology and the Promethean Will* (New York, 1936), pp. 236 ff.; and a valuable definition of the philosophical term "system" by Professor Dewey in Baldwin's *Dictionary*, II, p. 659.

From these references it will be sufficiently evident that no inevitability attaches either to the term "emotional" or to the term "system," in our hypothesis, if these terms be taken independently. But that religion is an art dealing with the emotional system is a necessary logical requirement of *any* theory of religion in culture because it is the definition of the necessary subject-matter of any such theory; and it is this fact which makes the conjunction of the terms in our hypothesis, inevitable. Literary and empirical evidence to the same effect—whether in the literature on the psychology of religion, as reviewed e.g., by T. H. Hughes in his recent *Psychology and Religious Origins* (New York, 1937), or whether in traditional sacred literature (as e.g., in the dictum, "The wages of sin is death"), or whether in actual "field" observation of the way a complex institution like religion works in a given culture—all such evidence would be *verificational* of what from the standpoint of culture theory, and the distinguishing of religion's place in it, is a logical necessity.

23. "Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is . . . history." Essay on "History As a System," in *Philosophy and History: Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer*, Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton, eds. (Oxford, 1936), p. 313.

human nature, bilateral symmetry becomes a category of human nature and its possibilities.

Not all categories of human nature may be rendered as "systems" —though human nature itself undoubtedly is in so far as it is a nature, and not merely a history— for some categories are purely structural, like bilateral symmetry, and definitive only of limits of order or arrangement. The "systems" of human nature are its dynamic categories, those which represent modalities of initiative and response, and the metaphysical implications or qualities of such modes, such as purpose and resistance, clarity or comprehensiveness, understanding and acting, being and changing, etc. The "decimal system," though not generally regarded as such, is near to being a "system" of human nature proper, since it represents a basic mode of human nature in responding to the requirements of enumeration. But human nature is not so rigidly bound that it cannot measure in inches.

The systems of human nature are products of interaction between human nature and the forms and opportunities of cultural life. Among other systems of human nature may be mentioned the system of reason.

It is from the standpoint of culture theory, and of culture taken as art, that the emotional aspect of human nature is definable as a system —that is, a recognizable configuration of relations and possibilities— and locatable as a central category of human nature, in the senses of centrality defined below.[24] It goes without saying that the emotional system, though distinguishable from the rest of human nature, is not separable from it.

Emotions are what is felt without knowing, or what is known with feeling; and the emotional system is the central pattern of feeling or of feeling-knowing which attends, motivates, qualifies action in culture. Love and hate, in other words, make the world go round, and not reflection or efficiency, except as these become, or issue from, powers of love and hate; and love and hate go according to some measure of law, inner and outer, in culture.

The metaphysical status of the emotional system is thus inseparable from the capital metaphysical status of the fact and concept of culture.

The emotional system is the subject-matter and field of operation of religion, as movement is of the dance, sound is of music, etc.

Musically produced sound will obey the laws of acoustical physics,

24. Cf. Otto Rank, *Truth and Reality* (New York, 1936), pp. 72 f.

and artistically produced movement those of mechanics; but neither music nor dance is a branch of physics, and by the same token religion is not a branch of psychology. Nevertheless, the emotional system is renderable in terms of psychological law; psychological law being also biological, etc.

As human nature cannot be understood wholly from within, but takes form from the environment in which it functions and of which, in the larger view, it is a part, so the emotional system is not to be understood as a purely internal structure, but as one that involves the objects, symbols, institutions and other external arrangements and processes through which it expresses itself and functions.

Human nature is a part of man's environment, primarily of his psychological and spiritual environment, as it were, but also of his physical environment, as in the case of a church, a market-place, a law court, and the psycho-physical processes and realities for which these are the culturally convenient symbols and abstractions.

The emotional system is thus also a part of the environment; i.e., of nature; and testimonies about the further constitution of nature may be as reliably drawn from it, as from any other source. They have to be drawn, however, and not imposed.

The emotional system is no more a finality than any other category of nature, human or physical; and, because of its centrality, perhaps rather less than other categories.

One may produce effects, short or long, deep or superficial, on the emotional system by altering the quantity or quality of food—as in starvation induced by military siege or blockade, or as in fasting prescribed by religious observance, or by the manipulation of symbols—a scroll, a cross, or a flag.

Emotionality is a flux; it is when it takes form and begins to be viewable from the standpoint of psychological law[25] that it becomes

25. Psychological law is human behavior viewed from a cause-and-effect standpoint. Psychological cause-and-effect, in any perspective longer than the instantaneous, probably amounts to habit-formation.

Emotional habits would seem to have two aspects: on the one hand their manifest forms, anger, fear, pity, resolution, love, hate, resignation, and so on infinitely; and on the other, their underlying mechanisms, historical and structural. The relations between the two aspects may not be direct and simple; they are certainly complex, and may be inverse, or apparently so. In other words, a historical mechanism of love may suddenly become manifest as operative hate, and presumably, or perhaps, vice versa. Some of these phenomena of complexity and apparent inversion have been formulated by the psychoanalysts as ambivalence, compensation, etc.

an emotional system. Emotional habit-formation, in the broadest sense, is the mechanism of the emotional system, and emotional habits are its contents. The cosmical and metaphysical status of habit, as when the morning stars sing together and the sons of god shout for joy, should not go unnoticed.

The emotional system is, in the first instance, coextensive with cultural life, and for all practical purposes not separable from the latter. Religion separates it primarily.

The emotional system, like any other, relies as much on secondary or symbolic contents as on the primary ones, and sometimes more. Durkheim points out the forgotten commonplace that a soldier may die actually for his flag rather than for his country (as the totem emblem replaces the totem),[26] and Freud has shown how our lives are governed by transference and displacement. A child's first shoe may be bronzed and endure as the effective symbol of the mother's love, long after her feeling for the grown-up person may have changed to one of disappointment and disapproval, or even something stronger.

The symbolism is an important part of the emotional system, though the connection may be loose or strict, depending on circumstances. Changes in one will usually involve changes in the other, though where visible symbolism is concerned, as in institutional arrangements, this may sometimes remain the same, merely changing its meaning, as when the cross may change from the symbol of sacrifice and pity to the symbol of battle. But the symbolism and the behavior go together.

Each individual has his own emotional system, his own organization of drives, tendencies, habit-complexes, his own character. Two individuals may share, roughly speaking, the same set of symbolisms, but with different effects; both may follow the flag, but one with "the red badge of courage" and the other unheroically; both may worship, but one sincerely and the other not; both may consider "blood and soil" as having aspects of the sacred, but the one may draw humanitarian inferences and the other anti-human ones. In other words, in the disposition or use made of the emotional system many determinants enter, constitutional, environmental and philosophic, such as ends

26. *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York, 1915), p. 220. Cf. p. 133, where, "we arrive at the remarkable conclusion *that the images of totemic beings are more sacred than the beings themselves.*"

or values. But this has to do with our term control, which we discuss below.

The individuality of the emotional system does not deny its generality; each man has his own character, but all share in the psychological structure of human nature, which is at one and the same time both stable and fluid, rigid and malleable. It changes as much as it does; though it may be that the more it changes the more it remains the same. Universal reliance upon the techniques of education, persuasion, and propaganda show a universal assumption that it changes in some ways and in some degree; and one change does not rule out the possibility of further change, or of relapse from change.

Like everything else, physique, for instance, and technique, the emotional system shows cultural variation: the Red Indian is traditionally more stoical than the urban white man, the Viking more exploratory and piratical than the Swiss highlander, the Christian perhaps more forgiving than the Shintoist. More precise psychology would therefore be psychology of cultural types,[27] as well as of generally human characteristics; but the existence of the latter would not thereby be denied—it would perhaps be made clearer.

Religion, however, is not psychology and, therefore, does not describe the emotional system, though some of its contents and dynamics are rendered in theology and other forms of religious expression, as in the prophets' and mystics' descriptions of their own experiences, and other more recent accounts (William James).

Religion predicates the existence of the emotional system; it is an art of which the emotional system is the nuclear subject-matter and field of operation. Religion helps to create[28] and organize the emotional system of human nature.

The emotional system is, in the first instance, coextensive with cultural life; economic and technological operations, as well as politics, war and sport, involve the emotional system. In cult and theology, religion isolates crucial elements of the emotional system from their context in the flux of life, and gives them the prominent organization

27. A valuable essay in this direction has recently appeared. See, A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society: The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization* (New York, 1939).

28. Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 230 "[Collective representations] do not confine themselves to revealing the mental state with which they are associated; they aid in creating it." And p. 293, ". . . according to an expression frequently coming to the lips of the natives, the object of the initiation is to make or manufacture men."

and systematic character with which we are familiar in the traditional religious portraits of the human family and men's relations with themselves, with one another, and with other realities.

"Honor thy father and mother, as the Lord thy God commanded thee; that thy days may be long, and that it may go well with thee, upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee."

Lest any suspicion arise that the force of this religious injunction is purely "magical"—that is, non-functional, irrelevant and fallacious—the culture in question adds juridicial sanctions. The law says that if a child strike his parents, or curse them, he is to be stoned. Filial piety, longevity, land tenure, God, law,[29] and institutions of lethality are inextricably bound together; so that, in fulfilment of the task of the expression and organization, as well as the control of the distributed and diffused emotional system, religion is thus radically synthetic. Ritual, as we have seen, is the same.[30]

4. *The term, control.*

When a fire breaks out in a public auditorium, and the head usher or the house-manager springs, in the traditional fashion, to the platform, calls for quiet and gives assurance that the show will go on, and when quiet thereupon momentarily ensues, the situation is said to be under control. What is under control is the possibilities of the situation. It is by no means certain that the show will go on, as the manager well knows, and in most cases it will probably not. But if it turns out that it cannot, the now more relaxed, as well as more alert, audience may be directed to the exits and to the box-office to have their money refunded; and in any case, riot and panic have been averted.

This is the first meaning of control, that the possibilities of the emotional system are organized and brought to expression. In the example given, the desired possibilities of relaxation and alertness combined

29. The disinterested quality of the cultic is not inconsistent with the point noted by Malinowski, in *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York, 1926), pp. 33 f., and, for that matter, familiar enough to students of highly developed religions of law, that ceremonial religious acts sometimes have a legal side (as in Judaism), e.g., in mourning rites which are fulfilments of "obligations" toward other survivors.

30. The concept of the emotional system serves to illuminate and complete the otherwise somewhat puzzling, and frustrated, meaning of certain classic investigations of ritual, such as Van Gennep's *Les Rites de Passage* (Paris, 1909), where the relevance and validity of the analysis are insufficiently apparent, except on the premise that the activities, procedures, and forms described have this inherent subject-matter and field, the emotional system.

are organized and brought into play by the gesture, itself almost ritual, of taking control (or "command") of the situation from the platform. They are organized by the man on the platform, and the organization also takes place in the people of the audience. The real locus of the organization here in question is no doubt between the two.

The same thing holds good for the agricultural fertility rites of classic and so-called primitive cultures. If, for the sake of clarity, we personify ritual in these situations, then what it does in the first instance is take control or command of the emotional possibilities involved—namely, of anxiety and tension, alertness and relaxation, with reference to a perfectly crucial situation of cultural life, that of food-getting.

An immediate consequence, strictly functional—no matter how "secondary" from a logical point of view, is that anxiety is canalized and discharged, tension relaxed, and intellectual, emotional and physical energies released (perhaps also heightened) for the pursuit of the technological procedures.[31]

The question of magic arises. We have seen that the magical attitude, like the sacramental, is an essential component of ritual, being that aspect of the latter in which the inalienable psychic quality of expectation functions proximately, or in the character of objective immediacy. This type of psychic functioning may become relatively institutionalized, that is, its natural or appropriate techniques and patterns of action may become conspicuous, or at least distinguishable, within the larger matrix of a particular art of control. It may even dominate that art, or apparently usurp the whole of it. The religion of that culture then appears to be nothing but magic.

Nevertheless, the functional meaning of magic is a matter of the culture taken as a whole, and more specifically of the emotional system

31. Cf. C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (London, 1933), the chapter on "Archaic Man," pp. 143 ff.

Cf. also Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 216: "But while they [the Australian noisemakers] express it [i.e., the agitation felt], they also strengthen it."

Also, E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose* (London, 1932), p. 259, for the same reasoning applied particularly to the war-dance.

Also, Bertrand Russell's *Power* (New York, 1938), p. 19 ". . . life-boats and fire-brigades, like armies and navies, are constructed for the purpose of meeting dangers. In a certain less immediate sense, this is also true of religious bodies, which exist in part to allay the metaphysical fears that are buried deep in our nature."

For the special functional relevance of "myth" to situations of "sociological strain," see Malinowski's, *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (New York, 1926), pp. 58 f. and (for the distinction between "sociological" and more "metaphysical" myths) pp. 75 f.

peculiar to the culture in question. The pretensions of magic in various cultures will thus be found to differ, as they do.[32] With regard to the claim, implicit or explicit, of "control" over nature, whether prayer, for instance, may get rain or stop war, the following considerations pertain:

(a) The "radical fallacy" of magic—that is, the location of effectiveness where it does not or cannot reside—may be, and presumably has been, progressively eliminated from cultural practice; the "magical" side of religion, however, is not coincident with the perpetuation of that fallacy, but relates rather, (b) to the pan-psychic or spiritist assumptions which may be said to be implicit in the very operation of religion. It is by virtue of such assumptions that a deep or thorough-going religion, it may be said, is compelled to allege the possibility of control over (non-human) nature. (c) So far as this is a scientific question, it is one of psychical research. It need not detain us here. (d) As a philosophic and moral question, a certain re-statement of it is in order, to wit: that the pan-psychic does, indeed, dictate the treatment of nature as a person or a self, but this is in the second instance; and that what it dictates in the first instance is the treatment of the person, or the self, as an *object,* that is, as a system of relations subject to law not self-contained. From the treatment of the self as object to the treatment of the world as person is a road that thorough-going religion tends to travel, but only as from the first to the second instance, and not vice versa. For though that reversal of the order of ideas is no doubt possible, and has happened, it appears to lead, as in pan-psychism or subjectivism run riot, to cultural and moral disorder.

We may then say that religion asserts the possibility of control over nature, but only indirectly[33] and very ultimately.

We may assume that, in many cases, part of the purpose of the agricultural rite is also to induce a certain fatalistic set of mind about the outcome of the planting, etc., which is precarious enough at best. This attitude is, in part, what we mean by the discharge of anxiety. It would appear to be not inimical to efficiency in agriculture, as in

32. Cf. Ruth Benedict, article on "Magic," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* x, pp. 39-43.

33. The relation of religious control to the rest of life may also be stated as a relation of indirectness. In terms of a physical analogy, we may characterize religion as the primary system of psychic *leverage* in cultural life. Psychic leverage, indirection, etc., are related to the disinterested character of ritual, which we have noted above.

other procedures, sport, for instance, and has been found to be of value in the conduct of life generally.[34]

In its generalized form we call this the "discipline and purification of the will," and in the traditional language, resignation, or trust in God, or faith.

We may further illustrate the first meaning of control, that of organization and expression of the possibilities of the emotional system, from the metallurgical arts, as when steel is tempered and hardened without reference to its eventual specific use as a tool; or from general gymnastic, as when the general muscular system is developed, without reference to specific athletic performance. But as a certain type of gymnastic, or a certain type of treatment of steel, in itself delimits the field of possibilities, so the organization and expression of the emotional system involve at once its preparation for use in cultural life.

Another way of saying this is that arts of culture are not mere tools, but contain ends, purposes, values, implicit in their instrumental character.

The transition to cultural life as a whole is all the easier because the emotional system has been, in the first place, constituted of emotional materials contributed by the entire range of cultural life: the family, political and economic life, the arts and recreational life, etc. Control thus means control over, control of, and control for.

A great variety of meanings can be distinguished in the last sense of the term, depending on the values that range in cultural life, or are thrown forward at particular times. It should go without saying that control will partake of the complexity of the emotional system itself, in all its cultural variegation.

One should not take control flatly and obviously, to the effect, for instance, that in an aggressive and war-bent people, the cultic aspects

34. Cf., "A religion of ritual . . . gives rise to well-regulated conduct in at least two ways. It helps insure that the routines of life are carried on in the usual manner, since these routines are tied to the religious calendar. And it gives men's feelings of helplessness and those linked with the changing seasons adequate and orderly social expression. . . . The fact is that when the peasant has been working steadily, and has fulfilled the religious and magical ceremonies which tradition requires, he 'leaves the rest to God,' and waits for the ultimate results to come; the question of more or less skill and efficiency of work has very little importance." From an essay by G. C. Homans, quoted in G. G. Coulton, *Medieval Panorama* (New York, 1938), p. 204.

The incidence of such considerations for the problem of urban religion is suggested in James S. Plant's *Personality and the Cultural Pattern* (New York, 1937), pp. 385 f.

of public life which seem to be serving the aim of bending the emotional system toward war are doing only that. They are also, no doubt, serving, in one degree or another, the aim of neutralizing the fear of death,[35] healing and "saving" the infinite variety of individual traumas among people in a variety of particular ways ("sublimation"),[36] and, in general, by the combined action of stimulation and anesthesia giving people a willingness to live that, under many given circumstances, one would not otherwise credit them with.

Such aspects of control are universal: only the forms vary; the underlying function remains the same. We may sum up that function under the rubric: therapy.

Nature and biology supply the universal occasions, landscape, sea- and skyscape, cataclysm, sex, death and the inner life; and even the abominable religions of the cultures which we abominate are therapeutic with respect to such things, though suicide itself may be conceived as therapeutic too.

But these are moral judgments.

5. The term, central.

This term, last in the order of exposition, is first in the order of ideas. Religion is a centrality before it is an art; as an art it is first and foremost a central art; and it is only when we have first recognized it as a centrality that we may then more strictly characterize it as an art-centrality, and an emotional and a controlling one.

Centrality means pervasiveness.

What is pervasive in cultural life is the emotional system, and the art by which the latter is controlled will accordingly reflect that pervasiveness; that is, it will touch cultural life at many points, with co-extensiveness as the optimal limit, as in Bergson's "closed society," or the Jewish theocracy, or Calvin's, or the City of God.

The distinction between the "sacred" and the "profane" is not thereby annihilated, but becomes formal,[37] a principle of criticism and a guide to all right living, rather than a distinction between differently but equally relevant and appropriate kinds of life.

Religion then tends to become absorbed into cultural life, but the

35. Cf. Bergson, *Two Sources*, p. 112.

36. Cf. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, p. 42.

37. Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 318, on the tendency of the sacred and the profane to "flow into" one another, which is why it is all the more necessary, he says, to make an absolute formal separation between them.

latter itself takes on a special character; it takes on the character of the continuously and pervasively *cultic*. Thus, the saints of the City of God spend all of their time in contemplation, adoration and plainsong; the lives of many types of "primitives" are hedged about with many religious and "magical" procedures, which they may or may not find burdensome, depending on their point of view; the Puritan wears a characteristic dress and countenance, according, at least, to caricature; and the Jew who really and truly observes the Law finds everything subject to it.

In many, if not all, traditional religions this is the implicit ideal; dynamically speaking, it is the implicit tendency, though the extreme or distorted realizations of the ideal are, no doubt, not contemplated; that is to say, the type of cultural life in which this kind of tendency has historically seemed nearly realized would probably be theoretically repudiated by most religions today, and has, perhaps no inevitability. (But that is a question.)

In the poetic reaches of religion the ideal of coextensiveness is refined and etherealized. Cultural life will consist rather of immaculateness and plainsong (the City of God) than of going to the exchange in black suit and dour countenance.

In another, more dynamic, sense, centrality means synthetic or synthesizing.[38] This is a main feature of religion, that it synthesizes various phases of cultural life. We have seen how this is concretely—perhaps too concretely—reflected and expressed in the synthetic character of ritual.

Religion synthesizes various elements of culture having emotional significance (as nearly all potentially have) and renders them into a single, though only more or less unified and integrated, art or insti-

38. It would be a mistake to understand synthesis as mere putting together, and in this connection, Durkheim's statement (*op. cit.*, p. 446) that "all creation if not a mystical operation which escapes science and knowledge, is the product of a synthesis," is much to the point. Following out the implications of Durkheim's view, we may say that religion is thus the most radically creative activity of cultural life. Cf. Otto Rank, *Art and Artist* (New York, 1932), p. xiii.

The synthetic character of religion has been noted by Malinowski, who, however, emphasizes the synthetic (as well as the "derived"), nature of the *needs* which are satisfied in religion. Malinowski's profound grasp of the functional relevance and inevitability of religion appears to have stopped short of an adequate characterization of it as a distinct, even unique, kind of activity.

The fundamentally synthetic nature of religion is implicitly noted several times in H. L. Friess's chapter on "The Dimension of Universality in Religion," in *Essays in Honor of John Dewey* (New York, 1929), pp. 133 ff.

tution.[39] In its continuing operation, religion is synthetic with respect to the rest of culture, and with respect to cultural life as a whole. It is an art for the unification and integration of cultural life as a whole. Religion is an activity of cultural life, and, as such, it is the practice or cultivation of cultural synthesis. But this has its theoretical expression, as in the great theological constructions, or in any man's religious philosophy of life.[40]

Pervasiveness and synthetic quality have both internal (psychological) and external (social or institutional) phases.

On the external side they are represented by the linkages and interrelations between religion as a social institution and specific set of forms and practices and other (non-religious) institutions, forms and practices. This is the institutional aspect of the relations between the sacred and profane, or the sacred and the secular; it is the relation between the cultic and the non-cultic, or new cultic tendencies.

On the internal side, they are represented (and it is a more subtle and complicated affair here) by the psychological attitudes and behavior patterns which, established in the individual by religious beliefs and practices, are carried over into the rest of life.

When pervasiveness and synthetic quality take on socially dynamic significance (for instance, when the problems of ends, or merely of power, become the crucial ones),[41] then they become strategy of position, in cultural life. This is the opportunity indicated by pervasiveness and synthetic power. As an art having the control of the emotional system as its natural end, religion is in a strategic position with respect to other forms of social life. Religion's strategy of position is, however, lonely and unstable. It does not seem to register practically and visibly without alliances.

We may put this in another way by saying that theocracies seem

39. If, or perhaps when, the emotionally significant habits, customs, etc., of a culture constitute its ethos, then religion may be said to be the synthesis of arts whereby a culture cultivates its ethos.

40. On the ideological level this is religion's "ideal synthesis of all that is good" (Santayana), or its organized spiritual insights. "For it is religion that knows how to interpret the casual rationalities in the world and isolate their principle . . . ," *Reason in Religion* (New York, 1928), p. 212.

41. As when the question becomes: behind what particular goods, whether momentary or "permanent," such as peace, or the trans-oceanic planting of the cross, or conquest, shall the whole energy of "cultural" activity be thrown? on behalf of what interest, or to secure whose power shall it be exercised? On the general problem of religion's relation to social power, a suggestive discussion is contributed by Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 f., 50 ff., 108.

to have found it necessary to become also political and economic oligarchies in order to endure. The sacred arm needs the secular in order to make its way.

Historically speaking, neither religion nor the other cultural processes have failed to become aware, sooner or later, of religion's centrality. Such awareness brings in its train certain moral and political problems of the first magnitude.

These problems may be expressed as coming from religion's attempt —at those periods when, in despite of its pervasiveness, it has become relatively segregated and stratified as a distinct, and competitive, cultural institution—to exercise hegemony over cultural life; and contrariwise, as issuing also from the attempt of other social institutions or forces to obtain control of religion and use it for given purposes. These problems individualize themselves as those, for instance, of church and state, religion and education, religion and political movements, religion and social action.[42]

These problems suggest another sense of the term central, the meaning, namely, of decisive—but "decisive" as pertaining to cultural dynamics rather than to cultural goods. It does not necessarily mean "highest," or "best," or "most important," in the Platonic sense of most desirable. These latter meanings can arise only in connection with specific cultural values and goods on behalf of which the "decisiveness" is brought to bear.

The religious factor in culture decides things about the nature and direction of culture in the same way, both positively and negatively, that a tool and its use decide the result of a certain process; because

42. At least, these are the more obvious and dramatic forms of the problem historically, and even today in some places, not only in Europe, because with us, too, the attempt of a church or churches to influence legislation, or control public art and recreational life through censorship, etc., raises questions. Such questions have political significance and are obvious and dramatic in that sense.

Other forms of the question are less obvious and dramatic, but may be more significant. For instance, the increasing autonomy of the arts, and the spread and multiplication of the forms of individual and private self-cultivation (e.g., psychological therapy).

Ritual, as we have seen, is not mere art; nor does art take the place of ritual. But that does not prevent the movies, and sport for that matter, from affecting attendance at public worship.

Thus there are, apparently, forms of cultural life which affect negatively, in some cases almost to the point of their disappearance, the traditional forms of the practice of synthesis. Whether this is, under given circumstances, a net loss or gain, and whether synthesis may not be capable of very different composition from the traditional one—these, of course, are other questions.

the use of that factor—the use of the central art for the control of the emotional system—is involved in every cultural situation of major importance.

Religion in general, or the use made of the emotional system, is decisive in culture; but the specific decisions effected are not the result of religion in general, but of a specific religion and its specific content, new or old.

In sum:

(a) The purpose of our hypothesis is to give a functional definition of religion.

(b) The terms of our hypothesis are dynamically interrelated; that is: (i) though each is a partial clue to the identification of religion in culture, none is an independent criterion or an exhaustive one; and, (ii) the meanings of the terms are in part functions of one another, and will shift accordingly.

For instance, our hypothesis does not say that it is the function of religion in culture to control the emotional system. It says, rather, that the function of religion in culture is the control of the emotional system *centrally*. Etc.

(c) It is the functional focus which unites the terms of the hypothesis in dynamic equilibrium.

Function is here taken in a general sense. The hypothesis itself, as a generalization, represents the ideal tendency of religion in culture. By the same token, it represents ideal tendencies of its subordinate elements, such as, for instance, the tendency of emotional life to become, or to be used as if constituting, a system.

Function is particularized in terms of a given problem or situation. Thus, the forms, nature, and degree of centrality differ with different cultures, as well as the value-significance of centrality. The emotional system changes too. Above all, values or ends change.

Apart from its analytic value, the hypothesis as a whole is prolegomenon to value-formulations, or theology.[43]

(To be concluded in the March number)

43. We take theology to be the necessary mythological language of the social arts, but also the natural end of the social sciences, or, at least, their constant friend and companion. Cf. the recent book of R. S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton, 1939), especially Ch. v.

COMMUNICATIONS

THE APPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD TO ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*

By J. Glenn Gray

Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education

One of the most vexed and most insistent problems of today is the problem of the application of scientific fact and procedure to the sphere of our ethical and social life. Hence the relations, both actually existing and possible, between scientific knowledge and value judgments call urgently for investigation.

The serious crises with which the twentieth century has been almost continually confronted have led many thoughtful people to see therein a rapid deterioration of Western culture. If others are not so pessimistic, all see, at least, that our civilization is suffering from deep-rooted maladies, the nature and cause of which must be determined if their progress is to be checked. Diagnoses of our condition are various, but most thinkers agree in attributing to the phenomenal rise of natural science and its tremendous influence on modern thought a basic cause of these continued cultural crises. The concentration of science on the investigation of a world of facts, they argue, has helped to make us indifferent to, and incompetent in, the investigation of the field of ethics and the social sciences in so far as they relate to values. In the eager search for exact determination of concrete facts, we have neglected to study and to determine values. Today we are confronted with the spectacle of trained specialists in physical science who are unable to distinguish or avoid even the large and simple errors in the moral realm. If modern man is to regain his social and intellectual equilibrium, he must surely find some kind of satisfactory method of applying the discipline of science to the more fundamental

* A digest of four papers and five discussions devoted to this subject in one section of the annual conference of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education (Keuka College, Keuka Park, New York, August 29 to September 4, 1940): "The Relation Between Scientific Knowledge and Value Judgment," Dr. Wolfgang Köhler, Swarthmore College; "What is Empirical Knowledge?" Miss Anne Schlabach, University of Wisconsin; "Scientific and Philosophical Knowledge," Dr. John M. Moore, Hamilton College; "The Applicability of Scientific Method to Social Science and Religion," Dr. Gregory Vlastos, Queen's University, Ontario.

problems of ethics and value judgments in general. He must escape soon from the ethical illiteracy that the long quest for facts has helped to bring about.

Such is the nature of the vital problem of today, in the opinion of many. The solutions proposed, however, are numerous, and not so clearly or exactly determined. Let us briefly consider two rather sharply contrasting solutions, or rather, methods of approach, to the relation of science and value. The first view maintains that a science of ethics is possible, in the sense that there can be an objective determination of ethical values in any cultural situation. This approach holds that the ethical situation is subject to phenomenological investigation and is not inherently dependent upon the experiencing individual. Values are objective, even as facts, and are therefore capable of scientific formulation. It reasons thus: "Human experience is pervaded by hosts of vectors which either issue from the self or, issuing elsewhere, tend to determine the self's actions. Such experienced vectors constitute the basic element of value, value judgments and, more particularly, ethics. Phenomenologically certain situations appear as 'good,' others as 'bad.' If the vectors which issue from the self agree with the direction inherent in a good situation, the quality 'good' spreads into the attitude of the self. If those vectors are opposed to the inherent trend of a good situation, the quality 'bad' is felt in reference to the vectors."[1] These ethical values are inherent in the situation itself, and though not independent of the self, are nevertheless objectively dependable and capable of exact study. The first task of ethics, then, in this view is "to investigate in what sense the goodness or the badness of a situation has a claim to be regarded as *valid* goodness or badness. The validity of ethical goodness or badness seems to depend on the results of this investigation."[2] Because of our great concern with physical facts, this task has not yet been done. But it is possible and urgently needs doing. In the first instance, this primary task of ethics does not strictly refer to an ethical question. It is, rather, a scientific analysis, after all external and non-essential elements have been cleared away, of the essence of an ethical situation. Such essences can be appropriated and known by the application of a strictly scientific method.

1. Köhler.
2. *Idem.*

Such a conviction of the objectivity of values necessarily rejects, as unscientific and logically fallacious, relativistic arguments so common to the modern world. It argues that the relativists, in pointing to the diversity of ethical demands in different cultures, cannot logically assume from this diversity arbitrariness of ethical response or a limitation of objective ethical validity. For what appears as a given situation to us may appear as an entirely different situation to men of primitive tribes, for instance; hence, in this manner, differences as to "situational meanings" are really responsible for variations in ethical attitudes. Furthermore, such relativism overlooks the fact that all tribes and peoples agree about certain fundamental ethical issues, and that agreement among independent civilizations tends to become stronger the more they advance and the more they develop appropriate thought and wisdom.

Against this way of approach to the problem of science and value several objections may be brought. It can be seriously doubted whether the goodness or badness of any event is, in any essential sense, independent of the experiencing individual, the subject. Consequently, relativists would remain convinced that differences of interests on the part of individuals and groups basically affect value-determinations, thus making impossible any independent consideration of the ethical problem apart from the other factors in any cultural situation. If such an objection is valid, there can be no certainty in ethics and other social sciences in the same degree as in natural science. From this viewpoint the question of validity and truth is dependent, to a great extent, on genesis and historical causation, so that all ethical claims have reference only to the conditions of that culture out of which they grow. Though such claims may well be regarded as valid and compulsive in relation to that culture, it is a mistake to believe them universally acceptable or scientifically dependable. Value judgments are, thus, in the sphere of objective relativism, not to be regarded as merely subjective or arbitrary, but also not scientific or universal.

Out of such considerations as these, a second solution or way of approach to our problem is broached. This point of view recognizes a basic difference between the physical and the social sciences, a difference of quality. In the social sciences the human factor—feelings, desires, ideals—is inextricably present and all-important. That factor, however, does not render impossible the application of scientific meth-

od to social and ethical problems. The reason for this is found in the fact that human desires may be predicted and, within limits, directed and canalized. "Though we cannot determine with certainty what men will do in given circumstances, we can predict with certainty that men cannot escape their circumstances." To that extent action is conditioned. The main thesis of this way of approach is "that the domain of social science is the realm of conditioned action."[3]

Such an analysis, moreover, does not exclude any activity from social conditioning. Scientific thinking, too, is conditioned thinking. Scientists cannot purge their minds from the influence of cultural environment. Hence the problem for science and ethics is not to seek to escape such conditioning, not to "clean" the situation as in the first view, but rather to bring about an ideal type of conditioning. To such an end the scientific method applied in the social sphere can aid toward exact analysis of the conditions in our present culture that prevent the realization of an ideal and scientific community. A community providing the right kind of conditioning would be progressive, free, equal, and mutual. In this perspective, the problem of social conditioning involves essentially the relation of novelty and regularity in history—in other terms, that of freedom and determination. This relation is a dialectical one, since novelty does not violate the principle of law, but rather extends it. Novelty is as pervasive a character of reality as regularity, hence freedom and determination can not be mutually exclusive, as so often supposed. The problem is how to conserve and canalize novelty in order to change regularity, how to integrate the two. This is the basic question, in this view, for the social sciences, and in pursuit of the ideal community, where such integration could be effected, the scientific method can be of inestimable service.

Let us pursue the problem raised by these contrasting points of view by reference to the role of philosophy in the world of today. We may raise the question: What is then the proper task of philosophy in the face of scientific fact and scientific method? Does philosophy yield any knowledge distinct from that of the sciences? One thing seems fairly certain. Modern thinkers reject the older philosophies which regarded metaphysics as "the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality." We are agreed that the kind of a priori deductive metaphysics which assumed that the philosopher could possess complete

3. Vlastos.

knowledge of the existential relevance of a set of premises can be of very limited use to us in the solution of our problems. Much more relevant and useful is it to conceive of knowledge in the Baconian terms of human power. Knowledge regarded thus, as an instrument for achieving concrete human ends, makes social and ethical problems "the intimate rather than the accidental concern of science."[4]

Having given up the medieval conception of pure and absolute knowledge and the hope of an a priori deductive metaphysics, what is left for the philosopher to do, how may he set about the task of re-forming moral and social values in the light of modern epistemology? Is he to be a critic of science, analyzing its conclusions, examining its presuppositions? Can he build a critical metaphysics on such lines, "a constructive metaphysics which uses experience as its basis and criterion of relevance, which employs categories and methods similar to those of the sciences, and which claims for its conclusions only a probability proportional to the evidence"?[5] A metaphysics of this sort, built on the use of the experimental method, would regard all knowledge as contextual, "intrinsically related to the problems of inquiry and the procedures used"; not, however, to be regarded as mere intellectual flux, since its objectivity and relative validity are made possible by common language, by shared experience, and by specified scientific procedures. To many, such a critical metaphysics seems possible and highly desirable, because it attempts to co-operate with science in the advancement of knowledge and the clarification thereby of human values.

But will such a modest and cautious metaphysics really solve the problem of the relation of fact and value? Does it provide us with an adequate basis for criticizing our ends and ideals? Is not the philosopher confronted with enormous difficulties, if he is to know all the sciences to such an extent that he can draw philosophical conclusions from his findings? Philosophy regarded as a kind of critical superstructure of the sciences can be almost an impossible ideal. And students may ask if philosophy has not, after all, some other basis, some content of its own beyond that which it appropriates from the sciences. Have not all philosophical systems of the past, fruitful in guidance and in clarification of values, been built on a primary intuition or in-

4. Schlabach
5. Moore.

sight, and not on the basis of a critical, rational analysis? Will not the same be true in the future? If such a conclusion be adopted, the ultimate problem for philosophy is the question of the verifiability and evaluation of these insights. Hence, it may rather be that scientific fact and method need to be brought to philosophy as a means of criticizing philosophical and artistic insight, rather than that philosophy be used as an instrument of criticism in science.

Thus we have arrived again at two divergent conceptions of the function of science and the scientific method in solving our social and ethical problems. Is science to act as a check and control on ideas and values that are largely antecedent to fact and primary in the social world, or is science to be the basis upon which those ideas and values are constructed? This would seem to be a valid formulation of an important problem confronting our society today: to what extent are values cognitive in their nature and to what extent are they independent of fact and cognition? If desirable ideals and values are derivative from fact and rational analysis of fact, then they can be changed and directed by application of the scientific method. If, on the other hand, they are largely non-rational in nature, science can, at best, be a check and participant a posteriori. To summarize the earlier, closely related contrast: If value judgments are objective and intrinsic to the ethical situation, the scientific method can play an inestimable role in determining the validity of the situation as to its ethical content; if, however, values are dependent on, and incident to, individual and group interests, largely non-rational, the role of science is to clarify those relative goods and aid toward a reasoned choice of the better.

There seem to emerge from these considerations three fairly distinct conceptions of the application of scientific method to the social sciences. The first sees the possibility of applying that method directly to value situations in order to determine objectively their validity, in independence of genesis or conditions of time and place. This view would appropriate scientific method directly for use in the realm of values, since it regards them as capable of validation in much the same way as facts are validated. The second point of view tends to regard the scientific method as a necessary check and aid in verification of values, which arise, on the whole, independently of fact and scientific knowledge. In this view, scientific fact is a servant of intuition and insight. The third approach considers science and value as both alike

expressions of the total social situation, hence relative and dependent on the conditioning factors in any given cultural situation. Values arise from facts, and facts in turn are judged from the perspective of values. It sees the application of scientific method in social science as both a critical and a creative force, indispensable in determining which values man can reasonably cherish in any particular society and, at the same time, an aid in bringing such values to actual realization.[6]

6. The foregoing digest reports the discussion which took place in one group at the conference, or "Week of Work," of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education. Another group of participants considered the topic, "Mystic and Moralist," with Dr. E. Harris Harbison, of Princeton University as chairman, and Dr. George La Piana, of Harvard University, as consultant. Papers were presented by Dr. Amos N. Wilder, of Andover Newton Theological School, Dr. Henry E. Allen, of Lafayette College, Dr. Baruch Braunstein, of New York City, Mr. E. McClung Fleming, of the College of the City of New York, and Mr. Howard Thurman, of Howard University. In a third group, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Evelyn Millis Duvall, of Chicago, and Professor Mark L. Entorf, of Cornell University, the discussions considered problems of "Family Relations." The fourth group, with Dr. Victor L. Butterfield, of Wesleyan University, as chairman, and Mr. Raymond Neikirk Wilburn, of St. John's College, as consultant, discussed questions of educational philosophy and policy related to "The Liberal Arts College." Papers and reports were presented by Dr. Butterfield, Mr. Wilburn, Dr. John L. Childs, of Teachers College, Columbia University, and Mr. John W. Nason, of Swarthmore College.

One series of evening lectures, with addresses by Dr. Waldo E. Stephens, of New York City, and Dr. Hans Simons, of the New School of Social Research, considered aspects of the present world crisis and the relation of educators thereto. Other evening addresses, by Miss Leslie Blanchard, of New York City, and Dr. Clarence P. Shedd, of Yale University Divinity School, were directed to the problems of religion in the college of today.

An Introduction to Philo Judaeus. By Erwin R. Goodenough. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. xii + 223 pp. $2.75.

The advance made in Philonic studies in the last thirty years is clearly shown by a comparison of the present volume with the Introduction, published in 1910 by Norman Bentwich under the title *Philo Judaeus of Alexandria.* Although Bentwich's book contains a good deal of information which is still useful, it hardly touches a number of important aspects of Philo's teaching, particularly his political and mystical doctrine, which Goodenough has managed to present most adequately in brief compass. It must be further stated that Goodenough has been able to correct certain misconceptions and to define more clearly certain obscure issues, as a result of the intensive research in both Hellenistic and early Jewish theology and law that has been carried on by a host of scholars, as well as by Goodenough himself, since the appearance of the earlier Introduction.

In seven chapters Goodenough discusses "Method," "Philo's Writings," "The Political Thinker," "The Jew," "The Philosopher: Metaphysics," "The Philosopher: Man and Ethics," "The Mystic." These are followed by a Bibliographical Note and an Index.

The book is eminently readable. Goodenough has a talent for making ancient thought and institutions come alive. He is very happy in his modern instances, designed to enable the reader to feel his way into a different culture. One illustration of this topical allusiveness occurs on page 160, where, in connection with his discussion of the Greek and Jewish elements in Philo's ethical philosophy, he writes, "Unfortunately this Jewish feeling cannot be isolated and documented; into notes whose pitch and scale follow the Greek modes have come new overtones and rhythm which make the song Jewish, just as a negress singing 'You Take the High Road' in 'swing' makes the Scottish ballad almost as true a product of the negro spirit as is 'Ol' Man River.' " Before singling out for notice some of the excellent passages, the reviewer must call attention to the general excellence of the chapters on metaphysics and mysticism. It would be difficult for any scholar to state so clearly, accurately and eloquently, and in such brief form, the essential points of Philo's thought in these fields.

The reviewer believes that the following passages in the book are deserving of special notice as formulations of a correct approach to Philo. Page 16—"We disagree sharply among ourselves about details, but agree that the basic departure of Philo from normative Judaism lies in the fact that he took to his heart the pagan idea of salvation." Pages 19 ff.—"Völker's essential error is his consistent adherence to the *a priore* assumption that there can be no real religious spirit or motivation, certainly none that could appeal to a Jew, in pagan religiosity." Page 62—"The 'key' to understanding Philo will at last appear to be not his Judaism, his mysticism, his Stoicism, his Platonism, or any of the other aspects of the man, but the man himself." Page 66—"The spirit of Roman rule is most closely represented in modern times by fascism, for Augustus and his successors were fascist rulers in the sense that there was no constitutional warrant for their authority." Page 81—"The only excuse for peering through the screen to get glimpses of the Philo of everyday life is that Philo is so extraordinarily interesting, and that it is good to remind ourselves that the true Philo of most of his writings is really the super-Philo." Page 112—"True he does come nearer to calling the mystical apprehension the 'higher' apprehension that he does the Jewish, and he would lead the Jews of the inner circle into increasing apprehension of the abstract Being of God. But the fact was that as a Jew and man of everyday experience he needed the personal loving God, and as a thinker and mystic he needed the other." Page 148—"In all of Philo's approach to purely philosophical problems there is great indifference to consistency." The reviewer is glad to note that, on pages 204 ff., Goodenough corrects the impression given to some readers by his earlier work that he believed Philo to belong to a group practicing mystical rites outside of the traditional Jewish ones; he now writes, "That mystic Jews had distinct rites of their own, distinct initiations, to which even Jews must be specially admitted, there is no evidence whatever to support. . . . If mystic Judaism made use of rites, it would have used Jewish rites, suffused, indeed transformed, with pagan ideology, but externally as unchanged as was Philo's Pentateuch."

There are, of course, a number of statements in the book which the reviewer thinks debatable, misleading or plainly incorrect. Page 60—Goodenough is wrong in saying that, in his treatise *On the Indestructibility of the World*, Philo "argues that the physical world could neither have been created nor ever perish." Philo argues here that the

world is imperishable but was created. Page 93—Goodenough thinks that the Jews were opposed to the divine cult of the Roman emperors for "politico-religious" reasons, rather than the purely religious reason that this cult was a violation of their laws against idolatry. "The Jew was not asked, be it remembered, to go into pagan temples to venerate the emperor's statue with pagan rites. He was asked to put the image into his own synagogues, and show respect to it in his own fashion." This statement Goodenough himself contradicts on page 101, where he says, "What was at that time the highest symbol of Jewish differentiation, the freedom of the temple from any taint of pagan worship, was to be violated by the erection of a statue of Gaius, as Jupiter, in the very holy of holies. This, Philo realized would be a destruction of the temple more complete than its being torn down." Unless Goodenough is prepared to show that the erection of Gaius' statue in an Alexandrian synagogue involved idolatry to a less extent than its erection in the temple at Jerusalem, the two passages must be considered contradictory. Moreover, his further argument, on page 93, that "hellenized Jews were making the freest use of pagan images in their catacombs and synagogues" entirely overlooks the important distinction made by early rabbinic authorities between representations that seem to them connected with idol worship (*'abodah zarah*) and mere decoration. An image in the round was not mere decoration. Since the emperor's statue was a part of the pagan cult, it was religiously impossible for Jews to erect it in their temple or synagogue. The archeological discoveries of recent times have absolutely no bearing on this particular problem. Whatever political reasons Philo and other individuals had for disliking Roman rule is another matter. Page 98—"The Judaism of the Baruch and Enoch traditions was very different from the Judaism of either the Pharisees or the Sadducees." No doubt there were differences, but the important point is what did the differences amount to; a few more lines of explanation would be welcome. Pages 104-5—"A tendency had arisen in Judaism to surround God with angels who were often more definitely personal than were the gods of Greece and Egypt for thoughtful Greeks." This is misleading. There is no evidence that thoughtful Jews personalized angels to a greater extent than thoughtful Greeks personalized their gods. If Goodenough had been satisfied to compare popular paganism with popular Judaism, his comparison would have been more apt. The context suggests that he includes thoughtful Jews in this "ten-

dency." Page 106—"Philo likewise prayed to Moses." Surely it was an apostrophe rather than a prayer in the sense that an allocution to God is a prayer. Pages 108 ff.—On the subject of Philo's severity and that of contemporary Jews, as well as of Christians later, against pagan respect for images of the gods, much might be said on the other side, but the reviewer hopes to deal with this problem later in a review of E. Bevan's *Holy Images*. Page 162—"To the Greek scheme of social ethics he adapts his Judaism as completely as he made the Greek psychology and metaphysics the core of his personal ethics." The reviewer would alter this to read, "he adapts the Greek scheme of social ethics to his Judaism, etc." Page 184 and note 6—It is a pity that Goodenough did not adduce some evidence for his view that the term "mystery" became as "multifarious in its ancient usage as the term 'science' today." He says that one scholar became convinced that he was right by looking up this and similar words in Liddell-Scott. Most scholars would like a little more source material; there are monographs on these terms. In connection with the author's remark that there is need of a translation into a modern language of the Armenian version of Philo's *Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus*, the reviewer believes that students of Philo may be interested to know that he is preparing an English translation of the Armenian text with partial retroversion into Greek, for the last volume of the Loeb Classical Library Translation of Philo.

One final remark. It is significant of the increasingly friendly relations between Christian and Jewish theologians that Goodenough has dedicated this volume to the staff of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, "who in person demonstrate that Christian Ethic has its source in Judaism."

RALPH MARCUS

Jewish Institute of Religion,
and Columbia University

Philo and the Oral Law: The Philonic Interpretation of Biblical Law in Relation to the Palestinian Halakah. By SAMUEL BELKIN. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940. xi + 292 pp. $3.50.

Among the numerous works published on Philo within the last twenty years, only two of any importance have dealt with the prob-

lems raised by his interpretation of the Mosaic laws in his treatise *De Specialibus Legibus;* these were E. R. Goodenough's *The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt* (1929), and I. Heinemann's *Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung* (1932). Both books sought to advance the discussion beyond the stage reached in the quasi-pioneer study *Philo und die Halacha* (1879), by B. Ritter, who tried to prove that much of Philo's halakah (oral law or interpretation of Mosaic civil and ceremonial laws) disagreed with the contemporary Palestine halakah found in the Tannaite sources, and therefore reflect the decisions of Jewish courts in Alexandria. Ritter, however, gave no convincing solution of several related problems: how far Philo's discussion of the law was merely theoretical and apologetic; whether he was dealing exclusively with the Greek translation of the Bible; to what extent his interpretation agrees with Greco-Roman or Egyptian law against Tannaite halakah. To these problems Goodenough and Heinemann made notable contributions, chiefly by adducing considerable new material from Hellenistic sources. But as both scholars lacked a knowledge of rabbinic jurisprudence comparable with their knowledge of Greco-Roman law and philosophy, they, too, were unsuccessful in giving a final answer to these problems.

Dr. Belkin approaches the task from a more advantageous position. Thanks to the labors of his predecessors, he has had most of the Hellenistic material before him; like them he has the requisite linguistic knowledge to deal with the problem of the relation of Philo's statements to the Hebrew and Greek texts of the Bible; in addition, he has a much more expert knowledge of the rabbinic legal sources and a mastery of the technique necessary to their proper historical and comparative evaluation.

In order to make clear what Belkin's position is in relation to those of his immediate predecessors, the following simplified statement of their respective conclusions may be of use:

Goodenough holds that

(a) Philo's interpretation agrees much more with Greco-Roman than with Palestinian law.

(b) Philo's discussion reflects the practice and decisions of Jewish courts in Egypt, which were forced to modify Jewish law to meet the needs of Diaspora Jewry.

Heinemann holds that

(a) Philo had no first-hand knowledge of Palestinian law, and was much more Greek than Jewish in his interpretation.

(b) His discussion is more theoretical and apologetic than a reflection of actual Jewish legal practice in Egypt.

Belkin holds that

(a) Philo's law is much more Jewish (i.e., Palestinian) than Greco-Roman.

(b) Most of his laws reflect the decisions of Jewish courts in Alexandria.[1]

Before reading Belkin's book, the reviewer was pretty well satisfied that Goodenough was wrong in holding that Philo's interpretation agreed more with Greco-Roman than with Jewish law and that it represents the practice of Jewish courts in Egypt; he also believed that Heinemann was wrong in denying that Philo had any firsthand knowledge of Jewish oral law, but was right in holding that the discussion in the *De Specialibus Legibus* was theoretical and apologetic rather than practical.

Belkin's careful and well-documented analysis has caused the reviewer to change his mind about the last point. Not only has Belkin proved finally and completely, in the reviewer's opinion, that Philo had firsthand knowledge of Palestinian law and in general followed it, but he has also shown, in a more convincing manner than did Goodenough, that at least some of Philo's discussion reflects the practice of Jewish courts in Alexandria, for Belkin has cited evidence from the Talmud to the effect that the Alexandrian legal interpretation differed from the Palestinian in the matter of illegitimacy (p. 239) and bethrothal (pp. 244 ff.). If the Palestinian rabbis themselves recognized the existence of distinct legal traditions in Egypt, it must be admitted that Goodenough and Belkin are right in assuming that Philo's statements of some laws, differing from the Palestinian ruling, must reflect the practice of Jewish courts in Egypt, unless one takes refuge in the tenuous argument that the Jewish interpreters in Egypt were merely theorizing.

1. It may be added that in this volume Belkin refers to a theory published in one of his earlier studies, to the effect that both Philo and Josephus wrote two distinct types of work concerning Jewish law, one apologetic, the other practical; the first type is represented by Philo's *Hypothetica* and Josephus' *Contra Apionem*, the other by Philo's *De Specialibus Legibus* and Josephus' *Antiquities*. With this theory the reviewer is unable to agree, but can not discuss the reasons for disagreement here.

In this connection, however, the reviewer ventures to make one general reservation about Belkin's otherwise seemingly valid conclusions, namely that Belkin perhaps underestimates the theoretical and apologetic elements in the *De Spec. Leg.*, which Heinemann has stressed. The reviewer would therefore propose the following outline of the conclusions which may be drawn from the evidence cited by Goodenough, Heinemann and Belkin:

(a) Philo had firsthand knowledge of Palestinian (oral) law.
(b) His interpretation is much more Jewish than Greco-Roman.
(c) His discussion is partly a reflection of actual practice in Alexandria and partly theoretical and apologetic.

To the last proposition Belkin would probably agree, as he himself recognizes the apologetic character of at least two of Philo's legal statements (pp. 206, 256). He would probably differ with the reviewer as to the proportion of theoretical and practical elements, the former of which the reviewer agrees with Heinemann in regarding as preponderant. For this last assumption there are several bits of evidence: the occasional agreement of Philo's formulation with pagan against Jewish law, where there is at the same time a matter of comparative morality involved; the prominent allegorical and symbolical aspects of *De Spec. Leg.* i and ii, Philo's derivation of laws from the Bible by "remote inference" (cf. Colson's note on *porrōthen* in *De Spec. Leg.* iii.63); Philo's indecision about the form of penalty for some offenses (pp. 144 ff., 257 ff.) which seem to the reviewer not to prove that Philo was referring to actual practice, as Belkin maintains, but, on the contrary, that he was theorizing, since Philo is generally dogmatic whenever an existing institution gives him the opportunity to be so; finally, in the one case where Philo seems to be describing actual legal procedure, he is speaking of Palestinian and not Alexandrian courts, as Belkin himself points out (p. 190). For these reasons the reviewer is still inclined to regard most of the discussion in *De Spec. Leg.* as theoretical and apologetic—even though based on the oral law.

After these remarks it is time to call attention to some of the interesting and useful passages in Belkin's book, a study, incidentally, which will prove extremely valuable, not only to students of Philo and early Judaism, but also to New Testament scholars who are inter-

ested in the legal problems connected with the controversies between Jesus and the Pharisees.

The view expressed (p. 17) that the literalists whom Philo denounced as impious and slanderous are pagans rather than sectarian Jews deserves careful consideration. The author is probably correct in saying (p. 27) that Philo's treatise on the laws was designed for both gentile and Jewish readers, though primarily for the former. The sixfold classification of Jewish groups who differed in their approach to the law (pp. 27-28) is very instructive and probably sound; Belkin enumerates the following groups: (1) Sadducaean literalists, (2) Pharisaic halakists, (3) Alexandrian inconsistent literalists, (4) Palestinian practical allegorists, (5) Alexandrian theoretical and mystical allegorists, (6) "Alexandrian Jews who, like Philo, combined Pharisaic Halakism, allegorism and mysticism." Thoroughly satisfying is the demonstration (pp. 35 ff.) that Philo consulted the Hebrew text of the Bible as well as the Septuagint; Belkin's material, in addition to that offered earlier by other scholars, should settle the matter once and for all; that Philo may have been helped by a more learned Hebraist is quite possible, but it seems to be a fact that he was able to control the LXX text by referring to the Hebrew original. Belkin's objection (p. 106) to Goodenough's assumption that lynching was a common Jewish practice for crimes outside the jurisdiction of Roman courts seems valid, particularly if one regards Philo's discussion of the penalty for poisoning (not mentioned in the Bible) as theoretical rather than practical. The author has an excellent note on the confession of sins in rabbinic Judaism and early Christianity (p. 155). Also excellent is his argument (p. 166) that a pre-Pharisaic tradition is preserved in Philo's statement that only the high priest can fully absolve a person from a vow, and that the Pharisees may have transferred this power from the high priest to a court in the time of Alexander Jannaeus. Belkin also gives plausible explanations of Jesus' criticism of Pharisaic vows in Matt. 23:16 ff. (pp. 168 ff.), of the passage on intermarriage between gentiles and Jews in the Testament of Levi (p. 235, n. 90), and of the story of Mary's bethrothal in Matt. 1:18 (p. 247). His whole discussion of betrothal and of levirate and agnate marriages in Judaea, Galilee and Egypt is enlightening (pp. 243-257).

The following details seem to call for questioning or correction.

Page 75—the discussion of tithes might have included a reference to the article on Demai by Prof. Tchernowitz in *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut*. Page 76, n. 33—there is an incorrect reference to Josephus, *Ant.* xiv, 9:21. Page 100—the passage quoted to indicate Philo's "literal" interpretation of the law of "an eye for an eye" is the opposite of literal. Page 138—the reference to *De Fuga* should be corrected to *De Congressu*. Page 138—the last paragraph is in direct contradiction to the last sentence on page 137 and leaves Belkin's argument obscure. Page 141, n. 9—for "Sheb. 4:15" read "Sheb. 4:13." Page 147, n. 26—for "Yalamdanu" read "Yelammedenu." Page 152—should not the Midrash Pirqe R. Eliezer be described as Tannaite Haggadah rather than as Tannaite Halakah? Page 164—is it accurate to say that the Zadokite Fragment contains "more or less Sadducean ideas"?; according to L. Ginzberg, whose commentary Belkin himself cites elsewhere, the Fragment is Pharisaic in all but one or two points of law. Page 264—Belkin should have given passages to support his differentiation in meaning between Philo's *dia plēgōn* and the LXX *paideusousi*.

The book is unusually well printed and well made. It contains a good index, list of references and bibliography. The author deserves congratulations on an important and useful achievement.

RALPH MARCUS

Jewish Institute of Religion,
and Columbia University

En-Roeh: The Prophecies of Isaiah the Seer with Habakkuk and Nahum. Introduction, Translation and Notes by W. A. WORDSWORTH. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. ix + 512 pp. $6.00.

From the point of view of standardized Old Testament literary and historical criticism, this publication is extremely reactionary. But it is the work of a scholar who knows his Hebrew and the literature involved, and it cannot be dismissed with a mere wave of the hand. Further, biblical critics must be tolerant toward those who differ from them, lest they stifle originality and set up a "tradition" of their own.

Contrary to the prevalent critical view that the Book of Isaiah, as it appears in the original and the various versions, is a composite

work, consisting of the contributions of the historical Isaiah, a Second or Deutero-Isaiah, and a Trito-Isaiah, coming from three distinct epochs of Hebrew history, stretching over a period of about two centuries, the author defends the older and discarded view that it is substantially the composition of one author, namely, that of the historical Isaiah who flourished in the time of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, from about 740-700 B.C. The author adroitly takes advantage of the difference of opinions of critics to push his own theory. So, for instance, accepting Torrey's view of the unity of the Second Isaiah, thus doing away with the Trito-Isaiah, he takes the further reactionary step of claiming the unity of the whole and for the historical Isaiah.

But that Isaiah, chapter forty onward, is of different and later age is founded on arguments that cannot be so lightly gainsaid. It is the result of two generations of painstaking and believing critical scholarship, and based on the cumulative evidence which comes from three independent directions: the historical background which is the Babylonian captivity; the literary style; and chiefly the religious conceptions in which Old Testament prophecy reaches its climax. To account for it, as the author does, as arising from Sennacherib's invasion, even if it be admitted that the name of Cyrus is an interpolation, is utterly inadequate. Not thus can be thrown over what devout scholarship has built on sound foundations. Consequently, the author's depreciating and belittling attitude toward the Deutero-Isaiah theory does not inspire confidence in his judgment on critical questions.

The author is a free lance in biblical exposition. He is fanciful and ingenious, bound by no conventions. He goes his own way, undisturbed by what other competent scholars think. But his novelties are not likely to find acceptance, for instance, his substitution of Yeabe for Jehovah. In it "Yea" is to stand for Jah, and "be," with the accent on it, to convey the sense of the English verb "to be," and together to mean "Indeed-be," which was constantly present to the prophet's mind: "I am, and there is none else." Ingenious, indeed, but too far-fetched and circumlocutory to offer as an acceptable substitute for the well-established Jehovah, however erroneous in its origin, or Yahweh with its various spellings.

Of the same piece is the author's attempt to reconstruct the messianic elements in Isaiah. This appears his major task and involves

his expositions of the Immanuel passages in chapters 7, 8, 9, 11, and the "Servant" passages. Here his fanciful ingenuity is lavish. Accordingly, the author claims, the prophet Isaiah had begun to formulate messianic expectations around the person of King Uzziah, whom he calls the messianic priest-king after the order of Melchizedek. But when Uzziah was struck with leprosy and died, the messianic expectation was dashed to pieces. But now new expectations were revealed to Isaiah, centering in the child of another scion or "branch" of David other than Solomon, namely, that of Nathan, whose family, according to the author, still lived in the ancestral home of Bethlehem. All this is supposed to lie back of Isaiah's vision and call in chapter 6.

"Immanuel" is the messianic child whose birth is given as a sign to Ahaz and who was born in the marriage of Eliezer, the representative of Nathan's line, and the "virgin" or maiden who the author believes was Lo-Ruhamah, the daughter of Hosea. This notion gives a strange sensation to the reviewer, who believes that Lo-Ruhamah of Hosea 1 is a midrash on the symbolic occurrence of the name in chapter 2; and in fact she never existed whom Eliezer married. Be this as it may, the author holds that Ahaz guessed in the messianic child a possible usurper and sought after his life. Hence the prophet could no longer speak openly of his faith, but he kept the secret alive in the hearts of his faithful disciples and provided for its sealing. Nevertheless, "Jeshua-Immanuel, the Christ," lived in Jerusalem until he was carried captive by the Assyrians in B.C. 709. But after the destruction of Sennacherib's army and the rescue of Jerusalem, the prophet's faith in the "Messiah" revived and mounted to greater heights, but only to be dashed to pieces again. For "instead of a speedy fulfilment of the hope, history repeated itself; 'the Messiah' was struck down by leprosy (lii and liii)." But this was only a transition to a sublimer faith in the messianic mission, embodied in the fifty-third chapter, which tells of ignominious death followed by triumphant victory. By omitting "Cyrus" as an interpolation, all the achievements ascribed to this conqueror, including the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Temple (although Sennacherib had not destroyed them, but only shut up Jerusalem "as a bird in a cage"), is now the glorious task of "Yeabe's" "Servant" and "Messiah."

The author writes as a devout Christian, which is, of course, noth-

ing against him. But his interpretation of the messianic element in Isaiah is not objective, but due to his dogmatic prepossessions which he says "is simply the tradition of the Catholic Church." But he does not belong to the old type school of predictionists. He declares that "Prophets did not write history before it happened, but they were men who were spiritually in advance of their times by anything from one to a thousand generations." With this it will not be difficult to agree; but it is questionable whether, in order to believe in Jesus Christ as the fulfiller of prophecy, it is necessary to hold that there must have been someone in Isaiah's day in whom the whole process of our salvation was foreshadowed. It might be quite enough to see him fulfilling prophecy in his conscious and deliberate choice of living up to the highest moral and spiritual ideals of the prophet and embodying them in his self-sacrificing life. Herein also it is possible to see the divine purpose and harmony of the universe.

Of the author's translation of the Hebrew text in general much may be said in praise. He has endeavored to reproduce the original rhythm, even at the expense of making havoc with the English. His endeavor to find paranomasia and play upon words is overdone, but it deserves to be tested one by one. His effort to go back of the Massoretic text to the Septuagint is legitimate; as is also his attempt to improve readings by means of a good guess; but his suspicion of the intentional corruption by the Massorites is also overdone; and his numerous discoveries of hidden Shilo reminds one of Cheyne's Jerahmeel.

The consequences of the author's peculiar view of the prophecies of Isaiah are considerable and far-reaching. Habakkuk's description of Chaldean might is out of place at the time in which the author places the prophet; and Zech. 9-14, which he would make as coming from an older contemporary of Isaiah, is equally out of place in pre-exilic times. The author's suggestion that Uzziah's leprosy originated the book of Job, that the author of Job is the author of parts of Isaiah, and that Isaiah II and the great chapters of Job that correspond with it are, perhaps, in its first form the work of Isaiah's youth, called out by the great tragedy of king Uzziah's leprosy, is based merely upon superficial semblances, but has no foundation in solid and historical facts. The author appears colorblind to the idea of an evolutionary development in biblical ideas, and he speaks slightingly of modern biblical scholarship. But he himself has no vision for the sweeping

movements of historical developments which are the bases of a modern world-view, and he cannot see the woods for the trees.

It is this that will account for the author's employment of obsolete Jewish, medieval, and mystical methods of biblical exegesis. He believes he possesses the key to unlock the hidden inner scripture meanings which others cannot see; and he embodies this presumption in the quotations on the flyleaf: "Thou shalt not come in hither, except thou take away the blind and the lame. . . . The man that is called Jesus made clay and anointed mine eyes and said unto me go to Siloam and wash: so I went away and washed and I received sight. . . . Who is blind but my servant: And deaf as my messenger I send?" It is illustrated also by the author's allusion that Menahem, King Hezekiah's son, was the anticipated messianic king, a rival to Immanuel in the author's opinion. But the identification of Menahem with the Messiah is a Jewish delusion based upon a fanciful exegesis known as Gematria, which saw mystic relations between scriptural words in numerical equivalence, because the letters Zemah, "Branch," and Menahem both alike number 138.

It must appear, therefore, that the author has chosen to pursue an obsolete and fanciful type of scriptural exposition and has produced a book which is a literary curiosity. As such it has its value. It cannot be recommended for propagation of scriptural truth. But it may be placed on library shelves and made use of by the informed, who will find grains of wheat among the chaff of fancy, but who will know how to distinguish between them.

Ismar J. Peritz

Wolcott, N.Y.

The Jewish Contribution to Civilization. Edited by C. A. Stonehill, Jr. With a preface by Stefan Zweig. A collection of books formed and offered by C. A. Stonehill, Ltd. Cheltenham, Glos.: C. A. Stonehill, Ltd., 1940. 198 pp. 93 illustrations. $3.00. (Copies of this catalogue may be obtained in the U.S.A. from C. A. Stonehill, 262 York Street, New Haven, Conn.)

A bookseller's catalogue does not always rank among literary ephemera. It is unlikely, by its very nature, to rank with Shakespeare as "not for an age, but for all time." Still there is a haven, between evanescence and eternity, reserved for the catalogue compiled by a

bookseller with sufficient imagination and scholarship to be inspired by an idea, and to carry it out to its conclusion. Again, such a catalogue must be incomplete. It is not a bibliographer's delight, but a listing of books actually for sale at a given time and place. Years may have gone into the making of the collection; its dispersal may be a matter of days. The determining factor in the acquisition of the books must have been their saleability. A bookseller's catalogue may be limited in scope, but it dare not be limited in appeal.

Assuming these limitations, and accepting their implications, we have at hand an extremely successful and satisfactory example of the type. It has a somewhat over-ambitious title, *The Jewish Contribution to Civilization.* In many respects, the title may even be considered injudicious. If the 2,500 books listed did actually represent *the* Jewish contribution to civilization, then civilization, which is scarcely beyond its swaddling clothes today, would be in a bad way indeed. No, this is not a twentieth part of the Jewish contribution to civilization.

The editor, C. A. Stonehill, Jr., of the English firm of C. A. Stonehill, Ltd., is undoubtedly conscious of the value of this catalogue as propaganda. From the moment when, on the title page, the reader is asked to take note that the catalogue is published from an "Emergency address," rather than from the headquarters of the firm in London, the European conflict now raging is never far from our minds. In his Foreword, Mr. Stonehill emphasizes this aspect of his work:

> In this instance, we are further at a disadvantage through our reluctance to buy anything from those countries responsible for the most recent misery of the people whose accomplishments are herein set forth (p. 9).

Further, the purposive character of the catalogue is set forth in the editor's definition of a Jew.

> For the purposes of this catalogue we assume a Jew to be *one who, by reason of one Jewish grandparent, would under the Nuremberg race laws be deprived of the rights of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, nay, perhaps of life itself. . . . The definition is not original with us* (p. 9).

The italics are Mr. Stonehill's; they might be those of any reader.

Stefan Zweig, himself an exile from his native land because he is a Jew, writes in his Preface:

> It is always a virtue to expose a lie. It is well-known that some countries, in order to justify their real programme, the rape of Jewish property, have tried to propagate the belief that the Jewish mentality has always been of a

purely destructive nature. Simply and without ostentation, the evidence is here presented to speak for itself, and as book after book and name after name are enumerated, the malicious falsehood of the statement is laid bare. Even one who, like the writer, has steeped himself in the subject, will be surprised how many and what manifold creative personalities are to be found in the selection here offered (p. 5).

Enough has been cited here to establish the fact that this is more than just another catalogue. Catalogue it is; propaganda it is; and, at least in the eyes of Zweig, it is an attempt to right an ancient wrong, by an attack on its modern exemplar.

Before examining the actual Jewish contributions, it might be well to dispose of those who are here only by the "Squatter's right" given by the editor's acceptance of a definition based upon the Nuremberg Race Laws. For, after all, valuable as these cases are for propaganda, they are infinitely less important for the broad argument set forth by Zweig than are those who were brought up within the Jewish tradition. The question at issue is not whether an individual, by merest chance of Jewish ancestry, brought up entirely in a non-Jewish environment, may make a contribution to civilization. It is whether there is some factor in Jewish heredity and Jewish training which makes such a contribution possible. There is even a speculative extension of this question suggested by Zweig, when he says,

> In viewing objectively the achievements of the Jews, one must reflect that no other race in History has so immersed itself in the aesthetic and confined itself to intellectual endeavour, or so steadfastly renounced conquest, expansion and military power for the delights of the intellect. . . .
>
> The scholar, the writer, the scientist, the seeker after knowledge, the wise man and the saint have always held a higher place in the imagination of the Jewish people than the man of power, the hero or the materialist. Forced migration scattered the Jewish race far and wide, but wherever they settled, they evinced a profound desire to master foreign tongues and foreign idioms and to collaborate in the great enterprises of mankind. Neither persecution, exile, inquisition nor pogrom succeeded in stamping out that invincible impulse to create, which has proved again and again its indestructible fertility wherever the race has been allowed to participate in the life of the community (p. 6).

If this is more than rhetoric, and the sincerity of its tone suggests that it is, Zweig is suggesting that the incidence of Jewish contributions to civilization is higher than might be expected. To me, as a teacher, this suggests the existence of some factor in Jewish education

which introduces the higher morality of service to mankind described by Zweig into the imagination, rather than simply into the mind of the child.

My own inclination would be to broaden Zweig's suggestion, to direct it to the observation of all those who had a genuine and sincere moral training within their churches, of whatever denomination and to investigate whether they, too, had the morality of service to mankind manifesting itself in contributions to civilization. Perhaps we would discover that we have carried the secularization of education much too far, that it is the emotional nexus of religious belief which introduces morality into the imagination.

But let us return to our catalogue. Among the Nuremberg cases, it is interesting to note that Jean Bodin, Michel de l'Hospital, and Montaigne, three of the greatest of sixteenth century French thinkers, were all of Jewish ancestry. It is perhaps even more important that all three were advocates of tolerance. The editor's note on Sven Hedin's descent from Aaron Isak, the founder of the Jewish community in Sweden, is of special significance in the light of the alleged pro-Nazi activities of the distinguished Swedish explorer and geographer. The faithfulness of Luther's Bible to the Hebrew original, despite Luther's avowed anti-Semitism, becomes less of a problem in the light of the revelation that his two major sources, the commentaries of Nicholas de Lyra and of Paulus de Sancta Maria, Bishop of Burgos, are both the work of converted Jews. Writing of Gilbert Cannan, the English novelist and playwright, Stonehill says,

> His name came to my notice, rather as a surprise, through a publication designed to save the unwary, "Index der Anglo-jüdischen Literatur," by Karl Arns, 1938 (p. 39).

Surely any race would be proud to accept these men, and those others included in the Stonehill catalogue, even without benefit of discriminatory legislation.

But the Jewish contribution to civilization does not lie in such men. It lies in that vastly larger group of participants in every phase of cultural activity from Anthropology to Zoology, some of whose names and works complete Mr. Stonehill's exciting collection. The first page yields Lazarus Aaronson, a contemporary English poet; Aben-Ezra and Aben Ye'hia, twelfth century Rabbis who wrote a book on the delights of chess; Don Isaac Abrabanel, the Portuguese statesman and

scholar, who fled from his native land into Spain, and there became Finance Minister in the court of Ferdinand and Isabella, and one of the patrons of Columbus; and his son, Judah Abrabanel, whose philosophical work, the *Dialogues of Love,* was one of the most widely read books of its age. The last page is devoted to Leopold Zunz, one of the more important nineteenth century Jewish historians; Arnold Zweig, contemporary German novelist, and Stefan Zweig, contemporary Austrian polygraph, both now in exile.

Between these, there are a host of others, of all professions, even, despite the introduction, one or two military authorities. Of all, possibly the most important single group is composed of the Jews of all ages and all countries who have contributed to the development of the medical sciences. This list is so imposing, both in the number of its members and in the extent of its contributions, that it is hard to refrain from pointing out the great opposition between its adventures in saving life and the efforts of today's arch-persecutor of the Jews to adventure in taking life. Truly, the sanctity of human life has been one of the great motives in the Jewish contribution to civilization.

It is a humbling experience to read this list, but one which cannot fail to leave its message. In the end of days, when truth and justice prevail, as, in the end, they must prevail, this message will be heard and understood by all the nations of the earth, "and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they practise warfare any more." Until that time, its message is only for those who care to hear, and it is the message of all religion, "Love thy neighbor as thyself."

Joseph L. Blau

New York City

The Book of Revelation. By E. F. Scott. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. 191 pp. $2.00.

Professor Scott has written a compact but thoroughly readable little volume on one of the most puzzling books of the New Testament. His primary aim is to interpret Revelation in the light of the purpose for which it was originally composed. Then he proceeds to expound its doctrinal teaching, to estimate the permanent value of its religious message, and to comment briefly upon its character as literature.

The subject is introduced by a few well-chosen remarks on the apocalyptic type of literature current among the Jews at the beginning of the Christian era. Note is taken of the fact that the Book of Revelation not only belongs to this type of writing, but consciously embodies materials largely borrowed from earlier apocalypses and worked over by the final author to serve the interests of his immediate situation. In its present form it is a genuinely Christian book composed toward the close of the first century when the churches, particularly in Asia Minor, were faced by serious persecution because of refusal to worship the emperor Domitian. Thus the date of writing was A.D. 96, or very soon thereafter. The author was a Christian named John, possibly John the Elder but hardly John the Apostle. At the time of writing he was under arrest for his opposition to Caesar-worship and had been exiled to the lonely island of Patmos. While here he composed his book addressed to the Christian congregations of his acquaintance in Asia Minor. But instead of delivering a plain message of admonition and encouragement, he so combined his own visions and reflections with borrowed materials from older sources that the result was an almost incoherent patchwork. Yet throughout there runs a unity of purpose as the author aims to interpret the world's destiny in the light of Christian beliefs.

Under the caption "The Drama of Revelation," the content of the book is analyzed according to its main divisions, and the meaning in each of the chief sections is explained. That it was written under the impulsion of ecstatic visions in conceded, yet the book as it now stands must be regarded as a work of art and reflection rather laboriously compiled from earlier sources embodying Jewish and Christian expectations. Much of the extravagant imagery of the book owes its origin to these inherited documents. It may have been that many of these items were ultimately descended from Babylonian mythology and astrology, but the author of Revelation was unaware of and not interested in this possibility. Hence no attempt is made to trace these borrowed features to their source in either Babylonian or Jewish antecedents. Recognizing that John freely availed himself of current myths, Professor Scott is concerned only with trying to discover the purposes which the imagery was designed to serve as used by the writer of Revelation. This principle is followed throughout in the interpretation of the content of the book.

In dealing with Revelation as an embodiment of Christian doctrine one discovers, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that John was actually a theologian holding views not essentially different from those generally accepted in the church of his day. His doctrine of the sovereignty of God, his conception of Christ, of the church, of the world and of worship are found to be solidly Christian, notwithstanding the strange language in which they are frequently expressed. Possibly some readers will feel that more has been read into Revelation than has been read out of it in the exposition of some of these topics, but it must be granted that Professor Scott never loses his sanity in dealing with the vagaries of his text.

When it comes to discovering the "Permanent Message of Revelation," the undertaking is more precarious. No other book of the New Testament was so surely written for a specific situation that came to an end almost, if not actually, before the book was circulated, and culminated in a manner entirely different from that which the author had anticipated. To penetrate behind the mass of ephemeral features and discover "permanent" values is a venturesome apologetic task. This is accomplished by detecting beneath the veiled language of the book certain religious principles suitable for modern evaluation. Thus the quality of permanence does not attach to all ideas in the book, but only to those items which accord with a present-day taste. Whether this modern code of values is permanent, who can say? Yet it may help to redeem Revelation from the neglect or perversion to which it has long been liable if it can be even forcibly modernized. We may note that its author confronted a crisis and so do we at present, although ours is not the specific crisis with which he was concerned. It is also true that he interpreted history from the religious point of view as a struggle between God and Satan, but, conscious as we may be of the conflict between good and evil, John's picture of the impending miraculous triumph of good certainly seems too fanciful when applied to our realistic situation. Professor Scott would not list this as a "permanent" value but would allegorize it to mean the struggle between material and spiritual ideals. Similarly John's vivid picture of impending judgment is watered down to mean that "sooner or later all evil is judged and punished." Undoubtedly John would have consented to the word "sooner," but would not "later" have seemed to him a gross perversion of his message? Yet if permanent meaning

has to be discovered in every New Testament book it would be hard to find an explorer who is more alluring and persuasive than Professor Scott.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

Florida School of Religion

Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of the Empire, 1900-1917. By JOHN SHELTON CURTISS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. pp. xi + 442. $4.00.

Dr. Curtiss has given us here a most important work on the Russian Church, for there has been made no such careful study of the actual workings of the Russian church administration, the economic aspects of church life, the actual position of the clergy, and the description of the processes which carried the Russian Church to its downfall in the Revolution of 1917. It is a picture of a series of lost opportunities, as the Tsar and the Over Procurators refused to see the trend of the times and struggled successfully against changes which were demanded by the friends as well as the foes of organized religion.

The author has made an exhaustive search of the records dealing with the Russian Church, and we may well believe that the work will not need soon to be done over again. The serious student and the general reader have now available the chief materials for an understanding of the collapse and the failure of the organization. As such, the book will long remain a standard text.

The difficulties and shortcomings of the work are themselves a result of its good qualities. In preparing a history which is based on records instead of on impressions, the dark sides which involved administrative action and recording tend to be emphasized. It is the same problem that confronts news gatherers everywhere. A priest who succeeded in doing a fairly good job without winning distinction will necessarily be ignored because of his failure to attract attention. A case of persecution that appears in the records naturally overshadows the cases where there were no such records necessary, and it is very possible that conditions were not so dark as a first reading of this volume might indicate.

It may well be asked whether a serious study of any American religious body would not reveal many of the same difficulties. There were, of course, peculiarly Russian abuses and defects, but, in general, we

see a religious body overburdened by bureaucracy and attempts to maintain records in a proper state, with disastrous results to the religious spirit of the whole.

There can be no doubt that the higher clergy were far too subservient to the government but, in balancing this, we have to remember the present situation in other countries. In times of crisis, an institution, especially one supported by a government, must be either for the government or definitely aligned against it. That is true in America in 1940, and a study of the utterances of leading American clergymen during the last two years would indicate that, to some degree, the Church in America is being confronted with much the same fundamental choice. The dream of building a great organization without supporting or injuring the state seems very difficult to realize, and Russia in the twentieth century was already in a crisis from which only the wisest leadership could have extricated it.

Another problem which is touched and well handled is the relation of the authorities to the Old Believers and sectarians. But, again, in judging the actions of the Church we must remember certain things. For a thousand years in Russia and Europe, entrance into military service was accompanied by a religious oath administered by the clergy. When various groups refused to take this oath, it was a serious matter, and there was always the question whether the man who refused had done so because of religious scruples or because of political unreliability. The Cossack Old Believers took one attitude, some of the sectarians another, and the problem was as complicated as the question whether the members of the American sect of Jehovah's Witnesses, in refusing to salute the flag, are prepared to go further in opposition to the government.

So, too, with the question of marriage. To the Russian mind the sacrament of matrimony and the institution of marriage were identical. For two centuries the Old Believers and sectarians had mulled over this question. There were times when a couple, especially of the Priestless sects, would prefer to have their children registered as illegitimate rather than admit that they themselves were married. Even though everyone knew that they were living in a lifelong monogamous union, and although they would have been condemned by their associates, if they separated, still they insisted that they were *not* married, for their sect had no priests. Later many of the Old Believers became

willing to have their union registered with the state, but there were many difficulties in the way, and Old Believer and sectarian influence often joined with the bigotry of the officials to prevent the carrying out of the laws. The actions of the Dukhobortsy in Canada certainly embarrassed the Canadian government, and strained Anglo-Saxon notions of religious toleration as Dr. Curtiss notices (p. 164). In view of our own experiences with some of our more extreme groups in this country, we may well wonder whether there was not in many cases some underlying sense amid the mass of rigorous rulings and apparent persecution that were shown by the records.

Naturally these problems are not fundamental to the interest of Dr. Curtiss, who is working on the legal and objective position of the Church, and is not trying to evaluate the wisdom of many of its decisions. Perhaps the peculiar mentality of Pobedonostsev had much to do with the chaos, and it is interesting that most of the data connected with the Old Believers and sectarians comes from the period of his office as Over Procurator.

Everyone except the bureaucrats realized that all was not well with the Russian Church, but the religious and irreligious critics did not agree on the remedy. The reforms advocated by the religious people seemed to the Left the strengthening of the inherent evils, and vice versa. The great fact that is clearly brought out was that the peasants lost confidence in the Church, the intelligentsia had lost it earlier, and the Rasputin affair disgusted everybody except the participants, and then it was too late to act.

We can be very grateful to Dr. Curtiss for his book. It is remarkably accurate and painstaking. The chapters on education, economics, and the attempts at reform are perfectly adequate and illuminating. The data is given here, and the book deserves to be in every library of religion and history.

Clarence A. Manning

Columbia University

Jonathan Edwards. By Ola Elizabeth Winslow. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. xii + 406 pp. $3.50.

This is the first biography of Jonathan Edwards which has been based on a complete study of the available sources, and it can be regarded as a definitive book on the life of its subject. Miss Winslow

appears to have studied every surviving manuscript relating either to Edwards himself or (with the exception of a notebook of Timothy Edwards, owned by the New York Historical Society) to the members of his family; and she shows a remarkable capacity for extracting from the somewhat meager materials everything which is of biographical significance. The portrait of Edwards, as it emerges from Miss Winslow's detailed examination of the manuscripts in the Yale and Andover collections, does not differ in essentials from that drawn by earlier biographers; Edwards' reading lists, for example, appear to contain no surprises. But Miss Winslow has been able to fill in a number of details which have hitherto remained obscure, and to give us much the most elaborate description of Edwards' family background, personal habits and intellectual development. The book is well-written, interesting to read, and shows a genuine talent for grasping and interpreting the basic traits of the different members of the Edwards family.

Since Miss Winslow's book will become the standard work on Edwards, it appears to this reviewer to be somewhat regrettable that she has concentrated so exclusively on Edwards himself and has not done more to place him in the life of his time. In general, she interprets his career by relating it to a movement within the Puritan Church away from clerical control and towards democracy; according to Miss Winslow, Edwards belonged to this movement in so far as he preached a religion of individual spiritual experience; he opposed it by asserting the right of the clergy to dominate their congregations. This is an interesting conception, and one would have liked to see it developed in more detail. Miss Winslow, however, says as little as possible about any subject not directly connected with the life of Edwards; many of her references to the events of the time may, indeed, be unintelligible to readers who are not well acquainted with the religious history of Massachusetts. She describes the Great Awakening only briefly, barely mentions the Separatist movement, and does not make any reference at all to the economic conflicts about inflation and landownership which formed the background of the religious controversies of the period. Miss Winslow's discussions of the traditional Calvinist theology and of the developments which culminated in Unitarianism are also somewhat meager. Although, therefore, her treatment makes Edwards himself come alive more vividly than in any previous work

on the subject, the milieu from which he emerged remains very misty.

Another (possibly more justifiable) criticism of Miss Winslow's book is that (in the opinion at least of this reviewer) she has underestimated Edwards' posthumous influence. According to Miss Winslow, Edwards and his disciples restated the doctrines of Calvinism so forcefully that their weaknesses became obvious, and New England was thereby impelled to reject the whole Calvinist system. Actually, however, the rejection of Calvinist tradition occurred only in eastern Massachusetts. Western Massachusetts and Connecticut were dominated by the Edwardean system for a hundred years; and in that area the eventual disappearance of Calvinism was due, not to any sudden revulsion against the dogma of predestination, but to a slow transmutation of the Edwardean doctrines by Edwards' disciples. The Edwardean identification of virtue with benevolence developed into a religion of humanitarianism, while the Edwardean theory of the will led gradually to a belief in human freedom and a denial of human depravity. It was not the Arminianism which Edwards opposed, but the Edwardean "new divinity" itself, which led finally to Horace Bushnell and Henry Ward Beecher.

H. B. Parkes

New York University

Elkanah and Mary Walker, Pioneers Among the Spokanes. By Clifford Merrill Drury. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Press, Ltd., 1940. 283 pp. $3.00.

The volume on Elkanah and Mary Walker completes a trilogy on missionaries who served in the Inland Empire, under the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. The first volume constituted a biography of Henry Harmon Spalding and his work at Lapwai Mission, in what is now the state of Idaho. The second volume represented a study of Dr. Marcus Whitman and the mission at Waiilatpu, situated about six miles distant from the present city of Walla Walla, Washington. This volume deals with the intimate life of the Walkers, who served in the mission station of Tshimakain, which was located in a valley now known as Walker's Prairie, about twenty-five miles distant from the city of Spokane, Washington.

Rev. Cushing Eells and wife were also located at the same station. The author mentions the fact that, since accounts of the Eells family

have been published, he has concentrated on the Walkers. Both Mr. and Mrs. Walker kept diaries. A narrative of the missions of the Inland Empire is incomplete if it does not contain the story of the Walkers. They were sincere, pious and industrious, and were respected wherever they lived. What is recorded in their journals and letters is of special value to the historian.

As Mrs. Walker's journal was not intended for publication, it furnishes an insight into the private lives of people who were pre-eminently of the Puritan stamp. They came from Puritan homes; they were members of Puritan churches; they were educated in Puritan institutions of learning. Here one can follow the stern realities and virtues of Puritanism, its censoriousness and its narrowness. If these lonely people, residing in the wilderness, had interspersed an occasional picnic among their fast days, the petty bickerings which marred their associations would have been greatly reduced. Citations from Mrs. Walker's diary give evidence that the Puritan ideal of early rising and continuous labor was followed in their lonely station, with no witness to their unceasing labor except the Indian, who considered idleness one of the chief ends of man.

Wherever these people were, whether at home, traveling, or visiting, the Puritan sabbath must be strictly observed. If these zealous missionaries had not been so rigid and exacting in reference to sabbath observance in their demands upon the Indians, they would have won more and alienated less. When the Roman Catholic priests appeared upon the scene, they became opportunists. They accepted the Indians as they found them, baptizing them and claiming them for the fold of their church with all their limitations. The Walker and Eells families lived among the Indians for nine years and did not have a single convert. Nevertheless, after the missionaries fled the country, the Indians petitioned for their return. In 1873, the Rev. Henry Harmon Spalding, missionary at Lapwai, by invitation from the Spokanes, visited the Spokane Indians and baptized 253 adults and 81 children. He established two Presbyterian churches still in existence on the foundations which were laid by the Walker and Eells families (p. 242).

One finds in the records of the Walkers the same general estimation of the Indian and the work of Indian missions which can be duplicated in other records. Thomas H. Benton, senator from Mis-

souri, told his fellow senators that "for two hundred years the problem of Indian civilization has been successively presented to each generation of Americans and solved by each in the same way. Schools have been set up, colleges founded, and missions established; a wonderful success has attended the commencement of every undertaking; and, after some time, the schools, the colleges, the missions, and the Indians have all disappeared together" (Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, Vol. I, p. 42). The comments upon the Indians in the records of the Walkers and other missionaries of the Inland Empire, and of the Methodists of the Willamette Valley, can be summed up under the following points: (1) A distinct disappointment arising from the fact that there is a decreasing response on the part of the Indian, instead of a growing interest; (2) The Indians refuse to settle and follow the serious business of tilling the soil and caring for cattle; (3) The growing mortality among the Indians; (4) A conviction that the Indian is doomed, and the white settler is destined to occupy the land. The last consideration caused a large number of the missionaries to become active colonizers.

The author of this volume appears to be standing in the background, allowing the actors to tell their story. He has incorporated much of the diaries in his publication. The reader becomes acquainted with the Walkers, and feels that he knows them intimately. The narrative introduces us to Elkanah Walker as a student in his senior year in the seminary at Bangor, Maine. While engaged in correspondence with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, he is informed that Miss Mary Richardson, of the same state, has volunteered to go as a foreign missionary. A mutual friend arranged a meeting which resulted in engagement for marriage within forty-eight hours after their first sight of one another.

Mary Richardson had enrolled as a student in the Wesleyan Seminary, Readfield, Maine, and like her parents, had taught school. In the spring of 1838, Mary Richardson and Elkanah Walker were married and started on their honeymoon journey, which carried them to the Oregon country.

William H. Gray, who had accompanied the Whitmans and the Spaldings as missionaries in 1836, had returned to the states for reinforcements and for a wife. William H. Gray and wife, Cushing Eells and wife, Asa Bowen Smith and wife, and Cornelius Rogers

constituted the contingent that made the overland journey to the Northwest in 1838, as additional missionaries for the work in the Inland Empire. After spending the winter with the Whitmans at Waiilatpu, they built their homes in the wilderness at Tshimakain. The Eells and the Walkers, with their infant son, Cyrus Hamlin Walker, who was born at the Whitman station, constituted the group at this station. As the missionaries received but a limited sum of money for living expenses, they were obliged to build their own homes, make their own furniture, and raise their own food. They also attempted to instruct the Indians in agriculture and provide seeds for them. Thus the agricultural enterprise was regarded as part of their work as missionaries. Mr. Walker was interested in learning the language of the Indians as soon as possible. He worked on the task of producing a primer in the Spokane language. Carrying his manuscript to the printing press at Lapwai, he printed it for use in his Indian school.

The Massacre of Dr. Marcus Whitman, his wife, and twelve others at Waiilatpu, together with the burning of the mission buildings at that place, Nov. 29, 1847, brought a crisis to all the missions of the Inland Empire. The Spalding family fled in terror from the mission at Lapwai; the Smiths had already abandoned their mission at Kamiah; and, on March 13, 1848, the Walker and Eells families left their station. The end of the missionary era in the Inland Empire had come.

The Walkers went to Oregon City and settled at Forest Grove, Oregon. Here Mr. Walker resided for about thirty years, until his death. Mrs. Walker resided here for about fifty years, until she too died. Mr. Walker's days as a missionary were over, but he continued as a farmer and preacher until his death. He was pastor of the Congregational Church at Forest Grove, a member of the first board of trustees at Whitman College, and a member of the board of trustees of Pacific University at Forest Grove.

The author, having lived in the vicinity of the mission stations, includes interesting information on conditions today. However, one is conscious of a lack of interpretation and of a philosophy of history in this volume, as well as in the previous ones. One who has visited the sites involved in these volumes, studied the original sources as thoroughly as has the author of these books, should have given the reader the benefit of his knowledge. There are episodes of adventure,

dramatic and tragic situations involved in the lives of these heroic missionaries. There are contrasts, clashes, contacts of two races—one representing children of the wilderness—the other, Christian civilization. What an opportunity for philosophizing!

MELVIN CLAY JACOBS

Whitman College

The Gospel of the Kingdom. By FREDERICK C. GRANT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. xvii + 204 pp. $2.00.

The Kingdom of God, as Jesus preached it, is essentially "this-worldly," and his Gospel is a "social gospel." It is made up of those who yield obedience to the Law of God the King, and their task is to remove all that now stands in the way of the fulfilment of God's purposes. The obstacles to these purposes are for us, first of all, the evils and injustices of the present order; the church exists to serve society and individuals, and so its work *ought* to be largely secular. This is the thesis of Dr. Grant's Haskell lectures, a thesis that he maintains with all the earnestness and sobriety we have learned to associate with his name. And it is a thesis worth maintaining today, as a needed correction to the exaggerated "other-worldly" transcendentalism, Barthian and otherwise, of which we hear so much.

Unfortunately, however, Dr. Grant's defence of his thesis is impaired by the form of his book, which is not a systematic study of his theme, but a collection of essays apparently written in dissociation from each other. Each essay in itself can be read with great pleasure and profit, but the reader attempting to follow the central argument will be endlessly perplexed by repetitions, gaps, and even contradictions. We read, on page 68, for instance, that the best tradition of Jesus' words comes from disciples "whose outlook was non-apocalyptic, non-eschatological," but, on page 170, that Jesus' "teaching is eschatological but not apocalyptic." On page 45, Dr. Grant doubts if apocalypticism were familiar to any but a few, and then tells us that it was the universal vehicle of primitive Christology. We hear that "Messiah" and "Son of Man" were completely unrelated terms, and, a little later, that the identification of the risen Jesus as Son of Man carried with it his identification as Messiah. We are assured that "Messiah" was inseparable from political connotations (especially pages 130, 154), and so could not have been used by Jesus; and we are assured

that the first Christians—whose outlook was certainly not political—applied it to him unhesitatingly. These and other incongruities need resolution.

Likewise many gaps need filling. How did Jesus view his own relation to the Kingdom? Righteous men from the world's beginning had accepted God as King; did Jesus think of himself simply as teaching God's will more fully? Or did he think of himself as inaugurating something wholly new? If so, in what sense? And how did he conceive his own place in the Kingdom? Dr. Grant insists—and very rightly insists—on God's immediate and undivided Kingship, but did Jesus then regard himself merely as one member of the Kingdom among others? Or did he regard himself as wholly on God's side? Can either alternative be attributed to him historically?

Moreover, Dr. Grant's interest in the "this-worldly" aspect of the Kingdom is so zealous that he touches only incidentally on its relation to the future life; to "sit down with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the Kingdom of God" does not fit into his thesis at all. Are all such passages in Jesus' recorded teaching to be attributed to a later and erroneous tradition? Surely not! Furthermore—and this is vital—to Jews, including Jesus, a full future life required, not only immortality of the soul, but resurrection of the body. But any concept of a resurrection is inseparable from apocalyptic in some form or other—and here Dr. Grant's thesis loses touch with history. No exclusively "this-worldly," non-apocalyptic doctrine of the Kingdom, whether expressed in Old Testament theocratic terms or not, can be reconciled with belief in a resurrection.

It is therefore needless to enter into a discussion of Dr. Grant's analysis of the Synoptic evidence, for his division of the early tradition into strata rests on premises which he has not established. But this is not to say that his book has not very real value, for much of Jesus' teaching about the Kingdom was genuinely "this-worldly," and his Gospel in many aspects was truly "social." It is the custom in many quarters nowadays to speak pityingly of the "liberals" of a bygone generation, as if all they taught were beneath our notice; but Dr. Grant does not hesitate to revive the title "liberal" and to glory in it—and he proves his right so to do. And yet liberalism is not all, nor is it all to Dr. Grant. For, on page 177, we read that for perfect realization of the Kingdom "sin, disease and death must be brought to an end." Perhaps this

world can be thought of as eventually freed from disease, even perhaps as freed from sin. But if death is to be abolished no ambiguity is possible: the world of the Kingdom is no longer *this* world!

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

General Theological Seminary

Reich Gottes und Menschensohn. Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Versuch. By RUDOLF OTTO. (2nd Ed.) München C. H. Beck, 1940. ix + 326 pp.

The importance of this work of Rudolf Otto lies in the fact that it represents a summary discussion of the extreme eschatological thesis as regards Jesus' ideas of the Kingdom of God and of the Son of Man. If Otto's argument is correct, the thesis may be adopted; if not, we have to lay it aside. I think he gave that eschatological interpretation of these ideas a mortal wound by showing, though unintentionally, that all the analogies in the history of religion do not suffice to prove that supposition, although it was his aim to demonstrate that there is a dependence of these two ideas upon similar ones both in Zoroastrianism and Jewish apocalyptic. Otto discusses this problem, which is important not only for New Testament study, but no less for living Christianity, on the basis of his deep knowledge of the Indian and Iranian religions, emphasizing that the message of the Kingdom "contains elements which certainly are not of Palestinian origin but point definitely to a connection with the ancient Aryan East," and to the direct influence of Iranian eschatology. He is surely right in stressing the similarity between the Kingdom of God and the Persian Kshatra of the good deity, within which the struggle of the good against the evil, of truth against falsehood, must be carried through. On the other hand, it is in no way justified by this fact to join A. Schweizer's exaggerated eschatologism. What is, or may be, true as to the late Jewish apocalyptic expectations, is not for the same reason true of Jesus' preaching.

To be sure, no one can overlook "the dynamic of the strongest eschatological tension" which is also in Jesus. Why, however, does Otto not draw the consistent inference from his correct statement of the fundamental distinction between Jesus and the Baptist in saying that Jesus abandoned the eschatological sacrament of baptism, and this not accidentally but essentially, because of "the new way of salvation which

John did not know"? He states that Jesus replaced the sacrament of the *eschaton* by the belief in the evangel. Underlining this fact, the author nevertheless describes Jesus' idea of the Kingdom as "the future kingdom of the last days conceived in strict eschatological terms, following the messianic woes and the divine judgment." Then, the reader will observe the more sharply two remarks which soften this statement: (a) Jesus was already living in the miracle of the last time and with clear-sighted eye beholding the Kingdom as growing, and (b) he mediated contact with this miracle of the transcendental, as a private possession, to a circle of adherents provided by him with charismatic power. This, then, as a matter of fact, means to a certain degree balancing the tensions between the two concepts of the Kingdom which, so often, are thought to be in opposition to each other. And the author achieves this effect by using his well known categories of the *tremendum* and *fascinosum* as attributes of the eschaton, and that of the *numinosum* as an attribute of the divine Kingdom. However skillful this is, it in no way depends on the author's profound intimacy with the Aryan religions.

The second thesis runs as follows: "After the confession of Peter, and especially in contexts where Jesus was referring to his own suffering and departure, he frequently designated himself as the Son of Man, while, at a later time, tradition (in the Gospels) introduced this solemn self-designation into utterances where the simple I was used originally. And this term is, according to Otto, identical with the Son of Man in the Book of Enoch, by which Jesus probably was inspired. To prove this, Otto devotes a whole "book" of this work to pertinent passages of that apocryphal work which, no doubt, had great influence upon the development of the synagogic and popular religion in Israel, by bestowing upon the mosaic and prophetic tradition faith in the eschatological and messianic Son of Man. The reader, in a connection like this, is, therefore, very gratified at being given an explanation of the Enochic idea of the Son of Man, which was throughout eschatological, just as the popular religion seems to have become, at least to a large extent. However, instead of unfolding what may be demonstrated on both sides of the argument—which seems rather impossible—Otto now shows that the only fit analogy to the most substantial point in the gospel picture of the Son of Man, his suffering, is far from being found in Enoch or elsewhere in apocalyptic literature—

but rather in the Old Testament. Thus Otto himself is at last compelled to infer that even the idea of the great combat of God against the anti-divine, and the idea of the moral task for man "gain their full depth when they are filled and penetrated with the content of the primordial word, the *Urwort*, of Lev. 19:12, "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy." Hence, the reader is to drop what he assumed in between from Enoch, and is led to substitute the new-old wisdom, that "it was on the basis of that *Urwort* and on its deepest understanding that in Israel there arose further the perception that only he can be holy whom God renders holy."

Considered now from this last inference made by Otto, the whole painful comparison of the terms of the Book of Enoch represents itself as a Danaidean episode. For, and this is more important, Otto then returns to the well known and biblically founded opinion that the Son of Man is identical with the Servant of Yahveh, and that this equation has actually been made and taught by Jesus. Also, the Last Supper is stated by Otto to have been understood by Jesus in the same way.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note how unscrupulously the author ranks Jesus among the many ecstatic exorcists—which, however, does not, in any way, mean a devaluation of the extraordinary powers of Jesus. On the contrary, it deserves to be stressed how sympathically Otto deals with the charismatic qualities whether of Jesus or of the apostles or of later followers like Blumhardt. Jesus is here called the *Urcharismatiker* of whose spiritual energy a transportation is possible in the form of gifts of healing and genuine exorcism, and the manifold gifts of prophecy and the discrimination of spirits, appearing more frequently and more intensely in the apostolic era than in our non-pneumatic world. At any rate, there is something universal in this realm; the charismatic himself is not a completely exceptional, marvellous and miraculous being, but has gifts which can actually appear in all believers who have received the spirit. To Otto, these gifts of grace to which he devotes the whole last chapter of forty-two pages, are "frank gifts of the spirit which bloweth where it listeth, not destined to be shown but preferably remaining hidden, procured for the purpose of health and love and conditioned by a God-consecrated and sanctified life."

It is an opinion so obvious that it will, time and again, suggest itself

to be pondered anew, that the Iranian idea of Ahura's kingdom and Jesus' idea of God's Kingdom are close kindred, a fact which incites us to search for a historic relation, or even for a common source. However, it seems not always the method of the disclosure of fundamental truths to use channels of common history. Flowing from the primordial well of all truth, those unveiling preachments sporadically happen, pointing out the same verity at various times and spots, and testifying to the basically identical nature of man.

On the other hand, the reviewer is tempted to complain both that the author too soon cut off the query as to an actual connection between the term, Son of Man, as offered in the Gospel, and the "genuine man" met in such sects as the Manichaeans and many gnostic circles, as well as in the figure of the Indian *purusha*, and that there is no opportunity here for outlining this desideratum. It may only be mentioned that there are certain junction-lines between the "primordial man," who is no proper earthly man, but rather primary light in the "profound" *bythos*, wherefrom he emanated to be an Aeon and take the place of the all-originating, God Nous, and the primary man who fell from his height into the depth of nature; again we meet the principle of the universe called "Man" and his offspring, the "Son of Man" as destined to suffer—this last point being most important for Otto's thesis that the suffering is one of the most characteristic moments in the evangelical picture of the Son of Man.

KARL BETH

Meadville Theological School

The Idea of a Christian Society. By T. S. ELIOT. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940. vii + 104 pp. $1.50.

Mr. Eliot, in these lectures originally delivered in March 1939 at Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, speaks as the Christian philosopher rather than as a social theorist. His thesis is the character of a truly Christian society. In such a society, Christianity would not only be regarded as the true philosophy for both individual and social life, but also as the accepted criterion for social and political action. The actual means and mechanisms by which such a state would come into being do not concern Mr. Eliot. His primary interest is what he calls the "spiritual institutions" by which men live. "Not," as he says in his preface, "in their separated aspect but (with) the organization of

values and a direction of religious thought which must inevitably proceed to a criticism of political and economic systems."

From this starting point, he goes on first to consider "what kind of a society we have at this time," and then to ask "what a Christian society would be like." Looking at our contemporary situation Mr. Eliot finds it not exactly un-Christian or pagan, but "negative." But society cannot remain at this level, for a "liberalized and negative Christian condition of society must either proceed into a gradual decline of which we see no end, or reform itself into a positive shape, which is likely to be effectively secular." In other words, either our bankrupt liberal semi-democratic culture will dissolve, through the agency of the various acids inherent in its own constitution as well as through those forces operating from without, or else, the new barbarism, a new effective pagan culture, such as Nazism, will be upon us. Besides these two the only other possibility is that of a positive Christian society.

Mr. Eliot next sketches "a slight outline" of what might be "the essential features of such a society." He defines the Christian state as "the Christian society under the aspect of legislation, public administration, legal tradition, and form." In this state, the rulers "would have received a Christian education . . . , and a Christian education would primarily train people to be able to think in Christian categories," not as an act of conscious faith, however; rather Mr. Eliot means that these rulers would consciously conform to Christian standards so that there would be "a minimum conscious conformity of behavior." Likewise, "in the Christian community which they ruled, the Christian faith would be ingrained." He does not show how this would be achieved, but explains that for the mass of people "religion should be primarily a matter of behavior and habit, and must be integrated with its social life, its business and its pleasure, and the specifically religious emotion would be a kind of extension and sanctification of the domestic and social emotions." Thus, "the religious life of the people would be largely a matter of conformity and behavior," and "social customs would take on religious sanctions."

Besides the rulers, who, "qua rulers accept Christianity not simply as their own faith to guide their actions, but as the system under which they are to govern"; and the people, who "accept it as a matter of behavior and habit," there is the third state, of the "Community of Christians." This is a nucleus of "consciously and thoughtfully prac-

ticing Christians, especially those of intellectual and spiritual superiority." This élite would first of all be necessary, as a critical witnessing minority, to prevent, on the one hand the political expediency of the rulers from becoming mere cynical manipulation, and on the other, the conformity of the ruled from degenerating into supine superstition. It would be the force for education, and, admittedly "a body of nebulous outline," it would contain "both clergy and laity of superior intellectual and/or spiritual gifts"; those of orthodox belief and even others outside or indifferent to the faith. Yet, "their identity of belief and aspiration" (there is a suggestion of inconsistancy here, unless Mr. Eliot means a common *formal* belief, but the words do not convey quite that meaning), "their background of a common system of education and common culture" would "enable them to influence and to be influenced by each other, and collectively to form the conscious mind, and the conscience, of the nation."

But in order to insure true Christian culture, as well as to implement the influence of this élite minority, there must be an authority acknowledged by the whole of society, and this must be the Christian Church. In relation to the ideal Christian society, with its three elements of rulers, ruled, and élite, this Church "must have a hierarchical organization in direct and official relation to the state . . . ; it must have an organization such as the parochial system in direct contact with the smallest units of the community and their individual members; and finally, it must have, in the person of its more intellectual scholarly and devout officers, its masters of ascetic theology, and its men of wider interests, a relation to the Community of Christians." Such a relation between the Church and Christian society organized in the state, can only be realised in an Establishment, and, as Mr. Eliot is dealing here with England, only in the Anglican Church. But to offset one of the many dangers admittedly implicit in such a relationship, the National Church must be regarded as being only a figment and a symbol of the Universal Church of Christendom.

Mr. Eliot throughout writes as a Christian philosopher vividly aware of the place and power of religion in social life, who yet is realistic concerning its inevitable dilution in its social form. He is also realistic in his appreciation of the fact that, whether under authoritarianism or democratic forms of organization, the people that really count are the few who think and act effectively, and who make up the

dominant oligarchy. Recognizing these facts, what he would provide is the wholesale background of Christian values, of Christian standards, of Christian education, so that there would result an entire reorientation of our present decaying negative society.

The political problem he admittedly does not face. He neither attempts a critique of our political life nor tries to indicate which would be the political forces and boundaries of a Christian state. Such discussion, according to Mr. Eliot, is out of his province. But even on his own ground, as a Christian thinker concerned with the social problem, is it possible so completely to ignore the political problem? What is the political organization of any community but the practical recognition that certain tendencies and forces of man in his communal life have to be subjected to checks and restraints? Thus theologically viewed, the problem of politics is the problem of sin in its corporate aspect. For the basic sin of selfishness on the individual level becomes the political problem of power on the social level. And nowhere does Mr. Eliot face this problem.

In his description of the negative character of our contemporary liberal culture, Mr. Eliot is at his best. Yet, despite his forceful strictures against liberalism, it almost seems as if Mr. Eliot himself were tinctured by a kind of Catholic liberalism. His diagnosis of our present situation, as well as his prescriptions for a Christian society, seem to imply the liberal faith that a change for the obviously better is a fairly simple possibility, particularly when attempted under the ægis of the hierarchical established Church working through a hierarchical authoritarian form of government. It is true, as he says, that modern society, if not definitely pagan, is not really Christian. Modern society, "where social behavior is no longer regulated by Christian standards, whose religious practices are abandoned, where practicing Christians are a minority," quite obviously is "a neutral society," and as such is not only not actively Christian, but also contains within it the possibility of becoming actively and aggressively pagan. But the ultimate causes of this condition lie not only in the background or framework of social beliefs and habits, but also in the diseases of the body economic and politic, and, according to Christian belief, ultimately in the shortcomings of human nature itself. And, not dealing with the religious fact of sin, nor with the political problem of power, Mr. Eliot seems to remain on the negative yet wishful level of pure social philosophising.

It might also be asked whether Mr. Eliot as a devout Anglo-Catholic has brought out the dynamic sacramentalism of the social and political problem; that, for instance, the social facts of our political struggle are facts which call for the flesh and blood of an ultimate redemption. Whatever measure of social salvation that may be achieved here on earth will have to be related far more realistically to the fact of sin, as well as to the possibility of grace. In Mr. Eliot's essay there is no sense of the travail and groaning involved in the history of man, any more than there is of the necessity of the Cross, with what that means in terms both of the struggles in history between sin and grace, and of the fact of ultimate judgment as well as of salvation.

None the less, the book presents us with a definite statement of the Christian *ideal* for the quality of life in any society. Not only beautifully but economically written (the book is less than 100 pages), it has an added significance in that it was prepared before the outbreak of war last September. Written after the Munich crisis the book reflects the necessary possibility of disaster for the contemporary society with which Mr. Eliot was concerned. And the events which have followed since emphasize rather than discount his criticisms and his judgments, and the tragic facts of the immediate moment only make more real the subject of his enquiry. But the very tragedy of this time calls for something more far-reaching, more precise, and yet more ultimate than what Mr. Eliot describes or prescribes for us.

URSULA M. NIEBUHR

Columbia University

The Church and the War. By ARTHUR C. COCHRANE. With a letter by KARL BARTH. Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd. 1940. xxix + 152 pp. $1.50.

The author, in his introduction for American readers, quotes the *Fortune* editorial of January 1940 wherein Mr. Davenport expressed the view that "absolute values," such as the Church should preach, would be declared by a "voice coming from something not ourselves," and the author modestly essays to tell us what he hears that authentic voice saying.

The thesis of the little volume—which only devoted followers of Barthian theology in its earlier stages are apt to find congenial—is that war not only is not the lesser of two evils, but that "Jesus Christ who

wills the ordinance of the State also wills this war. We are to see this war as a sign of Christ's grace and glory." However, it is not a "holy" war but a "just" one, which is now being fought against the " 'Revolution of Nihilism'—frank lawlessness . . . something inconceivably diabolic." The author leads through a maze of theological argument, based on Luther, Calvin, and Barth—as well as many modern Germans—to the prediction that the end of the world is at hand.

On his way to his conclusions—with which as touching the policy of the British few Americans will disagree—he takes aim at the Catholic Church, the Jews, modern theology, liberalism, the ecumenical movement, democracy, and all efforts to build a more peaceful world—and delivers what are intended to be shattering blows. It is all a bit bewildering and, at times, maddening in its paradoxes!

Having lived and worked in Germany with intimate association there in the struggle of the Church against the power of the Hitler State, Dr. Cochrane sees with clearness the issues that have been raised, and with his analysis it is hard to disagree. That the weakness and perversity of the German Church, as well as the sins of the Allies, led to the rise of Hitler no one who knows the facts at firsthand is likely to deny. Some of his sentences are worth quoting in detail: "National Socialism has become a power which seeks far more than *Lebensraum;* it is bent upon world-revolution. . . . It is a government so lawless and so unjust that Britain and her allies would be guilty before God if they allowed it to gain dominion over one more inch of territory. . . . We are fighting against an enemy whose victory would mean the end of all civil liberties and the Church's freedom to preach the Gospel. . . . National Socialist supremacy would eventually mean the reduction of all men to virtual serfdom and slavery. . . . Our war aims must be to fight *against* Germany *for* Germany as well as to fight against Germany for ourselves."

One of the most carefully reasoned sections of the book is devoted to a refutation of pacifism on Biblical grounds. To the Barthian it may be convincing. But, while agreeing with the author's conclusions as to our attitude towards the war, the present reviewer would not care to have to rest them upon such labored arguments and such a curious exegesis!

The best thing about the book is the warning which it gives against a self-righteous attitude on the part of those nations which are fighting

against National Socialism. The author would have us remember the ways in which we have all sinned and come short of the full duty of the Christian. He is anxious that Christians should pray more, and he thinks that—if they understand the reasons for doing it—they ought to fast as well. His conclusion may be summed up in his own words as follows:

"The Church . . . cannot say Yes to National Socialism and at the same time say Yes to Jesus Christ. The two are mutually exclusive and deny each other. The Church can only pray that God demolish National Socialism. . . . The Church, however, lives in a world in which law and order can only be preserved by the ordinance of the State. . . . The Church can no more withdraw herself from responsibility for the State than she can escape from the world. . . . She cannot demand that others do the dirty work of defending and policing the country while she withdraws herself in proud disdain, lest she herself become contaminated with the sin of the State."

HENRY SMITH LEIPER

New York City

American Faith: Its Religious, Political, and Economic Foundations. By ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 478 pp. $3.75.

Faith, in this skillful and understanding book, means an attitude to life rather than a definitive belief. It characterized the people from many lands and divers backgrounds who ventured into a new world and created here, out of a great complexity of religious doctrines, but a remarkable identity of purpose and spirit,—America!

Such faith is not the same as religion, yet it is religious, and it was the common requirement in these resolute souls, not always articulate, that they should have perfect freedom in their worship. Authority over their spiritual beings had been one of the wrongs, in many cases the principal offence, which they fled. That is not to say they were impelled by a holy motive entirely, for even the Pilgrims, who loved and longed for religious liberty more than all the others throughout the colonies, named this as only one of the reasons for their hazardous enterprise into a wilderness.

Of course, the other major factor was the economic one of getting a living and looking to security in old age. Out of these two motives,

first the natural and then the spiritual, they came, Anglicans, varieties of Protestants, and Roman Catholics, not to mention a motley of roustabouts, and today we survey these United States with a gifted author from that past which he has limned into living, moving, thrilling reality.

Not all of the elements which have contributed to the building of this nation and the unity of its people are contained in Mr. Bates's study. This is not, as it has been said, a full intellectual history, and it has real limitations in respect of religion, which at some points it does not evaluate in due proportion. There is a lack, also, in the weaving, into a single fabric which is American life, of the countless strands and colors which do make a distinct pattern of our society and our democracy. But who is equal to this task? Mr. Bates, in the reviewer's opinion, has come nearer to the achievement than any other writer. He knows there is a pattern, he is exquisitely sensitive to the presence of it, and through every page of the book, especially in the third part, "From Religion to Politics," you feel him working with a rare deftness in words to give you the picture. More than one reader will be able to fill out the design which is wanting in a detail here and there, but no one will say Mr. Bates has failed in what he set himself to do.

He says significantly at the beginning, "Democracy was envisaged in religious terms long before it assumed a political terminology." That is a capital sentence, because every form of government is founded upon a metaphysical theory or basis. Few lay historians understand this, and hardly any statesmen. That is to say, every state begins with a doctrine concerning the nature of God and authority, of the universe, and of man. In democracy it was chiefly a new concept of the nature and the rights of man that divided this new order from the monarchy which it fled.

While the Colonial Churches, with few exceptions, continued to preach on Sunday their thoroughgoing theism, with scant respect for humanity, the people actually lived the proposition, I believe in man. The emphasis that shifted to the human side did not impair belief in God, but it did cause a controversy against the most important of the founding Fathers who were called deists, or in the modern equivalent, humanists. Now all of this Mr. Bates appreciates, and as a decided liberal he gives his sympathetic attention to such leftists of their day as Roger Williams, Anne Hutchinson, Jefferson, Franklin, as against the

Mathers, Timothy Dwight, John Winthrop, and Alexander Hamilton. To be sure, these rightists were also makers of American faith, but if the predominant characteristic of our life steadily moving onward has been liberalism and democracy, Mr. Bates is a just interpreter.

Our faith has been a complex, an amalgamation of hundreds of contending sects, of inherited social, political and economic forces, conflicting even to this day, yet in the conflict there has been, according to Mr. Bates's sound opinion, "a constant tolerance of diversity which has brought us to a kind of residuum of common qualities found in varying degree in nearly all the constituent movements." Out of a method of compromise, and in spite of many logical contradictions, there has come a kind of unity which is American faith not only, but the American religion. This religion that we actually live awaits its own theologians. Precisely as the Reformation, and prior to that the Renaissance, first acted out and later formulated in intellectual terms the things they did and were, so this country and its people will one day have their doctrines to describe themselves dwelling together in a democracy. Mr. Bates has written a preface to such a later work, and he has done it worthily as a scholar, a patriot, and a humanist.

Not the least of his virtues is his large-minded appraisal of the Roman Catholic Church, which ecclesiastical historians are prone to treat unfairly. His knowledge of our heritage is sure, though the tradition of John Wiclif, who lived one hundred and fifty years before Martin Luther, cuts a greater figure in our history than the sixteenth century reformers. Our Colonial heretics who came to prevail in directing our social order and our constitutional foundation, are heroically and truly presented. Where the author is in disagreement with the anti-liberal forces in both religion and politics, he is nevertheless just and objective, with an occasional thrust at some particularly annoying word or act of reaction or intolerance. He seems fascinated with many of the queer religious and quasi-religious movements and their efflorescence of vagaries, which have little or nothing to do with American faith. On the whole, the author's value judgments are unexceptionable, his writing is eloquent, and frequently it is literature. One comes to the end with gratitude to a valiant spirit who died shortly after he finished this work, by which he will be well remembered.

ALBERT C. DIEFFENBACH

Boston Evening Transcript

Forgiveness: Decisive Issue in Protestant Thought. By Paul Lehmann. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940. xv + 234 pp. $2.00.

The point of this polemic is that theology must be based on dialectic, not on anthropology; it must exhibit the paradoxes in the relation of God to man, not the polarities; forgiveness must be catastrophic, total, a miraculous revelation from on high upon an unworthy creature. Any attempt to find in human relations or capacities a basis for God's forgiveness, any attempt to see continuity between God and man is vain, if not wicked. This thesis is developed with considerable erudition and more verbiage by contrasting the theologies of Ritschl and Barth. Ritschl, carrying out Schleiermacher's enterprise, made a theology out of the philosophy of the Enlightenment; Barth, finding theology in a crisis, is compelled increasingly to abandon not only philosophy but all "anthropological sentences." Lehmann's own position is nearer to Barth than to Ritschl, but he laments the most recent tendencies in Barth toward "supernaturalism," that is, the attempt to eliminate all social content from his dialectic. Lehmann pleads for a dialectic concept of grace and forgiveness which faces actual, human crises and can be applied to the Protestant churches today. In so far as Ritschl made the community of believers basic to his thought, he approached a Christian rather than a natural theology; in so far as Barth ignores the movements in which he is forced to live, his "chanting" of grace loses its relevance to crisis. Lehmann's most interesting and informative criticism is to be found in the Appendices and Notes, where he descends from the pulpit or pillar of fire, or whatever it is that generates his prophetic rhetoric.

It may be profitable on the part of a reviewer not to enter the arena of this polemic, but to ask a few questions of the contenders in order to sharpen the real issues. First, why is paradox a better starting point than polarity for an analysis of the relations between God and man, when in the end some sort of mediation must be admitted in either case? Continuity has been exaggerated by the liberals and revelation by the Barthians, as Lehmann proves convincingly. There must be some little anthropology in theology if grace is to enter man, and there must always be some difference between divine and human forgiveness, if theology is to have meaning. Since both dialectical and natural theologies thus lead to the practical problem of mediation, why this insistence on dialectic as the only valid method of theological analysis?

There is a practical answer to this question, which emerges now and then in the course of Lehmann's argument: from the point of view of dialectic, faith is generated in man by his hearing the Word of God; from the point of view of polarity, faith is in man by nature and needs no such generation. The former account implies that the Holy Spirit descends upon man from the pulpit; the latter makes the pulpit unnecessary and gives the Holy Spirit a natural residence in man. It is really the pulpit that is at stake. The Enlightenment denied the Church as necessary mediator between God and man; now, in self-defense, the Church is reasserting its indispensability. Are not both positions extreme? Has the pulpit a monopoly on grace? Admitting that the laymen of the Enlightenment went too far in their anticlerical prejudices, is the Barthian conceit justified that ties the Word of God to the spoken word and the spoken word to the sermon? I know that when cornered the preacher replies that he never said such a blasphemous and arrogant thing. But that is, nevertheless, the only pragmatic implication of his argument. If he were content to insist that God *may* speak through him, the reasonable layman ought to give him a fair trial, but when he asserts that the layman is so far removed not only from God but even from faith that faith itself, to say nothing of grace, must be *given* to him, since he has no natural religious resources whatsoever, the layman feels either insulted or despondent. Why should God and his preachers trouble themselves about things so unworthy? A mediator between God and man is justified in resisting the unregenerate pride of those Christians who demand pardon as a right acquired through Christ's atonement, but he defeats his own ends when his sermons descend so catastrophically on the layman that they promise almost anything but forgiveness. Laymen may have no rights, but to deny them even the potentialities of faith seems unnecessarily inhuman and not in the least plausible.

On the same grounds a layman might question the radical divorce between divine and human forgiveness. In fact, the reader of Lehmann's book gets the impression that God alone forgives. The fact that human beings forgive one another without benefit of clergy is barely referred to and is regarded as having no relation to divine forgiveness. The alternative to divine forgiveness is said to be "self-forgiveness," which is obviously absurd. The gift of grace is a "pure act" on God's part, so pure that it can have no taint of ordinary, natural mercy in it.

Human beings forgive each other continually, a few wrongs at a time. God forgives totally and only in crises. There might be some real point to such a distinction, if it were rigidly maintained, but when we are told that every moment of decision is a crisis, and that all sins as a totality are forgiven at each moment, the question naturally arises whether the gulf between human and divine "acts" is as great as it is theoretically said to be. Here again the pragmatic value of the dialectic is the emphasis on *Christian* forgiveness as it is represented by the Church. In order to save the Church, forgiveness through Christ must be presented as something radically different from natural "moral" forgiveness. But does it not rob the Church of its function in human society to regard the Cross of Christ as totally different from all human crosses? Is not the power of Christ's cross and resurrection related to the recurrence in human experience of crosses and resurrections? To make the life and death of Christ so unique, and to make Christian forgiveness so different from human pardon that no continuity is possible, robs the Christian gospel of its relevance to human experience at large and Christian symbols of their meaning for the uninitiated. In fighting for their human rights Churchmen too often claim divine privileges. Even when seen from inside the Christian Church, there seems little ground for reviving the totalitarian view of regeneration, insisting on the forgiveness of all our sins at a single moment of crisis. In practice, Christian experience has become less catastrophic than it was a century or two ago, and the crisis theology is in danger of becoming merely dialectical, if it tries to revive revivalism in theory and not in practice. "Man exists as *both* sinful *and* righteous because, in the last analysis, he is *either* forgiven *or* condemned, *either* dead *or* awakened from the dead" (pp. 125-26). If "the last analysis" is temporally the last judgment, there may be a real point in contrasting the state of man's existence with the final judgment on that existence, but if "ultimate" judgment occurs in the crises of human existence, how can forgiveness and condemnation be "either-or" when sin and righteousness are "both-and"? Lehmann, following Barth, criticizes very effectively the idea of a "state of grace," maintaining that grace is always an event. This recurrence of grace in the course of events makes it a temporal and living thing, not a state of being judged, and is more consistent with a theory of continuity than of dialectic.

This observation leads me, lastly, to question the identification of

forgiveness with justification. I realize that this means questioning a long and distinguished Lutheran tradition. Lehmann says:

> Exegetical and historico-theological usage combines with Ritschl's own to make the terms *justification* and *forgiveness* interchangeable. Although Ritschl employs the former more widely and more specifically, the latter will be adopted in the citations that follow in so far as the requirements of the present context involve no essential modification of those of the original (p. 215, n. 3).

There seems to me good reason for not using "forgiveness" and "justification" interchangeably. When a criminal is pardoned he is usually not justified. Forgiveness puts an end to a grievance, but does not pass judgment. It expresses a willingness to forget injury rather than an acquittal. To say that "forgiveness is the judgment of God over man, wherein man is predicated with both sin and righteousness" (p. 7) is less a paradox than a confusion. Forgiveness is not a judgment at all, and no one is justified by it. It may be fulfilment of the law to do justice and love mercy, but it is godlike to love justice and do mercy. To approach forgiveness as a legal problem is to misconceive it at the start. The reconciliation wrought by Christ need not be translated into the antiquated legalism of imputation, atonement, redemption, and justification. Reconciliation needs neither law nor ethics; it is based simply on penitence and love. To a legalistic mind penitence and love are indeed "unheard-of miracles," but they occur daily among men as well as before God.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

Columbia University

A Philosophy of Religion. By EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940. $3.00.

This study represents, not the culmination, but a higher stage in the dialectic of Professor Brightman's thinking. *An Introduction to Philosophy*, in 1925 (still one of the best introductory texts), represents the earliest important resting-place in that dialectic. The present volume does not need the *Introduction* to be understood, for it is self-explanatory in all respects, except the argument for personalistic idealism. But all of the earlier stages of the dialectic, including *A Philosophy of Ideals* (1928), the ethics of *Moral Laws* (1933), the religious philosophy of *The Problem of God* (1930), and *The Finding*

of God (1931), need this comprehensive and incisive work as an elaboration, correction, and deepening of earlier insights.

It will be quite surprising if this volume does not help to fill the need for good texts in the philosophy of religion. For it presents concisely the significant empirical facts (history, psychology, and sociology) of religion, and then proceeds to relate them to all the other significant data, including the biological and physical. This study is all the more important because it stands as an internal critique of traditional theism, and an inescapable challenge to present theological supernaturalism on the one hand, and to contemporary "empirical" naturalism and positivism on the other.

Professor Brightman represents what I am going to call the more empirical tendencies within that movement (Personalism) which finds metaphysical and moral problems most coherently explained by the hypothesis that ultimate reality is a society of minds, the omnipotent and morally perfect Deity and the finite persons whom He creates and sustains. Physical nature, on this view, is a part of God's metaphysical being, the energizing of God's will. The empirical demands of Professor Brightman's thinking force him to agree that God and resultant reality are personal (and temporal), but also to insist that God is finite in will-power and therefore in the realization of goodness. This review will confine itself to the more outstanding and characteristic theses of Professor Brightman's thought as presented in this book.

1. The theme underlying and recurring throughout this volume is that the philosopher must be inspired by the empirical spirit and armed with empirical method in his battle for truth. This means that *no aspect* of human experience (consciousness), whether it be æsthetic, religious, moral, or sensational, whether it be wish, ideal, reason, or perception, is to be ruled out of the philosopher's court before it has been allowed to present its case. For any truth which is worthy of the name must be based on an analysis and synthesis of the data of experience as a whole. Since Brightman is here especially concerned with the relation of values to non-valuational experience, the first 107 pages deal with the data of religio-ethical valuation.

2. But Brightman does not confuse empirical *method* in the search for truth with the *criterion* of truth. The criterion of truth is coherence. Since many have misinterpreted this concept as used by Brightman and other personalists, the warning must be immediately issued that this

criterion is not to be confused with one doctrine of metaphysical absolutism, the coherence theory or definition of truth. Brightman's *definition* of truth is correspondence between the proposition and the referent, and not coherence.

The coherence criterion entails more than mere consistency or the absence of logical contradiction, though consistency is a minimum requirement of any coherent hypothesis. Specifically, Brightman's coherence is an empirical coherence which can be attributed only to that hypothetical proposition which is not only consistent with all the known facts of experience, but also constitutes the best interpretation of the facts and relations of experience "in its details and as a whole" (cf. p. 128). Since this criterion forces an hypothesis to be ever related to the whole of experience and knowledge, it becomes "a principle of constant reorganization, a law of criticism and growth, rather than a closed system" (pp. 128, 129). Absolute truth is consequently a fiction which must give way to tentative, most probable, synoptic hypotheses relevant to experience as a whole.

3. Having thus "sterilized his instruments," Brightman analyzes critically various historical and contemporary conceptions of God. The difficulties in other views lead him to the personalistic hypothesis which the remainder of the book validates. The God of the personalist is a conscious Person immanent both in nature and in the value-possibilities of which man and nature together give evidence. But the careful reader must note the sense in which God is said to be a Person. For the personalist, the words "person" and "personality" refer to a "self-experiencing whole which includes thinking, choosing, remembering, anticipating, and purposing, as well as feeling and sensing" (p. 348, and cf. pp. 350 ff.). God is a person who shares the *essential* processes of a personal entity: "*qualia* (including ideal norms) . . . a wide range of temporal and spatial consciousness, time-transcendence and space-transcendence, free purposive self-control, rational awareness of meaning, free response to environment, and privacy of consciousness" (p. 363). But the divine Person differs from the human person in that He is eternal and uncreated, has no physiological framework, and creates and sustains finite persons. While He "undoubtedly has types of experience unknown to us," (p. 367) there is "no adequate empirical or rational ground for asserting that there is anything in God which is not experience" (p. 368). Finally, the divine Person is "completely and per-

fectly personal" (p. 368) in that the essentials of His personal experience do not have the imperfections characteristic of human persons, moral or psychological (though the power of God's will also is finite).

Obviously, the personalistic God is no simple-minded anthropomorphic image, and some critics of Personalism would be more relevant if these distinctions and the bases for them were recalled. It would seem to me, however, that Personalists, including Professor Brightman, might help to avoid confusion by refraining from the use of the ambiguous word "personality" for God and restricting themselves to the word "person." For "person," as Brightman himself is at pains to point out, refers to a specific kind or grade of self-conscious experience or self. To use the word "personality" for this same metaphysical entity is to invite confusion with the legitimate psychological meaning of the term which cannot be intelligibly attributed to God on the personalistic view. For, psychologically, personality is a culturally acquired product; if it is a unity, the unity is acquired and not given, as is that of the personal self. The psychological personality is an instrument of adjustment which the self or person develops as he learns to adjust to his environment and his own given nature. Since God's personality is not such a by-product, it would seem wiser to refer to Him only as a Person and thus avoid misinterpretation.

4. In any case, Brightman is now obligated to realize the empirical ideal of proving that God's existence is "organically related to the facts and . . . needed in order to interpret them coherently" (p. 191). Accordingly, he proceeds to evaluate various ways of knowing God. Brightman himself is an epistemological dualist, who, carefully limiting the weasel word "experience" to the data of immediate consciousness, claims that there is no immediate *knowledge* of any trans-experiential object. The existence of any trans-experiential object is never given, but is always a reasonable inference from the data of consciousness. Applying this epistemological dualism to religious experience of God, Brightman is willing to concede the knowledge-claim of any experience which purports to be religious, but rightly insists that all such knowledge-claims, far from being independent and indubitable ways of knowing God, must be shown to be empirically coherent and logically consistent with all other empirical data and knowledge-claims. For similar reasons, Brightman is not willing to accept any autonomous religious a priori such as is held by his scholarly friend Albert C. Knudson.

Is there then no religious revelation? Brightman's answer may be summarized as follows. If revelation refers to an essentially cognitive relation, to the immediate communication of truth from the divine to the human mind, then there is none. If, however, "revelation is the communicating of power and purpose, rather than truth," (p. 177) then it has meaning in a theistic world in which God is both immanent and transcendent. This teleological and dynamic view of revelation is certainly not confronted with the difficulties encountered by the dogmatic revelationist, when he maintains the intrinsic validity of religious experience despite the conflicting variety of religious revelation and the difficulty of establishing exactly what the peculiarly religious datum is. One might wish, however, that Brightman had discussed this latter problem more distinctly and had clarified further the sense in which revelation can be the communication of power and especially purpose—an extremely tangled problem to be sure.

5. Without the independent aid of religious revelation, Brightman builds his argument from the facts and interrelations of natural and value experience. Although Brightman, nowhere to my knowledge, explicitly names his argument for the existence of God teleological (cf. pp. 215 ff.), the tenor of the total argument, as I, perhaps mistakenly, understand it, is teleological. The phase of the argument which is distinctive of Brightman is called "the dialectic of desire," and deserves more thorough discussion than is possible here.

Briefly, Brightman argues that the rational development of the desire for pleasure, the first step in the dialectic, entails not only the desire for physical things, for activity, for personal sharing, but the desire for ideals as well. As Brightman sees it, the validity of these ideals depends on their lying "beyond all human personalities as their objective goal and judge" (p. 255). If the dialectic is to be rationally complete, the next stage must involve "a supreme person in whom supreme good is acknowledged and actualized" (p. 256). In other words, logical and reflective thought about human desires, the "anatomy of good," as Brightman calls the dialectic, suggests belief in God as a supreme Person. Brightman is the first to realize that this "immanent logic of desire" omits "the plain and inevitable fact of evil," and he treats the dialectic as suggestive only, until the facts of evil have been taken into account.

This phase of the total argument for God causes the reviewer most pause, for even the suggestiveness of the dialectic is grounded in logi-

cal completeness rather than the empirical facts of value and their de facto realization in human experience. Were this the only phase of the argument, the grounds for the existence of God would be empirically weak.

As already indicated, however, the dialectic of desire is only that phase of the argument which has to do with a movement within human experience. The total argument, as I see it, takes into account the value-producing processes in biological and physical nature which support the human experience and realization of value. To quote: "At least a part of nature contains evidence that there is an objective source and continuer of value. Man's value experiences are certainly no mere subjective creations of his fancy or his mores; beauty, order, co-operation, adaptation, have their objective grounds" (p. 216). Nature is one of the areas through which God's purposes are being realized, it being a mechanism sustained and controlled by more ultimate purposes and values. A world in which nature and man are evidence of value-producing processes calls for the hypothesis of a Value-Producer and Continuer. This Agent cannot be an impersonal process, for there can be no appreciation and initiation of value where there is no conscious will.

6. Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of Brightman's thinking about God is revealed by the empirical fashion in which he faces the problem of evil. Atheism is usually the hypothesis designed to explain evil; theism to explain good. The problem of "good-and-evil" constitutes for this empiricist the essential theoretical conflict which the God-hypothesis must resolve.

Brightman finds not only a hierarchy of organically related values, but also intrinsic evils interpenetrating with goods. Those evils fall into two main classes: (a) evils, like incoherent will, ignorance, maladjustment, and incompetence, which might be decreased by internal development, and (b) irreducible evil, such as imbecility, which cannot, without unempirical appeal to the unknown, be said to contribute to the "whole of good." Brightman does not first prove God or no-God and then explain away, or treat indifferently, some evils or some goods. His is the dialectic of "productive interrelation." For him traditional theism not only violates empirical procedure when it explains (away!) evil by appealing to ignorance of the final outcome, but it also destroys the validity of all value-judgments. For if present evil may in the long run be a good, as traditionalists maintain, then present good in the

long run may be evil. Better sacrifice theism than admit such chaos into the realm of reasonable values!

7. In this predicament Brightman sees that either the moral goodness of God or his omnipotence must go, if philosophy of religion is to be empirically guided, if, specifically, one is to take into account the excess, undisciplinary evils of existence. The explanatory hypothesis Brightman suggests is a good (loving) God with tremendous but not infinite power, the creator of the universe and man, the initiator and sustainer of all value-processes. The good will of God works under conditions prescribed, not by some power beyond him, but by his own uncreated nature. To these conditions Brightman assigns the name "the Given" and carefully indicates that on the formal side it contains the necessities of reason, while on the side of content, recalcitrant, brute fact is present to the divine consciousness. "The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (*qualia*), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil" (p. 337). Rather than dichotomizing the nature of God, the Given in both its aspects "eternally enters into every moment of the divine experience and into everything that is, either as obstacle or as instrument to the will of God" (p. 300).

8. Thus empirical coherence dethrones power and establishes love "at work under difficulties" (p. 318). If there is any argument for God at all, it is at the same time an argument for the claim that this volitionally finite God, though impeded by the nonrational Given, is in sufficient control of the universe to effect the order and value which are empirically discovered in cosmic and human history. Brightman's universe is a melioristic one, not of infinite perfection, but of "inexhaustible perfectibility." And upon the rock of God's goodness and control rests the reasonable faith in (conditional) immortality for those "whom God judges to be capable of developing worthily at any time in their future existence" (p. 408).

This review, which has dealt mainly with Professor Brightman's Personalism, must not leave the impression that this volume is written with a personalistic bias or for personalists. From beginning to end it provides an independent analysis and exposition of the many problems

and various solutions which confront serious thinking about religion. In a day when irrational and unreasonable absolutes, when religious and anti-religious dogmatism are seeking ascendancy, when movements back to the theological and political right again question the power and validity of reason, we are fortunate indeed to have for ourselves and our students a demonstration of the power of empirical reasoning as a guide for faith.

PETER A. BERTOCCI

Bates College

The Human Meaning of Science. By ARTHUR H. COMPTON. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940. xii + 88 pp. $1.00.

This little book represents the McNair Lectures at the University of North Carolina for 1939. It consists of a preface, and three chapters, headed respectively: I. "Science, Religion, and Human Growth"; II. "Human Freedom and Physical Law"; and III. "The Need for God in an Age of Science." The main objective is "to show the need for both science and religion in order that man shall grow to his full stature" (xii).

In the first chapter, Dr. Compton maintains "that it is primarily through the growth of science and technology that man has acquired those attributes which distinguish him from the animals" (2), and that the rate of growth of knowledge and control of nature has increased to such an extent that "in the last generation science has exerted a more profound influence in changing all aspects of life than has been exerted in a comparable period by any other agency" (12). After admitting that the powers put in man's hands by science may be used for evil or for good, the author asserts that a technological society requires an increasing degree of co-operation; thus "science is emphasizing as never before the need for love of neighbors" (16), and "the man of science" is in complete accord with the principle of Christian love.

In the second chapter, after explaining indeterminacy and the statistical nature of physical law, the author maintains the freedom of man on the basis of his own experience of the effectiveness of purpose, which is "more direct and cogent than any logical argument based on scientific generalizations" (49). Physical laws are of universal validity; but they only define the limits or possibilities of action, and are

not a complete account of the world. Every small-scale event has an unpredictable quality, and consciousness seems to be made up of these small-scale events. Thus, "instead of removing the foundation of morality, science now presents new reasons why men should discipline their lives, and supplies new means whereby they can make their world more perfect" (55).

In the final chapter, Dr. Compton distinguishes between the means of living and the content or value of life, such as we get in the exercise of reason, love of beauty, desire for friendship and selection of the good; and although he does not say that science is concerned with the means, he does hold that the values, or at least the fundamental values, belong to religion and depend on God, the Intelligence or Power that has shaped the world. He believes that the argument from design has never been "adequately refuted" (62), and maintains that as almost none of the laws of science are considered proved but are accepted as working hypotheses, so "faith in an intelligent God may be a thoroughly scientific attitude." But our new information will probably modify our conception of God as well as the world; and "clearly it is toward the mechanized communities that we must look to find the most rapid adaptation of our thought and customs" (85). In development through science, education, and religion, men become partners of God.

It is clearly of immense importance to our culture to have scientists of the rank of Dr. Compton not only interested in religion, but also willing to discuss the philosophical significance of their discoveries and theories. No amount of naïveté on their part can justify attacks of fellow-scientists or professional philosophers on their attempt to bring out the full cultural implications of science as they see it. For the only alternatives are, either to keep scientific discoveries in their strictly technical formulae, which would be to deny them any cognitive significance for general culture, or to confine the task of elucidation to professional philosophers, most of whom do not know enough science. It is far better in the end to make the cultural significance a matter of co-operation between scientists and philosophers; and such co-operation depends upon our having some scientists, like Dr. Compton, who will state their attitude in general terms that all intelligent people can understand.

The present review may be taken as an attempt on the part of a phi-

losopher to do his part in the proceeding. And the first thing to make clear is that any refusal to recognize the results of science on the whole, or any minimizing of its importance, whether in the name of the humanities or of religion or of a culture, is simply intellectual suicide. On that fundamental point we must stand with Dr. Compton. But we may well raise the question whether he has not overstated the case. Does science, as science, emphasize the need for love of neighbors? and does "the man of science" as such delight in Christian principles? Since this book was written, the Prime Minister of Greater Britain has called our attention to a "perverted science," which is being used to thwart many of the moral and religious principles in which Dr. Compton believes, including love of neighbors. Must we not face this fact with greater frankness than is found in the present book? And when we do, will it not make for clarity if we keep the term "science" for the cognitive enterprise pure and simple, and distinguish it from all practical employment of its results to further some purpose? From that point of view, the future may lie with technological and mechanized communities, as Dr. Compton suggests; but that is not the full story, for some of them may also be good, and others bad.

ROBERT SCOON

Princeton University

The Integration of the Personality. By C. G. JUNG. Translated by STANLEY M. DELL. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939. 313 pp. $3.00.

Dr. Jung of Zürich is a man of many interests and many accomplishments. Evidence of his proficiency in psychology is to be found in the word association tests which he initiated. His thorough grasp of psychiatry is shown in his brilliant study of Dementia Praecox, and in his incisive contributions to psychoanalytic theory during his early association with Freud. He is also well-versed in philosophy and in comparative religion. The present book represents the latter interests. It takes its departure from his theory of the "collective unconscious." In sharp distinction from the usual view which would derive all subliminal phenomena from consciousness and its contents, Jung holds that the conscious mind is based upon and results from an unconscious psyche which is prior to consciousness and independent of it. Just as the body is the resultant of a long phylogenetic history, so the mind

is something far more than an individual manifestation. This unconscious has apparently no center of its own, but among its manifold components are three "archetypes" which are commonly personified, the "anima," the "shadow," and the "wise old man." By the "anima" he means that unconscious component of the personality which in a man is feminine and in a woman masculine. Its moral range is wide, embracing both the degraded woman and the "femme inspiratrice." Always however it belongs in a world in which ten thousand years is but as yesterday. There may be something elfin about it, but it is old and wise, and with it the ego must come to terms. The "shadow" in the case of the man is masculine. It represents the inferior and less commendable part of the personality. The "wise old man" is the magician, the medicine man, the enlightener and teacher.

Evidence for the existence of these archetypes he offers in the analysis of a series of dreams and in a study of medieval alchemy.

The dream material consists of four hundred dreams and visual impressions by a scientifically trained, relatively normal, youngish man. These dreams were secured without knowledge on his part of the problems involved, and, except for the last forty-five, without personal contact with Dr. Jung. From these dreams Dr. Jung presents extracts of the first twenty-two in the order of their occurrence. He then selects out fifty-nine which exhibit what he calls the "mandala" or "sacred circle" pattern. These dreams are presented apart from the life history of the dreamer, which he is not free to divulge. He holds that they may be dealt with as fragmentary texts or inscriptions in an unknown language. By comparing one with another, each in its context, it is possible to discover meanings. He thus finds, particularly in these dreams of the "mandala" pattern, a certain central symbol around which the personal psyche chases like a shy animal, fascinated and frightened at the same time, always running away and yet always approaching.

In the study of medieval alchemy Dr. Jung sees much that throws light upon this dream material. The alchemist, he finds, was far less concerned about turning base metal into gold than with psychic adventure. Alchemists were for the most part solitary men, who worked in great secrecy and concerned themselves with the discovery of the philosopher's stone and of that which was most worth while, not merely physical gold but spiritual redemption. In their writings he

finds abundant mandala symbolism and evidence of a state of relative unconsciousness which causes suffering and calls for redemption through the pairing of opposites.

For the achievement of its higher potentialities, the personality must be faced with the unconscious and come to terms with it. This involves the process of "individuation." It means learning to hear the voice of God, and being true to the "vocation" which thus comes to one. This is no easy process. Neuroses very frequently represent the attempt to escape from the inner voice, while the mechanisms of convention and of organized religion have as their function to keep men unconscious so that like wild game they can follow their customary runways without the painful necessity of conscious choice. It is thus only the few who are saved. These become the heroes who stand out like mountain peaks among the mass that has clung to its collective fears, convictions, laws, and methods.

The chief new contribution in this book is to be found in the chapter on medieval alchemy. This is a field which has been receiving little attention. Dr. Jung has approached it from a fresh viewpoint and with scholarly care. The other chapters merely offer additional material bearing upon theories which he has previously elaborated.

To this reviewer the new evidence brought forward in this book is not convincing. With Jung's general viewpoint regarding the purposive aspects of human nature and the unconscious forces which make for health and for salvation he is in full agreement, and he regards it as salutary to have it brought home to our attention that human nature is infinitely complex. But the type of explanation offered in this book seems to be the reverse of that sought in scientific inquiry. Instead of explaining the unknown in terms of the known, Dr. Jung seems here to have followed the example of his alchemists in explaining things on the principle of *obscurum per obscurius, ignotum per ignotius.*

ANTON T. BOISEN

Chicago Theological Seminary

BOOK NOTES

La Religione antica nelle sue linee fondamentali. By Carlo Kerényi. (*Storia delle Religioni*, xiv). Bologna: Zanichelli, 1940. xii + 285 pp.

The fourteenth volume in Raffaele Pettazzoni's good series is a translation from the German manuscript of Karl Kerényi. In this book, as in his other writings on Greek and Roman religion (notably *Apollon, Studien über antike Religion und Humanität*, Amsterdam, 1937), Kerényi shows the influence of the so-called Frankfurt Ideology, as represented by Leo Frobenius, the founder of *Kulturmorphologie*, by Walter Otto, and by Franz Altheim. This school sets a high value upon intuition in the study of ancient religion; its aim is to relive the ancient attitude. With such a procedure scientific method is apt to merge into meditation on human existence in general. The results are very different from the accumulation, classification, and interpretation of ancient evidence to be found in a work of orthodox historical scholarship such as Pfister's *Die Religion der Griechen und Römer*. An obvious objection to the impressionistic method is *suppressio veri*, and this in turn must almost inevitably bring with it *suggestio falsi*. What Kerényi says of ancient religions is largely true, but other intuitions, supported by equally valid evidence, would lead to other and equally valid aspects of truth.

Kerényi's central doctrine, as stated in his first chapter, is that ancient religion was based on a sense of reality, not on faith which itself implies the possibility of denial. The ancients were without that kind of faith, because their gods were realities which needed no revelation. The reality of religious ideas was based on the intuitive certainty, not conviction, that these ideas expressed the true nature of the universe, and that the universe was unquestionably an orderly cosmos. Even without forces whose existence requires and act of faith, Kerényi continues in his second chapter, men have a *senso di festività*, which gives them the capacity to live on a plane other than the commonplace. Kerényi then glances at such words as *pistis, deisdaimonia, nomos, hosion, hieron, sebas, aidôs, eusebeia, eulabeia, nemesis, sacrum, pietas, religio. Begriffsforschung* can be very fruitful, but Kerényi, does not carry us much beyond what a lexicon would supply. The remaining chapters have interesting views of sacrifice, the laughter of the gods, the life of the *flamen dialis*, the ancient view of death. For the well ballasted student these views will be stimulating and suggestive, but, as an introduction to its subject, the book is at least inadequate, and perhaps even misleading.

Moses Hadas

Popular Buddhism in China. By Shao Chang Lee. Introduction by Johannes Rahder, Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 1939. vi + 75 pp.

"The purpose of this small volume is to answer some of the more important questions on Chinese Buddhism asked by interested students in classes

on Chinese history, Oriental religions, and Chinese civilization, conducted at the University of Hawaii since 1922. It assumes the form of five titles, which present a concise account of the development of Buddhism in China, a collection of current Buddhist proverbs, a set of ten poems on Buddhism as a unifying religion, a new translation of Hsüan Ts'ang's *Essence of the Wisdom Sutra*, and a fresh rendering of Kumarajiva's *The Diamond Sutra*" (From the author's Foreword, p. v).

One may gather from this statement that the seventy-five pages of this book offer much in little. And indeed, while Professor Lee has kept all within a small compass, his work has been carefully done. As to the quality of the translations, the authority of Professor Rahder of Leiden may be cited: "In Mr. Shao Chang Lee's excellent translation of *The Diamond Sutra*, *The Wisdom Sutra*, and the ten Buddhist poems are equally evident his philosophical acumen, his keen philosophical insight, his firm grasp of elusive thought patterns and his delicate sense of literary beauty."

The nine-page sketch of the historical development of Buddhism in China stops with the tenth century. The sutras selected for translation give rather preponderant emphasis to subtle *Prajnaparamita* doctrines like that of *sunya*. But this emphasis is balanced by copious notes that elaborate informingly on other aspects of Chinese Buddhism alluded to in the texts, so that some impression of its comprehensive and eclectic character in relation to native Chinese traditions is gained. There are four illustrations, and twenty-five pages are devoted to giving the Chinese of the translated texts. The whole may serve as an authentic little manual.

H. L. F.

The Gospels: Their Origin and Growth. By Donald Wayne Riddle. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939. ix + 305 pp. $3.00.

The study of the New Testament gospels has taken a new lease on life in the past two decades. The discovery that the form in which the materials about Jesus appear in the gospel record is, in and of itself, evidence as to the way in which the gospels were written has set a new objective for New Testament study, has brought new zest into research and has indeed added materially to our knowledge. Professor Donald Riddle, of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, himself an exponent of this type of research, has undertaken in this book to report for students who are not themselves on the firing-line of research the findings of the Form-Critical school as they bear on the story of how the Christian tradition started and how it developed into our present gospels.

Dr. Riddle's major interest is in the *process of growth* in the literary expression of Christianity. The content of the gospels concerns him mainly as a reflection of the process of this growth. The form which the stories and sayings take serves to reveal the social situation in the Christian communities, and through these avenues he builds up a clear and consistent picture of the way the gospels took shape.

The importance and adequacy of the oral tradition before the gospels were written; the constantly growing body of tradition; the variety in the forms in which this tradition was shaped; and the determining character of the religious needs of the Christian communities are consistent emphases through the work. This book is not to be looked to for an interpretation of the content of the gospels, nor for an estimate of the religious significance of Jesus. Not all who read it will accept its major conclusion; namely, that the gospel materials were shaped by the religious needs of the Christian communities, and not by the words and deeds of Jesus. But scholars and laymen who wish to be more adequately informed about the methods of the new type of research on the gospels, and who are interested to discover how one exponent of these methods draws his conclusions, will find this work of genuine value.

MARY ELY LYMAN

Paul: Man of Conflict. By DONALD WAYNE RIDDLE. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1940. 244 pp. $2.00.

From the plethora of books on Paul, Dr. Riddle's stands out as based solely on the "primary" sources in the "acknowledged" Epistles, the "secondary" data in Acts being passed over. That this makes very much difference in the resulting portrait of Paul himself, however, cannot be said: Paulinism, as Dr. Riddle reconstructs it, moves along the familiar lines of early struggles with the Law (Romans 7 is accepted as autobiographical), peace won through the conversion experience, the conclusion that the Law is unavailing for salvation, the formulation of the justification doctrine, the further experience of sanctification through the Spirit, the theories as to baptism and the Church—all this is abundantly familiar. The chief innovation is in form rather than substance. Dr. Riddle deliberately adopts a tone of "detached and dispassionate empiricism" (p. 61), treating Paul simply as a figure in past history, from whom "one may learn . . . not a little which is instructive and useful in modern religious life and leadership" (p. 181). This objectivity is heightened in tone by employing a very modern and technical vocabulary for the appraisement of Paul's thinking: "He achieved his redintegrated life" (p. 84), "quasi-philosophical formulation of terms and concepts and a radically mystical articulation of message" (page 116), "a high degree of spiritistic expression" (p. 158; where Paul says "Holy Spirit" Dr. Riddle always writes "spiritistic"), "having such a frame of reference" (p. 214). In other words, the book is written, not for the general public, but for rather advanced students who have specialized in religious psychology and sociology; in order to follow certain parts of the work, moreover—especially the chronological discussion in Appendix II—unusual familiarity with technical New Testament criticism is essential.

A few points may be noticed. Paul's pre-conversion experience was by no means unique (p. 35); all that he says about human beings and the Law

is duplicated in 4 Ezra. In speaking of Hellenistic Judaism (p. 39), Dr. Riddle forgets Paul's familiarity with the Book of Wisdom. In 1 Corinthians 7, in the matter of mixed marriages, Paul shows expert knowledge of Halacha (p. 47); no born Pharisee could fail to know it, but in discarding the Law, Paul discarded Halacha with it. When in Philippians 1:23 Paul writes, "I have a desire to depart and be with Christ," he certainly shows no evidence of thinking that because of the postponement of the Parousia "the very keystone of the arch of his convictions . . . had collapsed" (p. 166). And if Paul had really been thrown to the beasts in Ephesus (p. 118)—what is the evidence?—how did he manage to come out alive? On the other hand, while certain of Dr. Riddle's past works have been criticized through over-attention to environment and insufficient attention to personality, it is a pleasure to note the emphasis laid in the present volume on personality rather than environment; pages 152-156, especially, are models of judicious writing.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

Church and State in the Later Roman Empire: The Religious Policy of Anastasius the First, 491-518. By PETER CHARANIS. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1939. 102 pp. $1.50.

In this careful and exhaustive monograph the author is less concerned with Anastasius' domination over the prelates and with their rivalries inside the orthodox and Monophysite churches than with demonstrating the independence of the emperor's policy. While privately a Monophysite, Anastasius shifted his support on occasion, primarily for the purpose of keeping his heterogeneous subjects loyal to his regime. The new oriental sources utilized here would seem to make it necessary that consideration of the general problem be extended to the other periods as well; there is perhaps no other way of testing Charanis' interpretation of the rapidly moving events of this quarter-century. The sole element lacking in the narrative, in so far as the reviewer can judge, is the role played by the demes, or Hippodrome factions, who seem to have been divided on social as well as on religious lines.

JOSHUA STARR

The Armenian Church. By PAPKEN CATHOLICOS GULESSERIAN, translated by TERENIG VARTABED POLADIAN. Second edition. New York: The Gotchnag Press, 1939. xii + 61 pp.

A convenient little manual summarising the traditional history of the early Church in Armenia, its doctrines, its liturgy, its Church year, its version of the Bible, the various bodies into which it has become divided (Armenians proper, Uniates, and Protestants), and its ecclesiastical organisation, with a strong protest against the charge of monophysitism so often levelled against it. As a general, though uncritical, introduction it may be

recommended; but for a deeper knowledge one must still refer to such works as Malachia Ormanian's *The Church of Armenia* (English translation, London, 1912) and (from the Roman Catholic point of view) chapters xi-xii of R. Janin's *Les Églises orientales et les rites orientaux* (2d ed., Paris, 1926).

L. H. G.

The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship. By Franklin Le Van Baumer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. x + 259 pp. $2.50.

"Never in English history has the king played a more important role than during the first half of the sixteenth century. The early Tudor era marked the king's acquisition of greater powers, temporal and spiritual, than he has ever wielded indisputably before or since." The political theory arising out of this development is the subject of this book. The contention is that, despite the realities, the political writers of the period claimed less for the king than did the royalists of the next century. An effete monarchy often makes its most extravagant pretensions when on the point of dissolution. When the prerogative of the crown was challenged by parliament in the age of the Stuarts, divine right was claimed by the king. But Henry VIII, with parliament solidly behind him in his struggle with the Pope, exercised power without claiming it, and the political pamphleteers thought still in medieval terms in subordinating the king to law, natural and positive, and in urging the king's moral responsibility. With regard, at least, to the civil authority of the king, Tudor political thought was conservative, more conservative than the facts.

In the ecclesiastical area, however, the author emphasizes the novelty alike of fact and theory. In point of fact, Henry established a national church free of Roman control. The king took to himself the jurisdictional, if not the sacramental role of the medieval papacy. Though the king was no priest and could not perform the sacraments, nor transmit the apostolic succession, yet together with parliament he could govern and legislate for the church. This innovation could not be justified out of the main stream of English medieval political thought, and the writer most extensively and effectively used in the Henrician propaganda was the continental imperialist, Marsilius of Padua.

This picture seems to me essentially sound. Henry, of course, did something thoroughly novel in that he erected a national church which endured, and the revolution in English political thought, as evidenced by the appropriation of Marsilius, is highly instructive. Nevertheless, the novelty seems to me to be slightly overdone, and I wonder whether the ecclesiastical revolution and its theory might not be brought somewhat more nearly into accord with medieval precedents and ideas.

Take an instance which the author employs to demonstrate the radicalness of Henry's actual conduct. In 1512 he was ready to go to war with

France rather than suffer the Pope to be brought under the domination of Louis XII. A quarter of a century later Henry himself repudiated papal authority. What a *volte face!* Not precisely, because in the meantime what Henry feared had come to pass, and the papacy had succumbed to the control of another European power, in this instance Spain. That was why Henry could not secure from the Pope permission to set aside a Spanish princess. At the moment Henry was not prepared to fight Spain, and England was too remote for a transfer of the papacy to Canterbury or the setting up of a counterpope in good medieval fashion. The remaining recourse, also medieval, was to incur excommunication and wait for a convenient time to capitulate on acceptable terms. Whether Henry intended to do this may be questioned, in view of the bridges he burned, but his supporters like Gardiner, as Janelle has pointed out, may well have interpreted his moves in this sense at first.

The author has shown that a defense of lay control over the temporalities of the church was novel in English political thought. Yet if one envisages the whole of Church history, including the Caesaropapism of Justinian, enshrined in the reviving Rome law, such theory and practice were not altogether unprecedented.

This learned book stimulates thought and provokes discussion. Among its other excellencies is a thorough and extensive description of the materials utilized in the study.

ROLAND H. BAINTON

Eusebius Matthopoulos, Founder of Zoe, A Biography. By SERAPHIM PAPAKOSTA, ARCHIMANDRITE. Translated by A. MASSOUTI. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1939. New York: The Macmillan Co. pp. xvi + 107. $.90.

This simple and unassuming biography gives us an excellent picture of one of the outstanding leaders of the Orthodox Church in Greece for many years. The Archimandrite Eusebius Matthopoulos, during his long service, was directly concerned in all the attempts which were made to reawaken the spiritual life of the Greek Church, and to adapt it to the modern world and modern conditions. We are often tempted to forget that there is much live thought and hard work being done behind the apparently changeless exterior of the Orthodox Church. The liberation of the Balkan countries from the five-century-long domination by the Ottoman Empire created many problems which we in the West have never realized. There was need of remedying old abuses, of creating new instruments of the religious life, and this has been seriously undertaken, especially by the Brotherhood of Zoe.

The author of this volume has sketched in broad outlines the essential elements of these problems, and has given us one of the few books available in English which describe what is taking place and has taken place in the religious life of the Orthodox peoples. Father Eusebius deserves a high rank among religious leaders the world over, and we can be very grateful to the

publishers for making his book available in English. We can only hope that more books of this kind will appear, and that they will combine so well the historical and devotional aspects of the problem. The volume deserves to be known to students in many fields of religious and social studies.

C. A. M.

Religion Yesterday and Today. By Henry Sloane Coffin. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1940. 183 pp. $1.75.

These are the Deems Lectures at New York University, delivered by the President of Union Theological Seminary. They were also given at Emory University in Atlanta, on the Jarrell Foundation. Dr. Coffin has endeavored, as he suggests, "to portray some of the factors which influenced thinking among . . . Christians a half century ago and some of the factors since which have led some of us, their successors, to modify or revise their views."

The lectures are marked by the charm of style, the penetration of insight, and the wealth of quotation and illustration for which Dr. Coffin is so well-known among preachers. They range from a discussion of the influence of evolutionary science, with its result in an all-too-immanental theology, to the new social conscience and the revival of concern for the Church as an indispensable part of the Christian gospel.

Dr. Coffin says that he has confined himself purposely to "that segment of the American Church" with which he has been familiar. For that reason, it may be remarked, the survey seems not quite adequate; very little is said, for example, of the Modernist Movement in the Roman Church, or of the development of a "liberal Catholicism" in the Anglican Communion. The theological discussion lacks reference to the work done in recent years by the Archbishop of York, especially in the matter of revelation—a change which seems more fundamental than many to which Dr. Coffin directs attention.

But any reader will have special interests for which he will want a place. And the volume itself gives us an informative sketch of the Protestant scene in America since, perhaps, 1880 or 1890.

W. Norman Pittenger

Christianity Goes to Press. By Edgar J. Goodspeed. New York: The Macmillan Company. vi + 115 pp. $1.50.

These are the Richard Lectures which Dr. Goodspeed delivered at the University of Virginia last October. They trace (1) the influence of publication upon the formation of Christian literature—primarily the New Testament—and then (2) the influence of Christian publication upon the publication, transmission, and even the writing of other literature. First century Judaism in Palestine was not literary; the earliest form of Christian preaching and teaching was therefore oral. But it was not long before Christianity burst these bonds and became literary: "Throughout the writing of the New Testament, Christianity may be seen growing more and more Greek in content."

It was Christianity which took the spoken Greek and made it a literary language, as the Egyptian papyri prove. It was Christianity which gave the world the codex or leaf-book, in place of the vellum or papyrus roll: Christian literature (which included the Greek Old Testament) was too extensive, too bulky, for convenient use in this older form; and Christian literature was written and published to be *read.*

How the purposes of "publication" led to the collecting of the Pauline letters, and then to the four-fold Gospel, and eventually the whole New Testament; how books were copied and published in the Greco-Roman world, and how growing Christianity took over the very latest improvements in the book-business, in the furtherance of the Gospel; how *literary* Christianity was from the start (in contrast to the mystery religions, for example), and how the Church has in almost every age fostered learning; how the great versions and editions of the Bible have been published, down to the present day—all this comes into the fascinating story Dr. Goodspeed tells in the present volume. It is brief, readable, and packed with information. His other books will be consulted for his special theories, e.g., the composition and purpose of Ephesians; here is a brilliant and persuasive introductory presentation.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Spirit and Its Freedom. By GEORGE F. THOMAS. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939. xii + 149 pp. $1.00.

In four chapters this book publishes the McNair Lectures given at the University of North Carolina by Dr. Thomas in 1938. The presentation is so smooth and pleasing that one is easily carried from point to point without close reckoning of what has been said. When one is finished, the criticism of historic conceptions has left a more definite impression than the positive argument. But just for this reason it seems desirable to focus now upon a brief résumé and critique of the author's own position.

The first chapter reviews the Platonic, Christian, and Hegelian conceptions of spirit, so as to indicate major contributions and limitations of each. Then, in the second chapter, on "The essence of spirit," after a brief appreciation of Max Scheler, Dr. Thomas pursues his own thought to the conclusion that spirit "is a distinctive activity of mind, able to transform life and to raise goodness to its own level." "Spirit is mind in so far as mind is directed toward ultimate reality and absolute value." And in sum, "Spirit is the creative activity by which persons apprehend universal truth and good with rational insight and serve men with love born of faith in their divine potentialities." This last statement begins the third chapter, on "Freedom and the Spirit," which after criticizing historic doctrines of freedom distinguishes spiritual freedom as "that which is achieved through devotion to universal truth and good." The inner fruits of peace and active self-unification, which this kind of freedom brings, are stressed at this point. But in the last chapter, on "Politics and the Spirit," Dr. Thomas claims a political role

for the spirit, first by polemic against legalists, political realists and empiricists, and then positively by maintaining that the "common good" of "real community" implies "moral responsibility touched by spiritual aspiration." This point is developed with particular reference to the ideals of democracy.

The discussion of historic doctrines is often excellent, and the list of thinkers criticized by Dr. Thomas includes, besides Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, also Aquinas, Scotus, Kant, Burke, Mill, Marx, Nietzsche, and among contemporaries, Berdyaev, Carritt, and G. E. Moore. Dr. Thomas finds particular support for certain features of his own position in arguments of T. H. Green, A. D. Lindsay and H. W. B. Joseph. Insisting that the universal good to which spirit is devoted is not "an abstract uniformity but a concrete system," he advances the usual Hegelian criticism against views that present only abstractions or isolated parts of this system. Unfortunately, it is painfully obvious that Dr. Thomas' own reference to universal good is abstract in the extreme. He scarcely enters into the problem of the organization of a concrete system of good at all, for instance, into the relation between "personal worth" and "super-personal ends." A treatment of political organization is not only lacking, but the subsumption of political freedom under "freedom of opportunity" (p. 103) makes it particularly difficult to guess what direction Dr. Thomas would take in this sphere. Instead of inquiring whether investigation of the organization of the psyche, as conducted in current psychology, throws any light upon the spirit and its freedom, Dr. Thomas only "wonders whether the Nietzschean theory has not permeated the thought of many psychoanalysts and social psychologists more deeply than they themselves realize." It comes as something of a shock to have one of the younger philosophers announce in our day that "the human spirit has taken more than two thousand years to obtain a full understanding of its freedom." There may be gratification in the collected and sane resistance shown in these lectures to the clamor of strident voices battling through recent decades. But this is overshadowed by disappointment at the apparent falling back in ease upon an agreeable formula.

H. L. F.

Their Future Is Now: The Growth and Development of Christian Personality. By Ernest M. Ligon. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. xv + 369 pp. $3.00.

Much of so-called modern religious education is vague in theory and trivial in practice. Here is a book on character development which offers a direct challenge to the leaders of Protestantism to make up their minds what they are doing with the children in Sunday school, and then go ahead and do it in such a clear-cut and definite way that their results can be examined and evaluated.

As goals for character education Professor Ligon proposes eight traits based on the Beatitudes, as he has interpreted them in a former volume, *The Psychology of Christian Personality*. These traits he calls (1) Vision—

Blessed are the poor in spirit; (2) Love of Righteousness and Truth—*Blessed are those that hunger and thirst after righteousness;* (3) Faith in the Friendliness of the Universe—*Blessed are the meek;* (4) Dominating purpose—*Blessed are the pure in heart;* (5) Being sensitive to the needs of others—*Blessed are they that mourn;* (6) Forgiveness—*Blessed are the merciful;* (7) Magnanimity—*Blessed are the peacemakers;* (8) Christian Courage—*Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake.* The first four are grouped under the heading, "Experimental Faith," and the last four under "Fatherly Love."

The plan for character development based on these eight traits involves a personality study of each individual in the Sunday school on the basis of a questionnaire to be answered independently by each parent and by the teacher. From the combined results of the ratings of parents and teacher a "character profile" of each child is to be constructed showing his special needs and aptitudes.

The method of character education which Dr. Ligon advocates he calls "drama type education." For little children this means practice with satisfaction in desirable social activities. For twelve-year-olds it involves a long time emphasis on certain Biblical incidents selected for their value in developing desired traits, with dramatic work in which each boy and girl can utilize his special aptitudes and also develop along needed lines. For high school and college students it involves extensive information on subjects vitally interesting to adolescents, and much provision for group discussion. In general, an activity program of social integration with wide use of community resources is warmly recommended.

All this is not purely theoretical. Far from it. This plan for creative religious education based on personality studies, worked out according to the eight traits suggested is actually being carried on in Westminster Church, Albany, New York, in close cooperation with Professor Ligon and his laboratory in Union College, Schenectady.

There can be no doubt that Dr. Ligon's volume is the most important book on character education in which religion finds a place which has come out for many years. It is extremely stimulating and thought provoking. Every chapter abounds in items of helpful information and in sound common sense. It is also open to criticism at many points. Do not the Beatitudes suffer considerable strain as they are treated here? Are these traits characteristic of individuals, or do they not vary in each individual according to time and place? Is not an individual's "style of living" simpler and more deeply emotional than would be indicated by this treatment? Is conventional religious education merely given a new dress and more to do; or is this really something new? If the Sunday schools do all that is suggested in this program, what will be left for the day schools? Is the Christian religion here regarded as merely instrumental for a good and successful life? How about the deeper reaches of Christian experience, the

adoration of Almighty God and the contemplation of his majesty? Would saintliness be developed by this kind of character education?

ADELAIDE CASE

For the Healing of the Nations. Impressions of Christianity around the World. By HENRY P. VAN DUSEN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. xx + 227 pp. $1.00.

Professor Van Dusen was a delegate to the meeting of the International Missionary Council which was held at Tambaram, near Madras, India, in December 1938. On his way to the Conference he and Mrs. Van Dusen made a prolonged journey which took them through the islands of the Pacific to New Zealand and Australia, to the Netherlands East Indies, to China both occupied and free, to Japan, and to India. On this journey Dr. Van Dusen made it a point to study missions. Never before had he made direct contact with them, and he had felt certain misgivings about them. These reservations he frankly states. As frankly he states how his observations brought him to the conclusion that his caveats had been unwarranted. He arrived at Madras an enthusiastic advocate of the Protestant foreign missionary enterprise. It was not that he believed that enterprise to be perfect, but its shortcomings seemed to him to be more than offset by its achievements.

At Madras Dr. Van Dusen met with leaders of the Protestant Christian forces the world around. What he saw at this conference led him to the conviction that Christianity is firmly planted outside the Occident in what are sometimes called the lands of the younger churches, and that here it has leadership both youthful and of striking ability. At Madras, he declares, "the universal church of Christ found concrete expression as never before in history." He goes on to place Madras in its setting in what has come to be known as the ecumenical Christian movement. He points out how, over a period of a number of decades, the Christian churches of the world have been coming together, and how this movement has been accelerated in the years since the first world war. The International Missionary Council, the World's Student Christian Federation, what are known, in brief, as "Life and Work" and "Faith and Order," and the nascent World Council of Churches, whose constitution was drafted in 1937 and is being ratified by an increasing number of churches, all are cited by him as evidence of a growing world-wide Christian movement. In this movement, he says, is "the only world-wide agency for the amelioration of basic human need and the furnishing of the essentials for true living of all mankind." He also declares that "for unnumbered millions of our humanity there is no slightest hope of release from disease, ignorance, and superstition save in the coming of Christianity amongst them."

The book is not meant for the scholar but for the average intelligent

reader. It is, however, by a scholar and commands respect for its candor and its intellectual honesty as well as for its clarity of statement.

K. S. LATOURETTE

The Seer's House. By ROBERT NELSON SPENCER. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. xii + 151 pp. $1.50.

The Bishop of Western Missouri is an able preacher and a writer with an apt and delightful style. These sermonic essays, full of literary illustrations skillfully blended into the text, are divided into three major divisions: Part I, "The Interpreter's House," based on Whittier's "Dear Lord and Father of Mankind"; Part II, "Where His Flock Rests at Noon"; Part III, "Speaking Good in His Name," based on selected psalms. It is difficult to summarize so rich a book. The emphasis is on peace, but it is peace through the facts and not peace by way of escape. "A crossroads," he writes, "is a place through which you may go upon a journey. If the road goes through hell, it may still lead up to heaven." Even the lilies do not provide illusion. "What perplexed Tennyson in the flower in the crannied wall, did not perplex Jesus in the flowers in a Galilean pasture." Lilies are not only beautiful, they also are useful. The Bishop recounts the story of a stag hunt, where the stag swims a river and runs across a field of lily-blooms, and the dogs lose the scent. The simple friendliness and informality of these chapters make the book interesting to the layman, and the preacher will find it a temptation to "lift" much of the material for his own use. The scholarship is sound, but, of course, the Prodigal Son does not appear in the "Old" Testament (p. 137). There is an index.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

Modern Man and the Cross. By JOHN C. SCHROEDER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. 168 pp. $1.50.

One of the chief values of any symbol is that it can have a variety of meanings. The cross, as the central symbol of nineteen hundred years of Christian history, has represented the heart of the Christian message. Thus, as the thinking has shifted, so has the meaning of the cross. However, there is a core of truth in Christianity that, although stated in different ways, has retained its essential meaning for every generation. Dr. Schroeder is concerned with a restatement of this truth which is the basic philosophy of Christianity.

It is not often that good theology is written in homiletical style. This author, who is the Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology at Yale Divinity School, has the all too rare gift of combining clear thinking with vivid and vigorous statement. His book is fine theology and superb preaching. The continuity of the chapters is rather tenuous, leading one to suppose that it might originally have been a series of sermons on the meaning of the cross. Certainly there is material here for a fine series. The cross is

considered from ten different points of view: as a symbol, as an event in the lives of good men, in man's history, in the heart of God; in its relationship to human personality, human goodness, the church, man's wisdom, the evil men do, and man's salvation.

This is American liberalism at its best. It faces life realistically, and yet unafraid. There is no easy and false optimism here, but the optimism of the prophet who can see victory "beyond tragedy" because of the fact of God. The cross is God's guarantee of ultimate victory. Although this symbol may seem, to the one outside the Christian tradition, to be merely a factual representation of a tragedy that once occurred on earth, Dr. Schroeder is reiterating the thing that Christianity has always affirmed—that the cross has cosmic relevance. The cross is a symbol for sacrifice, and the necessity for sacrifice is at the very heart of life. Nothing else is adequate. Goodness, wisdom, and high attainment all fall short of the goal until there is an element of sacrifice. This goes so deeply into life that it is a part of the nature of God. Thus the cross is in "the heart of God." It is also a revelation of the nature of man and offers man his only hope of salvation from himself. Perhaps the entire argument can be summed up by saying that the cross is a symbol of the price God paid for man, and it represents the price that man must pay to fulfill his own destiny.

This book makes no distinctive contribution to the field of theology, but it is an honest and realistic interpretation of the message of Christianity to the world. As such it will be widely read and appreciated.

WILFRED I. ORR

Philosophy of the State. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XV. The Office of the Secretary of the Association, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1940. 291 pp.

One would expect that a discussion of the philosophy of the state carried on in the U. S. in the year 1939 would center on the problem of the nature of totalitarianism and the restatement of the theory of democracy in the light of its challenge. We are not disappointed on this score in this volume of papers. Although some of the papers go over the old ground, attempting to show that all political thought and action are determined by the metaphysics and theology on which they are based, a few of the papers furnish us with a careful consideration of the problems which concern us now. Especially worthy of notice are the papers of W. Gurian, "The Philosophy of the Totalitarian State," and M. Adler, "In Terms of What Moral Principles is Democracy the Best Government?"

Gurian denies the assumption that totalitarianism is the only alternative to democracy. The existence of other alternatives makes it necessary to describe the totalitarian state positively. He finds it characterized by a one-party system, a missionary attitude, use of propaganda, and the complete concentration of power at one point. There are non-democratic states of which none of these is true. After considering the causes of the rise of the

totalitarian state—reaction against relativism, scepticism, and historicism; dissolution of the old individualism; the need for a new religion in the light of the results of technical progress—Gurian discusses briefly the Catholic position. Here he takes a stand similar to that of other contributors to this volume. Totalitarianism is inadequate because it fails to recognize "natural law" and because of the fact that the state is not a final end, but a proximate end with God as its final end. God is not in the state but beyond it.

Adler's paper is an outline of a formal proof that democracy is the best government and the only true state. On the basis of three principles—aiming at the common good, constitutionalism, and universal suffrage—he compares the various forms of government and shows that democracy, since it alone recognizes all three criteria, is the only true state in the strict sense of the term. Although his discussion is merely formal, and though he neglects the problem of freedom which must be crucial in any account of democracy today, Adler is to be commended for realizing that aiming at the common good is no sufficient criterion for a democratic state. That he makes it the criterion of the "good state" indicates that he has chosen to neglect the problems that are involved in (1) who is to determine whether the government aims at the common good, and (2) the empirical definition of that slippery phrase.

In a paper on the corporative state, J. Cook, in surveying the views of this school of Catholic political thought, develops a theory of the state similar to Guild Socialism. The central difference is that here function determines *status*, and, by this device, the problem of functional democracy is avoided.

HENRY M. MAGID

The Seeley Wintersmith Mudd Foundation Special Collection in the Hoose Library of Philosophy, School of Philosophy. Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1940. 39 pp.

This catalogue of recent acquisitions and previous purchases of unusual interest in the Seeley Wintersmith Mudd Collection begins with an historical statement concerning the inception of the Hoose Library of Philosophy, in 1924, under the direction of Professor R. T. Flewelling, and its policy of selection. The most recent addition to the Mudd Collection, here briefly catalogued (pp. 7-13), is composed of 3,200 volumes acquired from a private library in Vienna. It is an unusually complete collection of works by English, French, and German philosophers from about 1700 to 1850, including collected works of many of these philosophers and numerous first editions. The remaining pages of the catalogue list other important items in the Mudd Collection under the headings: Manuscripts, Incunabula, Other Rarities, Association Books, and Special Reference Sets.

EMERSON BUCHANAN

The Shadow of Atlantis. By ALEXANDRE BRAGHINE. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1940. 288 pp. 25 illustrations. $3.50.

A summary of the various theories of a new branch of prehistoric archeology, "atlantology," the literature of which now consists of more than 25,000 volumes. Col. Braghine brings together evidence from history, literature, archeology, anthropology, and geology in his attempt to solve the problem of Atlantis.

Wir Juden. By HANS SIMON. Tel-Aviv, Palestine: Verlag Joachim Goldstein, 1940. 16 pp. 30 mils.

A plea for the spiritualization of the Palestinian Jew.

The Modern Use of the Bible. By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. 291 pp. $1.00.

A second edition, issued in new format, of Dr. Fosdick's popular manual of biblical instruction.

Teaching in the Church School. By FRANCES COLE MCLESTER. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1940. 160 pp. $.60.

—*And the Other Mary: Faith's Victory Over Death.* By P. G. S. Hopwood. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1940. 122 pp. $1.25.

A glimpse of the life eternal, as seen by a pastor through the eyes of a dying girl.

The Old Fashioned Revival Hour and the Broadcasters. By J. ELWIN WRIGHT. Boston: Fellowship Press, 1940. 254 pp. $1.00.

The most modern phase of Christian Fundamentalism—revivalism on the air.

A Laymen's Guide to Churchmanship. By IRA ABBOTT MORTON. Denver, Colo., 1940 iv + 21 pp. $.25.

Snowden's Sunday School Lessons, 1941. By EARL L. DOUGLASS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. xiv + 370 pp. $1.50.

Practical expositions of the International Sunday School Lessons, with hints to teachers for effective methods of presentation.

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